Positioning NATO towards radical Islam

Trump has gotten many things right about the war on terror - one of these is his vision to have NATO direct its policies away from antagonising Russia and towards dealing with radical Islam.

Russia represents no threat to the USA - actually she represents a great asset for America. This is especially true in Syria. In Syria, Trump now has the option of withdrawing from the conflict altogether to let Russia and the Syrian government deal with ISIS and radical Islam there.

But radical Islam represents a sizeable and paramount threat to the USA. Since 9-11, the United States has not achieved even one notable victory in the war on terror. Even the capture of Osama Bin Laden was not a notable victory, because in Bin Laden's place is now Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, who is more extreme than Osama Bin Laden.

Capturing Bin Laden has only resulted in a further radicalisation caused by - you guessed it - Obama's policies in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Instead of Bin Laden's execution resulting in a breaking up of Al-Qaeda to decrease radicalisation, the capture of Bin Laden gave Obama the excuse to overthrow Libyan president Gidaffi, greatly increasing Al-Qaeda and ISIS networks there. Obama also funded Iraq's worst enemy in Syria while withdrawing from Iraq, which is tantamount to betrayal by the Obama Administration.

Trump's policies are likely to materialize into some of the greatest victories in the war on terror that we have yet seen - this is especially true if he repositions NATO in that direction.

To reposition NATO towards fighting radical Islam is likely to start in Libya, where NATO was last used. Under Obama and Hillary Clinton, NATO was used wrongly in support of radical Islamic terrorists seeking to overthrow Libyan President Gidaffi. Rather than land in Libya and have America bear all the costs, Trump is likely to use NATO to install Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya as the dictator there. This will result in a victory on the war on terror.

A greater victory on the war on terror than a Libya War is currently being accomplished in Syria under Russia. When Russia succeeds in stabilizing Syria - when, not if - Trump will need larger victories to compete. One such victory could be accomplished in Iraq.

In Iraq, whether America will attack ISIS on its own or whether Trump will use NATO is difficult to know for sure. Yet the only way to create a lasting victory in Iraq would be to up oil exports there over and above oil exports in Iran and Saudi Arabia, two known funders of radical Islamic terrorism.

In this second Iraq War (2014 - present), it would make sense for Trump to utilize NATO to protect oil fields in Iraq from lone wolf attacks. Increasing exports between NATO countries and Iraq would only be accomplished should the Iraqi oil fields remain protected. Trump has vowed complete energy independence from the world - an increase in oil exports between NATO countries and Iraq would be hugely beneficial to both parties without compromising Trump's promise for American energy independence.

In Afghanistan, it is harder to know for sure what Trump will do. Should he sit tight? Or should he withdraw? The only way to create a sizable victory in the Afghan War would be for temporary withdrawal from Afghanistan, a focus on Libya and Iraq, then a return to Afghanistan - from the air - once the situation has more seriously deteriorated. This would give the Afghanis an opportunity to form for themselves a government devoid of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban - but only after they see the Taliban firsthand without an American presence on the ground.

In short, Trump's victories on the war on terror are likely to be substantial. At the very least, I anticipate Trump policy to stabilize Syria, Iraq and Libya, which will decrease radical Islam's vice grip over the region.

Islamic State after ISIS

Trump's policies are set to destroy ISIS for good in Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic State is set to remain in the Middle-East.

ISIS and the Islamic State are one and the same organisation - the difference is in the wording. ISIS is the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria', which Trump has vowed to completely destroy. Because Assad will remain; because Trump will push up Iraq's oil exports to stabilize the country, the only place in which the Islamic State will be able to expand in the immediate future is Saudi Arabia.

The northern tribes of Saudi Arabia are, unfortunately, the same as those in eastern Syria and western Iraq, the base of support for the Islamic State. This is where the Islamic State is likely to begin its expansion.

But it will not end there. As well as northern Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State will be able to expand into the east, Al-Ahsa, where the Saudi Shi'ites are. The Islamic State would likely unleash an anger - a collective anger of the Sunni Muslims at the Shi'ites who defeated them in Syria and Iraq - unleash an anger directed at the Saudi Shi'ites and resulting in a tearing of the fabric in the eastern province.

Such violence would, eventually, spill into Kuwait and Bahrain as well. The results are likely genocide and mass emigration by the Shi'ites from the Gulf.

As well as the northern and eastern provinces, the Islamic State is likely to make its way into the region of Najd, the central region of the Islamic State's ideology. Here the battle will be most bitterly fought between two sides who believe they better reflect the doctrines of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Qaseem would likely fall to the Islamic State; Riyadh might fall, but that is harder to know for sure.

Should Mohammed Bin Salman remain the dominant figure of Saudi Arabia, Islamic State will be able to win over many of the tribes in Saudi Arabia and cause the Saud royal family to be living in existential crisis.

Should Mohammed Bin Nayef become more dominant than his cousin, there is a chance the Saudi kingdom would survive. While there are those who hate the Saudi government, Islamic State controlling Mecca and Medina is a very bad idea for the world.

The only feasible way someone like Mohammed Bin Nayef could save the kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be to ally with the lesser of two evils - namely, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. One almost wonders if that was the reason for King Salman waging the Yemen War in the first place: to train up the Saudi military and to stretch out a hand in alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of the Islamic State.

While Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula gaining dominance in Saudi Arabia is a threat to the kingdom, it is nowhere near as potent a threat as that of the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda, while condemning the Saud royal family, has on more than one occasion opened its hand in alliance with the kingdom, most notably during the Iraq-Kuwait War on 1990, in which Saudi Arabia rejected an alliance with Al-Qaeda in favour of the Americans.

Such alliance is Saudi Arabia's hope. After victory over the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would return Saudi Arabia to a sort of Islamic legitimacy, forcing the kingdom to cleanse itself of several policies which undermine it as bearer of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina. Those policies include breaking their previous alliance with America and Israel, as well as a focus on defeating America and Israel over and above the current focus on defeating Iran, something the Islamic State and Saudi Arabia currently share in common.

In the mean time, before a Saudi-Al-Qaeda victory over Islamic State could be achieved, it is to be expected that many of the smaller Gulf kingdoms would be destroyed by the Islamic State. These include Kuwait and Bahrain, previously mentioned; these also include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, where Dubai is located.

The Islamic State re-declaring itself as a Caliphate from its capital in Dubai is a frightening and distinct possibility.

The best thing President-elect Donald Trump could do in the face of such a conflict is minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East. Making Iraq one of America's top Arab allies is a step in the right direction - should the Trump Administration stabilize and wholeheartedly ally with Iraq, the Islamic State would be unable to expand back into its previous support network.

The other way Trump could minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East would be to minimize ties with Saudi Arabia, as he seems keen to do. The other way would be to withdraw support for Saudi's war on Yemen and even withdraw from bombing Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is going to need Al-Qaeda's help to defeat the Islamic State.

Staying neutral in the Saudi war is essential for Trump's withdrawal policies from the Middle-East to succeed. Should he get sucked into that conflict, it would only be exacerbated and increase the likelihood of the Saudi government falling.

Obama bombing more countries than Bush?!

Obama and Bush were both Establishment Presidents.

Of course Obama did some things that many Establishment Presidents would not do - namely, withdraw from Iraq (2011); the Iran Nuclear Deal (2015); not overthrow the Syrian Government (2011 - 2016) - in spite of this, Obama has, like Bush, agreed with the ideology of regime change.

Herein lies Obama's problem in foreign policy. Regime change is the biggest cause for increase in terrorism - we saw this after Bush invaded Iraq in 2003. The lessons from Bush's Iraq War have not been learnt by Obama in Yemen, Libya and Syria. And this is unacceptable.

For Yemen, Libya and Syria are the 3 additional conflicts Obama is bombing, added to Bush's bombing of 4 countries - namely, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. These 3 additional conflicts are, in essence, being bombed because the dominant powers in those countries run counter or ran counter to United States' interest.

In Yemen, the Houthis threaten to rip Yemen from Saudi Arabia's vice grip. The Houthis threaten the Al-Qaeda stronghold in Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, this is unacceptable, and America is assisting Saudi's war on Yemen, while also continuing drone strikes in the country against Al-Qaeda - which, I might add, help more than hinder Al-Qaeda's recruitment there.

In Libya, Moammar Al-Gidaffi had been on America's list of regime change for decades. The Arab Spring provided the Obama Administration with an opportunity for regime change there, overthrowing Gidaffi and replacing him with squabbling militias.

From these squabbling militias ISIS made its footprint in Derna and more recently in Sirte. The Obama Administration decided that bombing ISIS in Libya was a great idea, though had Gidaffi never been removed in the first place, ISIS would not exist in Libya. Again, Obama's campaign against ISIS in Libya helps more than hinders the spread of terrorism in Libya.

Syria is worst of the 3. To Obama's credit, he did not remove Bashar Al-Assad, but he still funded rebels, the majority of whom have more in common with ISIS than America. Now he is involved in an ISIS campaign that would not have existed in Syria had he but stayed out of Syria and not supported the rebels there.

Thankfully, Obama's ISIS campaign in Syria has not been helping recruitment there - it has been genuinely helpful in eradicating terrorism from Syria.


In the Trump Administration, expect a lot more productive intervention in the majority of the 7 countries the United States is currently bombing. Expect Trump to end the conflict in Syria by ending Obama's policy of 'Assad must go' and of funding Syrian rebels. Expect Trump to end much of the conflict in Iraq by 'taking their oil' (namely, increasing oil relations with Iraq over and above Saudi Arabia and Iran, to economically benefit Iraq). Expect Trump to install dictator Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, ending militias squabbling and restoring stability there.

Expect also Trump to withdraw from Afghanistan. It is true that America would likely return to Afghanistan 3 - 5 years after withdrawal, but Trump understands that spending much longer in Afghanistan is wasted effort. There are more immediate battles in the war on terror that require US' attention than Afghanistan.

Sadly, it is unlikely Trump would stop American bombings in Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen. Yet the ending of 3 - 4 conflicts in the Middle-East would greatly improve America's standing in the region.

Are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about to ally with China?

Trump's plans for the Middle-East represent significant problems for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.


For Saudi Arabia, the shrinking of Sunni-dominance in Iraq and Syria by the Trump Administration represents an existential threat to the Saudi kingdom.

Trump willing to work with Bashar Al-Assad against ISIS in Syria is one thing, but Trump's plan to increase relations with Iraq is another, a policy which threatens to unhinge Saudi Arabia from the American sphere of influence.

There are two options for Saudi Arabia. One is increased relations with China - the other is increased relations with the European Union. And Saudi Arabia is likely to make the most of both opportunities.

The European Union is from a political sphere of influence that runs counter to the 'New Nationalism' of Putin, Trump and Brexit. To ally more closely with the European Union makes logical sense for Saudi Arabia, as the European Union's views of immigration, Assad and Iran are not dissimilar with the conservative kingdom's own views.

China, though not a fan of Islamism, would share benefit from allying more closely with Saudi Arabia regarding oil. With Trump set to 'take their [Iraqi] oil,' (namely increase American oil relations with Iraq) previous oil deals between China and Iraq would be decreased substantially. Previous oil deals between America and Saudi Arabia would also be decreased substantially.

While Iran would provide some oil, it would not be enough for the gigantic Asian power. China would perhaps be able to move into America's shoes in Saudi Arabia, dominating much of the Arabian Gulf and being the largest importer of Saudi oil.

China, like Russia and Trump's America, benefits from a stable Middle-East. With Russia set to stabilize Syria and Trump to stabilize Iraq, China would perhaps be able to show its force in stabilizing what is likely to be an unstable Saudi Arabia.

This likelihood is increased by a further strengthening of Pakistani-Chinese relations under a Trump Administration.


Pakistan has similar threats from Trump as Saudi Arabia, though not as immediate. Trump, likely to withdraw from Afghanistan after solidly smashing the Taliban in 2017, would after 3 - 5 years return to fix an even more unstable Afghanistan. The reason for Trump's likely withdrawal is two-fold: first, the war on terror has other priority battlegrounds which need dealing with first, namely in Syria, Iraq and Libya; second, American public opinion no longer supports the Afghan war as it once did.

If Trump can show he wishes to rebuild American infrastructure and deal successfully with the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya, American public is unlikely to hold him as accountable for a worse Afghanistan. Namely, if Afghanistan explodes before the 2020 elections, it would unlikely affect Trump's popularity should America, Syria, Iraq and Libya recover.

Trump has said that his problem with the Afghan War is mainly Pakistan over Afghanistan. Trumps sees that Pakistan deliberately destabilizes Afghanistan through an increase in terrorism there. Trump would likely have an unfavourable policy towards Pakistan in order to stabilize Afghanistan. This would likely drive Pakistan more fully into China's embrace.

Pakistani-Chinese relations are currently good, and are only set to improve under a Trump Administration. With Trump able to stabilize Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan as an ally, it couldn't be a better deal for the American people, and couldn't be a better example of Trump foreign policy.

the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda

I predict that Trump will do more to end the war on terror than Bush and Obama put together.

In light of this, what is the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda?

Those who have read my previous posts would note that ISIS and Al-Qaeda are both about to suffer the worst defeats in their histories in Syria at the hands of Russia. Russia has fought an historic 'Iraq War in reverse,' which has greatly reversed the tide of radical Islamism in Syria.

With Trump agreeing - rightly so, might I add - to the direction and implication of Russian intervention in Syria, Al-Qaeda and ISIS are unlikely to have a substantial presence in Syria. Assad is the ultimate antidote to radical Islam in Syria.

Previously I have stated that ISIS, getting routed in Sirte, would not disappear forever in Libya. But Trump's likely plan of installing Haftar Al-Khalifa as the Libyan dictator would cause ISIS and Al-Qaeda to both be substantially weakened in North Africa as well.

But what of Iraq? Iraq depends very much on what Trump means to do there. If Trump 'takes their oil,' as he said he would in his campaign, Iraq would stabilize. (It should be noted here that in Trump language, 'take their oil' means increasing oil relations with Iraq. This would definitely stabilize Iraq substantially.)

If Trump wages war on the Iranian elements of the Iraqi government, Trump is doomed to failure. The best thing Trump can do - and his likely policy, might I add - is increase the use of American soft-power in Iraq to stabilize it, not change the regime there.

In the interim, as Iraq recovers, ISIS would still have a foothold in the country. They would try and destabilize Iraq - depending on how Trump reacts to it would depend on whether or not Iraq stabilizes.

With ISIS virtually non-existent in Syria and weakened in Iraq, it would have a different goal: provoking civil war in Saudi Arabia.

Scarily, ISIS has perhaps the perfect platform from which to destabilize Saudi Arabia. ISIS borders Saudi Arabia in Iraq; ISIS sleeper cells are already established in the northern provinces of Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia is preoccupied by a fruitless war in Yemen; the Saudi economy is currently weaker than in decades; and to top it all off, Mohammed Bin Salman is the perfect candidate for America's dupe, the personification of American influence in Saudi Arabia.

ISIS' future is sealed, forcing the world into a no-win situation. If ISIS is left unchecked in Iraq and Syria, it would destroy 2 beautiful countries and their minorities, and threaten the stability of neighbouring countries. But if ISIS is destroyed in Syria and Iraq, Iran looks the winner to the Arabs, causing Saudis and other Gulf countries to rally to ISIS' call and bitterly fight their governments.

But the second option is preferable. It's the option Russia and America have chosen in Putin and Trump. ISIS' new target after Iraq and Syria is, of course, Saudi Arabia, which it may even succeed in obtaining.

But what of Al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda is likely to have a resurgence. With its complete destruction in Syria and Libya, Al-Qaeda would invest more heavily in Yemen, giving Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) priority in funding. AQAP needs only for Yemen to go into famine in order to drastically increase appeal in Yemen. It already has much appeal in that it is not as barbaric or cruel as ISIS - if it continues its powerful soft-power policies, AQAP would exponentially grow in power in Yemen as Al-Qaeda crumbles in Libya and Syria.

Trump is unlikely to wage war against Saudi interests in Yemen. Like Obama, Trump would quietly support Saudi's war in Yemen, even should it cause Al-Qaeda to grow substantially in Yemen.

Not only would Al-Qaeda resurge in Yemen, but in Afghanistan as well. With Trump planning on withdrawing from Afghanistan - which, I might add, should have been done by Obama after the death of Osama Bin Laden - America would be set to return there in 3 - 5 years.

Trump would not make the mistake Obama did. Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Obama did almost exactly that in Iraq and Syria: he withdrew from Iraq while funding 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' in Syria, giving us ISIS.

Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Instead, Trump would withdraw from Afghanistan as Obama should have withdrawn from Iraq: Trump would not fund extremism next door.

But the Taliban would still resurge in Afghanistan after 3 - 5 years of troop withdrawal - not only so, but with a lack of places for Islamists to wage jihad under a Trump Administration (no longer able to in Iraq, Syria or Libya), foreign fighters would fight in Afghanistan instead. A resurgent Al-Qaeda is likely to fight on the Taliban's side in Afghanistan after America leaves.

But at the moment, radical Islam is widespread across Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan. A reduction in terror safe havens would of course benefit the Middle-East and decrease terrorism in the region.

But in place of unstable Syria, Iraq and Libya would be a more unstable Yemen and Afghanistan, benefitting Al-Qaeda's vision immensely in the region.

Even worse is when Saudi Arabia implodes. When Saudi Arabia implodes, all other previously known conflicts in recent memory will pale in comparison. We will see sights of blood we have not seen since the days of World War 2. You think the current Iraqi-Syrian conflict is bad? The Saudi conflict will be much, much worse, and ISIS in Saudi Arabia will reach new pits of depravity yet unseen in our generation.

Trump's Foreign Policy PART TWO

In my earlier post, "Trump's Foreign Policy," I suggested that Trump might install a dictator in Afghanistan and play the waiting game in Libya.

I wish to take it back and say the opposite: that Trump might install a dictator in Libya and play the waiting game in Afghanistan.

The Afghan War is the longest and one of the most unpopular wars in American memory. To spend much longer in Afghanistan would make Trump more unpopular. Since his foreign policy motto is to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability," he is likely to stabilize other countries first before trying to stabilize Afghanistan.

In any case, an exploding Afghanistan (caused by American troop removal) represents a much smaller regional threat to American assets than does an exploding Iraq, Syria or Libya.

Rather than stabilizing Afghanistan, it seems more likely that Trump, Russia and Iran would stabilize Syria by letting the legitimate Assad government remain to destroy ISIS. Though Assad victory in Syria strengthens Iran, Iran would be faced with an unstable Afghanistan on its eastern border. Such instability would only increase once America left, and would be a valuable bargaining chip for Trump against Iran.

As well as this, Trump would, in his words, "bomb the hell out of ISIS" in Iraq and Syria and "take their [Iraqi] oil." In Trump language this means destroy ISIS and increase oil relations with Iraq instead of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In Libya Trump has a valuable opportunity to cast himself as having a blueprint for American foreign policy. Comparatively, there has not been as much time in Libya since intervention (2011), compared to Afghanistan (2001) which again makes it easier to stabilize Libya over Afghanistan.

Unlike Afghanistan, in Libya there is already a potential dictator fighting on the ground: Haftar Al-Khalifa. All Trump would have to do is scrap the "Unity Government of National Salvation" (which has no power anyway) and give power back to the previously legitimate Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa. Trump supporting the Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa would likely stabilize Libya drastically.

Libya represents a large threat to the stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Trump stabilizing Libya would increase relations substantially between America and those countries.

An unstable Afghanistan represents a threat to stability for Pakistan and Iran in particular, which is also better for America. Iran is anti-American, so a threat to their stability is in America's interest. A threat to Pakistan forces Pakistan to rely more heavily on America. This is good considering Pakistan is one country that does - but should not have - nuclear weapons.


The negative behind America leaving Afghanistan would be a more radical Taliban emerging in 3 - 5 years. This, together with increased Al-Qaeda strength in Yemen, would put Al-Qaeda back on the map. Yet, like Iraq, it's what the American people are willing to accept for the price of getting out of the war.

A post-war unstable Afghanistan would only strengthen how Trump would look to the American people. The American people would be able to compare Trump's results in a stable Iraq, Syria and Libya with those of Obama and Bush, seen visibly in a continually deteriorating Afghanistan.


Such might increase Trump's popularity, causing him to come back for a second Presidential term and finish the war in Afghanistan for good, by installing a dictator on top. Then America would truly be out of the "nation-building business" and stability would return to those regions of the Middle-East.

Yemen: the next Islamic State

Taken from the 21st of August, 2015

For the past 5 months, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in the attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemeni Civil War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both Hadi’s forces and the Shi’ite Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of the Yemeni civil war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War, AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi airstrikes on the Houthi rebels. And like ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Though not directly supported by the United States, ISIS did help achieve America’s objectives in Syria by weakening the Assad government and, until the group invaded Iraq, was mostly left alone by the United States. The terror group, which has since taken over half of Syria and over a quarter of Iraq, claims to be a Caliphate, owing the allegiance of all Muslims, and asks all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Likewise, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been directly supported through Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Yet the result of Saudi’s airstrikes has been the emergence of AQAP as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP will attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes AQAP are working with have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an allegiance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aims in establishing a caliphate.

In Yemen, the largest non-governmental force pitted against the Houthis is the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement seeks to break unity with Northern Yemen and return Yemen to two states. As of now, Hadi’s forces and the Southern Movement are working together to defeat the Houthis. However, once the Houthis are no longer a threat to Southern Yemen, the Southern Movement is likely to fight the Hadi government for independence. Alone, it is unlikely the Southern Movement would succeed. However, were AQAP to join the Southern Movement on their endeavour, independence would become more likely. AQAP would, subsequently, establish a vice grip over the region, and cause the Southern Movement to be indebted to the group.

ISIS, on the other hand, is unlikely to develop much presence in Yemen. They will likely continue their bombings of Zaidi mosques in Yemen, and possibly establish a temporary foothold in Sunni Northern Yemen.

But AQAP is likely to desire to expand its influence, and there is a clever way in which AQAP could do this while still supporting the Southern Movement:

AQAP could claim parts of Sunni Northern Yemen as belonging to Southern Yemen.

Along the west coast of Northern Yemen there are a number of Sunni regions which could be coaxed to the side of both the Southern Movement and AQAP. This could mean the end not only of Yemen as a whole, but of any chance of Houthi or Hadi dominance in the foreseeable future, which is exactly what AQAP wants.

In this case, AQAP would not even need to invade Sana’a to control Yemen; all they would need would be to take the Sunni regions from Northern Yemen to weaken Hadi and Houthi influence. Then, for the first time in many years, Southern Yemen would prevail as stronger than Northern Yemen.

The unfortunate thing is that, like ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and like the Taliban in Afghanistan, America is unlikely to realise the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group may be heading for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. As ISIS grows stronger in Syria and Iraq, it is likely to turn more of its attention to Saudi Arabia. If ISIS invades Saudi Arabia from the north, AQAP might take advantage of the instability and launch an invasion from the south. If that happens, there will be little America can do to save the region.

Trump Is President. What's Next?

Well, Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States of America. What stands as next for the Middle-East?


It would be naive to think that a Trump Presidency would not be at least slightly hawkish. The Obama Administration is currently involved in 3 major conflicts: the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS, the Afghan War and the Libyan War on ISIS. I wish to provide the likely direction for each of them.

1) the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS

It will be swift and quick. In Syria, Trump will either cooperate with Russia or withdraw from Syria and let Russia defeat ISIS. The first seems more likely, as Trump would likely want himself seen as making "great deals," and one of those great deals would be to destroy ISIS in Syria and restore better relations with Russia. Both of these objectives would be achieved with Trump's plan: Assad's army is the largest capable fighting force against ISIS, and Russia, Syria and Trump would all benefit from an ISIS defeat at the hands of Assad.

In Iraq, the fight may be equally swift, but how Trump acts after defeating ISIS in Iraq will be telling. Trump's idea for "safe zones" in Syria funded by Turkey and the Gulf States is a long shot - a very long shot. However, safe zones in Iraq would be something that Turkey and the Gulf States would be - perhaps - more comfortable with.


Unless incredibly hawkish, Trump is likely to use some "soft-power" policies to increase Iraq's stability. One such would be the increased trade of oil between Iraq and America - such increased trade could benefit both Iraq's economy and America's. Trump has talked about "taking Iraqi oil," but in Trump language that means increasing oil trade with Iraq. He has also said he would not take Saudi oil if they refused to comply with his ISIS' strategy. Trump's "soft power" Iraqi oil policy would also benefit America should Saudi Arabia destabilize. (More about the destabilization of Saudi Arabia later).

If not "soft-power" policies, Trump might arrange for a Turkish guardianship of Iraq should the country destabilize again. This would mean that the Trump Administration would not have to return to Iraq, and Turkey would be sucked into the conflict instead.

2) the Afghan War

Like Obama in Iraq, Trump seems likely to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. This might be preceded by a solid smashing of the Taliban before they go, but other than that, there is no immediate desire to recreate the political fabric of Afghanistan for the third time in 40 years.

And, like Iraq, this would cause a massive problem of instability for Afghanistan within 3 - 5 years of American withdrawal. Perhaps a resurgent Taliban would emerge - perhaps ISIS - or perhaps, as I believe most likely, something even worse.

This would give Trump a chance to return to Afghanistan and smash out whatever terrorist organisation had taken root in the country, but to do so from only the skies, as Obama did in Iraq. With more American public support for the war, he would likely then try and work out how to install a dictator in Afghanistan, as dictatorship is the only likely alternative to more terrorism growing in the region.

3) the Libyan War on ISIS

In the beginning, Trump would not do a lot - he would want to see how his plan to defeat ISIS plays out in Syria and Iraq first. Yet Trump would work out, rather quickly, that Haftar Al-Khalifa is his best shot at a stable Libya. He would then use Al-Khalifa to flatten ISIS in the region, as well as the pockets of Islamist militias who are of the same mind as ISIS.

Like Iraq, Trump would likely increase oil production from Libya, to get America further and further away from Saudi oil. That, coupled together with a dictatorship under Haftar Al-Khalifa, gives Trump one of the best shots at an "American first" military victory.


I would also like to take the time to mention Yemen and Saudi Arabia, briefly.

4) Yemen.

It seems unlikely Trump would get involved in the Yemeni-Saudi conflict at all, save do what the Obama Administration is doing already: supply arms to Saudi Arabia in bombing Yemenis.

Of course this would only increase Al-Qaeda's power in Yemen. Trump may turn a blind eye to the Yemeni conflict for a time as he deals with ISIS, getting America out of Afghanistan and instability in Libya, but eventually Al-Qaeda will become too strong in Yemen to ignore.

This, so it seems to me, would lead Trump not to directly fight in Yemen, but to get another world power involved in fighting this sensitive war. Perhaps Russia, perhaps Britain - but it would be a war fought against Al-Qaeda, benefitting the Houthis and outraging Saudi Arabia.

5) Saudi Arabia

Trump's policies are nothing short of disastrous for Saudi Arabia. If Trump does as he has said he would, Syria would remain an ally of Iran, Iraqi-American relations would increase (benefitting the Shi'ite government in Iraq - remember Saudi is Sunni and Sunnis don't like Shi'ites) and with both Libya and Iraq supplying America with oil - together with America's own fracking, oil industries going up under a Trump Administration - Saudi economy would look less and less certain, as America would have far less need for cheap Saudi oil.

(Trump's Afghanistan has a silver lining for Saudi Arabia, as does Trump's non-intervention in Yemen, but these are lesser conflicts compared to Syria and Iraq in particular, both which Saudi would gain nothing from.)

This would make it perfect for internal explosion and chaos. With terrorism decreased in Iraq, Syria and Libya as a result of Trump policy, the increase would happen elsewhere: namely Yemen, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

It is hard to know what a Trump Administration would do were civil war to break out between terrorists and Saudis. On the one hand, a terrorist takeover of Saudi Arabia would legitimize Trump's war on terror in one way, increase relations between many Arab countries and Israel (as these countries would look for security against a terrorist-controlled Saudi Arabia), and on the other hand, having Mecca and Medina in the hand of terrorists explodes legitimacy for them, which is a huge blow to the war on terror in another way.

The likely idea is that Trump would keep the war going as long as possible between Saudi Arabia and the terrorists, as Obama did in Syria.



Anyway, only one way to know for certain: watch as the drama unfolds in 3 months' time.

If Assad wins the Syrian Civil War

As the Syrian Government’s forces, backed by the Russian air force, enter into Aleppo, it looks as if the bloody conflict of the Syrian Civil War may finally reach its end.

This article is to take a glimpse at what would happen in the Middle-East – and abroad – should Assad win the Syrian Civil War.

Christianity would survive in the Middle-East. Linked with the Syrian Government are the sizeable Christian minorities that support it – if the current Government survives the war, Christians would not have to find a home in the West, but would be able to stay in the heart of the Middle-East. Compared to Iraq, where Christians are being genocided by ISIS in Nineveh, this would be one of the major positives for an Assad victory.

Iran would be a power-house in the Middle-East. For Iran, consolidating control over Syria through the Assad Government would ensure that Iranian dominance in Palestine and Lebanon would continue unabated. Such dominance would worry both Israel and Saudi Arabia and likely strengthen their ties to each other, benefitting Israel.

The Kurds would have a chance at forming their own government. With Iraq and Syria both ransacked by war, the Kurds in each respective country would have a chance at creating an autonomous region ruled by neither government. An Iraqi-Syrian Kurdistan would greatly benefit Israel.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS would suffer horrific defeats. Were the Assad Government to regain control of all their Arab regions, ISIS and Al-Qaeda would end up completely driven from the country. This would be a major win against Sunni terrorism and an international benefit for an Assad victory.

The Wars in Libya and Yemen would intensify. For America, both the Libyan and Yemeni conflicts have been largely off the radar, compared with the Iraqi-Syrian conflict (2014 – current) in which ISIS has been able to flourish. Libya and Yemen would see a spike in violence caused by funders of Al-Qaeda and ISIS no longer able to fund terrorism in Syria.

In Libya it is difficult to tell whether ISIS or Al-Qaeda would benefit more, yet in Yemen the benefactor is clear. Over the course of the Yemeni Civil War (2015 – current), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has seen an exponential increase in support comparable to the rise of ISIS over the course of the Iraq War (2003 – 2011). With the defeat of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would see an even larger growth in funding and support, to the detriment of anti-terrorism in the region.

In Libya, to have success over Al-Qaeda, ISIS would have to become localized as they have been in Iraq and Syria, and they would also need a large enemy for Libyans to focus on. If ISIS could rebrand themselves as the protectors of Islam and the Libyan people, they may have more success than they have had in Derna and more recently in Sirte.

Instability would grow in the Gulf. With ISIS driven out of Syria, it would likely go underground in Iraq after the liberation of Mosul by the Iraqi Army. This would mean that while ISIS would still exist in Iraq, it would be too unpopular to mobilize support against the Iraqi Government – at least for the next couple of years.

With ISIS unable to expand in Syria and playing the waiting game in Iraq, it would largely focus on other countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia the opportunities for ISIS are frightening to contemplate. Much of the kingdom is familiar with ISIS’ radical ideology, as both Saudi Arabia and ISIS share much doctrine in Salafiya and share a deep and abiding hatred for Iran and Shi’a Islam.

With Assad secure, many Saudis would feel that their influence would be diminished by Iran’s, as Iran would control Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and would largely manage Iraq and contest for Yemen. This would breed frustration within the Kingdom and likely result in a war between the large Sunni majority and the smaller Shi’ite minority in the east of the Kingdom.

If the Saudi government does not tread carefully, they could be painted by ISIS as collaborators with the Saudi Shi’ites, driving more Saudis into their arms. While an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia is unlikely, the country could suffer from a crippling civil war akin to the one Syria would have just come out of.

And then there is Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. While seen as less relevant than ISIS by both Saudi and America, instability in Saudi Arabia could give Al-Qaeda the space to infiltrate into the south of the kingdom, meaning that it could end up at war with Shi’ites, Al-Qaeda and ISIS all at once – a war as complex as the one fought in Syria.

Iraq would grind on. While the Assad Government would likely stabilize Syria, Iraq would remain a centre of instability for the Middle-East – at least until a revolution takes place.

Were the Kurds to become completely autonomous, Iraq would end up a weaker country. It would cause the dysfunctional Iraqi government to continue persecuting and scape-goating the Sunni Arabs for all its own problems, meaning that ISIS would, after a couple of years, re-emerge in Iraq stronger than ever.

Yet the Kurds’ self-autonomy would cause many Shi’ites to blame the government – not the Sunnis – for their problems. This would give an opportunity for a revolutionary like Muqtada Al-Sadr to take control of the Sunni and Shi’ite areas of Iraq – such a change of government would only solidify the Kurdish separation from Iraq, though it might cause the remains of Iraq to stay together; neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor Shi’ites wish to divide their country in three.

Assad would stabilize Syria. Contrary to popular belief, Assad does have a majority support in Syria – especially given the alternatives the Syrians see right outside their front doorstep in ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Assad’s real test will be the winning of Bedouins in the Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor regions – fortunately he has controlled the city of Deir Ez-Zor for the entirety of the war, which suggests that Bedouin support for Assad is not fictional.

If the Kurds do end up separating, it is only the Ba’ath Party ideology that could keep the remainder of Syria together. Assad would be able to frame the Kurdish autonomy as an Israeli conspiracy, uniting the more extreme elements of his country to him, and returning Syria to the safe place it was five years ago.

It would be better than the alternative. If Assad did not win the war in Syria – say, if Hillary Clinton became President and made good on her threat to invade and overthrow the government there – Al-Qaeda and ISIS would have a safe-haven in Syria for the next two decades at least. Genocides of Alawites, Druze and Christians would occur, and Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would all be destabilized. Israel would be threatened on its border by Al-Qaeda in Syria, and a weak Muslim Brotherhood Government would nominally control Syria – as the Shi’ite Government nominally controls Iraq.

While Assad remaining as President of Syria would produce some unstable outcomes, the alternative is far, far worse.

Hypocrisy Reigns in the West as Syrian Government takes back Aleppo

Bashar Al-Assad, the legitimate ruler of Syria, with widespread support from Syrian Christians, Alawites, Druze and upper-class Sunni Muslims, is closer than ever to retaking control of Aleppo for the first time since 2012.

The outcome of this bloody battle would be one of the best for the Middle-Eastern region: Terrorism would be driven out of its largest stronghold in Syria.

But if one reads the news, there is nothing but screaming bloody murder towards the Syrian Government. The legitimate President in Syria, with unbelievable support from the army, surrounding government and people, is continuing to be called by Western Media and politicans as illegitimate and in need of removal.

Of course, if Bashar Al-Assad is removed from Syria, it would lead to the worst conflict of the Middle-East in the last century. Yes: worse than ISIS' invasion of Iraq in June 2014. We would have a radicalised Hezbollah in western Syria, fighting for control with Al-Qaeda, ISIS and a dysfunctional Muslim Brotherhood Syrian Government.

But the West seems to just ignore that every decision they've made thus far against certain sides - whether in Afghanistan in the 80's, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 or Yemen in 2015 - all of these are increasing terrorism in the region and bankrupting the West, both morally and financially.

In the 80's, funding the Mujahideen gave rise to the Taliban in Afghanistan. While this destroyed Russian influence in the country, it was replaced with a government which Al-Qaeda leaders pledge allegiance to. Really, US support of terrorists in Afghanistan gave themselves 9-11.

Removing Saddam Hussien in Iraq 2003 was even worse. ISIS is worse than Al-Qaeda, more brutal and more explosive for the region. Whereas Al-Qaeda focused largely on western targets, ISIS have ignited a Sunni-Shi'ite war in the Middle-East that has been raging ever since ISIS first emerged in 2003. Back then, ISIS was known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but its founder, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi is more aligned with self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi than with Osama Bin Laden, the latter who he pledged allegiance to.

Iraq borders Saudi Arabia, and the hardcore ISIS ideology has great sympathy there. If ISIS are able to successfully detonate in Saudi Arabia, the whole region could undergo a sysmic shift as the Arabian Peninsula completely destabilizes.


The results of removing Gidaffi in Libya 2011 are not yet felt in the region, but if Gidaffi loyalists continue to be persecuted and kept out of power in Libya, they will try and find another way as Saddam loyalists did: through terrorism. This will mean that, even if powers in the region successfully deal with Al-Qaeda and ISIS - which seems to me unlikely, with the exception of Russia - terrorism would still have a stronghold in Libya.

Western support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is strengthening Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to an alarming extent. As if ISIS didn't threaten Saudi Arabia enough, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is becoming one of the most powerful contenders for Yemen, right on Saudi Arabia's doorstep.

When all of these foolish blunders of the West are weighed up against Western criticism of the Syrian Government, one cannot help but feel that the West are either completely oblivious to what they are doing, like a child with his father's gun, or that the West are just destabilizing the Middle-East because they like terrorism.

The best thing America and the West can do in Syria is shut their mouths about its government gaining back their city, and focus on undoing their erroneous work: replace terrorism with strong governments.

Yet only Russia seems to have the sense to do that.

Is Mohammed Bin Salman pushing Saudi Arabia to civil war?

Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is making some very quick decisions in Saudi Arabia.


Mohammed Bin Salman is the most influential figure in Saudi Arabia at this moment. His father, King Salman, has given him authority in a variety of roles, ministries, including Deputy Crown Prince after Mohammed Bin Nayef. Bin Salman has been modernizing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia very quickly, and this process has been sped up many times faster than efforts under the previous king, King Abdullah.


There are rumours suggesting that Mohammed Bin Salman has his eyes set on the kingship, wishing to jump over Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef and become the next King. This could ignite civil war.


The truth is that Mohammed Bin Salman only has the ability to eye the kingship because the late King Abdullah's previous command has been completely ignored. This command was that Salman be king, followed by then Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin, followed by whoever Salman would choose.


King Salman raised the hopes of the royal family when he chose Mohammed Bin Nayef as Deputy Crown Prince and kept Muqrin as Crown Prince. But when Crown Prince Muqrin “resigned” and Mohammed Bin Salman was made the new Deputy Crown Prince, this caused frustration in the Saudi royal family.


The Saudi royal family favours Mohammed Bin Nayef, the crown prince, over Mohammed Bin Salman. Bin Salman has skipped over many other more qualified candidates for Deputy Crown Prince because he is the son of the esteemed king. King Salman had the popularity of the Saudi royal family and earned his right to become king. His son, however, has not.


Mohammed Bin Salman is also the architect of Saudi’s war with Yemen, which has resulted in severe devastation in the impoverished country – the damage done to Yemen is comparable to damage done in the Iraq by American intervention. Northern Yemen is at risk of famine, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is stronger than ever – the Houthis remain undefeated and Hadi’s government remains one of the weakest forces in Yemen.


This is all exacerbated by Mohammed Bin Salman’s rapid push for modernization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, without considering that Saudi Arabia was funded on the principle of spreading Salafiya – the most conservative and arguably truest form of Sunni Islam – across the world, and that for decades, the Saudi royal family has been able to balance internal westernization of the Kingdom with an external “Salafization”.


In modernizing the kingdom, ascending to the kingship and stopping the external "Salafization", Mohammed Bin Salman could be painted as a servant of America, ignoring the commands of God and bowing down to America’s wishes unashamedly.


Those in Saudi Arabia who are most frustrated with Mohammed Bin Salman are those older than him. He is young – very, very young by Saudi standards – to be in a position of such power. Many would not hesitate to wage war on him should he ascend to the kingship based on his age.


ISIS and Al-Qaeda would feed into this frustration. Al-Qaeda’s base nearest to the Kingdom is, ironically, in Yemen – Mohammed Bin Salman has been the architect of a war which has fuelled Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is bent on destroying the modernization Mohammed Bin Salman stands for.


Worse still is ISIS. Though their territories across Iraq and Syria are shrinking, their replacement is Iranian-backed governments in Iraq and Syria, as well as Israeli-sympathetic Kurdish governments – this is only fuelling sectarian hatred on which ISIS thrives. Unfortunately for Mohammed Bin Salman, the population in the Eastern Province is mixed between Sunnis and Shi’ites, which makes it ideal territory for ISIS to infiltrate into - from Iraq - at the outbreak of a civil war.
 
With ISIS in Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Yemen competing for influence in Saudi Arabia at the outbreak of war, Mohammed Bin Salman would face external and internal threats from these groups and the Saudis that support them.

Trump's Foreign Policy

I used to think Trump was a clown, a buffoon, a corrupt businessman who didn't know anything about American politics, whether domestic or international.

Then I watched the following policy speech:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q_s6cXSv_8


And I discovered that the Media portrayal of Trump in regards to Foreign Policy - he would be the first to use a nuke, that world war 3 would start under him - was false.

Trump, for all his faults, has a better Foreign Policy than Hillary Clinton's.


Hillary Clinton has followed the neo-con handbook. Her vote in favour of the Iraq War was not followed by apology or sincere change of policy - rather, she only continued to please her donors in voting for the ousting of Egypt's Mubarak - who had signed a declaration of peace with Israel - and Clinton replaced him with Muslim Brotherhood Morsi.

Clinton did not stop there. She continued her failed policy by ousting Gidaffi in Libya and replacing him with - well, militias squabbling with each other. They are still squabbling.

And she is not stopping. She wants to remove President Assad from Syria - which would be her worst foreign policy decision to date.

Yes, worse than voting for the Iraq War. I said it.
(Refer to earlier post for more details.)

Trump says he wishes to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability." (By the way, in his foreign policy speech, he did not mention nukes once. Not once! Ergh, American Media...)

Trump has tapped into what the American people want: an end to endless wars. But he recognises that in order to create lasting peace in an area as volatile as the Middle-East, strong men are a better alternative to terrorists. Regarding Assad, Trump said, "Maybe Assad is a bad guy, but there might be worse guys after him... We don't even know who we're funding."

Meaning that step 1 in Trump's Foreign Policy is the handing over of terrorism in Syria to Russia and President Assad - who is the head of the internationally recognised government anyway. Such a move benefits the Middle-East, benefits the Syrian people, benefits relations between America and Russia and benefits Israel. I will unpack each of these below:

1) Benefits the Middle-East. The destabilization of Syria with the removal of Assad would destroy much heritage and culture of the Middle-East. Together with Egypt and Iraq, Syria is one of the countries which is most recognised for its culture and heritage in the Middle-East. An escalation in violence and killing caused by the removal of Assad would destroy a sizeable amount of heritage in Syria and the Middle-East.

2) Benefits the Syrian people. Most Syrians live in Assad's territory - they're not fleeing Assad - they're fleeing Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The Syrians that are disgruntled and not content with Assad are mainly from the villages and countryside of Syria - these are a minority fighting the majority (except they have American/Western backing.) Most people would benefit more from an Assad victory than from his removal: Alawites, Druze, Christians and upper-class Sunnis would all stand to benefit.

3) Benefits relations between America and Russia. American-Russian relations are at their worst post-Cold War. American pressure easing in Syria would undoubtedly give Putin the space he needs to show the world that he wishes to accomplish good in Syria and fight terrorism. Putin would also give America more concessions in other areas if his top Middle-East ally were left alone.

4) Benefits Israel. There are those in Israel that believe getting rid of Assad would benefit Israel - Hillary Clinton is one such as this. I disagree for a reason I have stated earlier: at the moment, Israel's main enemies are Shi'ite Muslims, not Sunni Muslims. The majority of Muslims in the Middle-East - and in the world - are Sunni. If the Assad Government is removed - a Shi'ite power that has maintained a peaceful border with Israel - then Sunnis would undoubtedly turn their attention to Israel themselves and make this peaceful border not so peaceful. This "sleeping giant" of Sunnis turning to fight Israel has been asleep since the beginning of the Iraq War - Israel would be wise to keep it asleep.


Trump may also install a dictator in Afghanistan. At the moment, the Taliban controls a sizeable amount of territory in Afghanistan - they are stronger than they have been in a number of years - and America cannot defeat them with their current strategy. With "getting out of the nation-building business" and "focusing on stability," the logical conclusion for Trump regarding Afghanistan would be to push for a Sunni dictator to take control. This would destroy the Taliban for sure; it would also stabilize a country which has seen nothing but war for the past 15 years. It would provide a balwark for Iranian influence, much as Saddam Hussein did in Iraq prior to the Iraq War.

Afghanistan may be the country Trump gets out of more successfully than Obama did from Iraq.


It may be possible as well that Trump would increase relations with Iraq and decrease relations with Saudi Arabia. He has said jokingly, "We gotta take their [Iraqi] oil" - but what he is referring to is keeping Iraq's oil out of the hands of American companies - companies selling the oil elsewhere - and increasing oil trade between Iraq and America.

Iraq would likely stabilize under a new level of relations with America and the economic boost associated with it. Whether Iraq breaks in 2 or not would be irrelevant - America has established trade with Gulf countries whether part of Saudi Arabia or not; there is no reason to suggest they would not do the same with both mainland and Kurdish Iraq.

America not boosting the oil industry in both Iran and Saudi Arabia would dampen terrorist efforts enormously, as both have been funding terrorism extensively.

This would likely have an impact on the Saudi-American war on Houthis in Yemen. While pro-Iranian, the Houthis may be able to be pushed into closer relations with Iraq over Iran, through which Trump may give them the green light to control all of Yemen and expel Al-Qaeda from Yemen for good.

With Libya, Trump would likely wait for the country to deteriorate extensively before intervening again there. This is a sad reality for Libyans: Americans are war-weary.

Trump is a better solution than Clinton. I can provide more links below if requested.

ISIS finished in Sirte but not in Libya

 NOTE: for those who do not know, Libya was a functioning state - one of the best in Africa - under Muammar Al-Gidaffi. At the height of the Arab Spring, Barrack Obama - with much insistence from neo-con hawk Hillary Clinton - authorised a "no-fly-zone" in Libya. The result of this was that Gidaffi was deposed by Libyan militias and the country has since slid into utter chaos, threatening stability in Egypt, Tunisia, Niger and Chad.

Currently there is a civil war in Libya, which began at approximately the same time as the Iraqi-Syrian war in 2014. Two rival governments are fighting for contol - the government based in Tripoli is a loose band of militias, while the government in Tobruk are the remnants of Gidaffi's government. Exploiting this war was ISIS, which controlled the city of Derna for a few months, before relocating to Gidaffi's hometown in Sirte.

The chaos and instability in Libya is the result of the "no-fly-zone" authorised by Clinton and Obama. Keep that in mind the next time you hear Hillary Clinton use that term regarding Syria.



Barrack Obama has authorised the use of airstrikes against ISIS' stronghold in Sirte, with the aid of militias from rival city Misrata. ISIS has controlled the city for approximately 18 months, but is likely to be driven out of the city.

While no longer in control of any physical territory, ISIS is very unlikely to be driven from the country - only to change strategy.

After ISIS - then Al-Qaeda in Iraq - was driven out of Fallujah and other Iraqi cities in 2006 - as a result of the Anbar Awakening - the organisation merely shifted its strategy from establishing an Islamic State to destabilizing the region through numerous suicide bombings. It was true: Sunni Iraqis despised ISIS for the next few years, but the result of the destabilizing tactic by ISIS was that they returned even more powerfully in 2014, 8 years later.

The other thing to note about ISIS' strategy in Iraq was that they took advantage of the chaos in nearby Syria. Under the guise of Jabhat Al-Nusra - Al-Qaeda in Syria - ISIS established control of much territory in eastern and northern Syria. This battle experience was essential in the lightning-fast offensive against the Iraqi Government in 2014.

ISIS is in Libya to stay, perhaps not as a ruler of territory but as a destabilizer. ISIS is close to losing its Caliphate in Iraq - recent developments suggest Iraqi Sunnis may be more willing to work with Iraqi Shi'ites than with ISIS, uniting central and southern Iraq to each other.

Such a move would be a massive and potentially long-term blow for the group in Iraq, but Libya is still a centre of chaos which ISIS can take advantage of. The small militias fighting one another is likely to breed much frustration for Libyans - especially their youth - and the result of this may be, in the next few years, a rapid increase of support for ISIS.

One country not talked about is post-Arab Spring Tunisia. Interestingly, the majority of ISIS fighters comes not from countries sharing their ideology - such as Saudi Arabia - but Tunisia. These fighters are coming home. They are angry with their government, angry with the erosion of their Arabic culture and the majority of their youth are unemployed.

Tunisia seems ready for civil war. Given the amount of fighters from Tunisia, ISIS would be the likely benefactor of such a war, to the detriment of Arab democracy and Libya.

Tunisia's south is more conservative than its north. Because of this, ISIS would be able to maintain a stronghold in the south and from there push into Libya.

Such seems the future of Libya: destined for more chaos and more ISIS. There is nothing the West can do, only wait to pick up the remnants of the country and piece them back together, as they are doing in Iraq.

Iraq: the Impending Revolution

(NOTE: Regarding ISIS and the Iraq War, there are those who blame Barrack Obama for withdrawing the way he did in 2011 - Obama has other things he should be blamed for re Foreign Policy, but withdrawing from Iraq is not one of them.

The blame for ISIS and the Iraq War rests squarely on the Bush Administration and especially on Dick Cheney who, if one sifts through old videos from the 1990's, would find out that he did know better - but did it anyway because, as they say, "money talks."

Since 2004 - yes, since 2004 - Iraq has been ISIS' most effective base. Under its founder, Zarqawi, ISIS used to be called "Al-Qaeda in Iraq," but Zarqawi's methods were quite different to those of Bin Laden: Zarqawi was interested in starting a Sunni-Shi'ite war across the Middle-East - Bin Laden was focused on sustaining a long-term Sunni war on the West. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS, heralds directly from Zarqawi's vision. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS are the SAME organisation.)



No matter what happens in Syria, Yemen or Libya, Iraq is destined for more chaos.

Since 2003, Iraq has been the Middle-East's centre for chaos. An argument could almost be made that, without the Iraq War, the Arab Spring would never have happened. Without the Iraq War, the Syrian Civil War would not have been as horrid or as deadly.

Without the Iraq War, there would not be any ISIS in Iraq.

Now the Iraqi Army is moving in to take control of Mosul, one of Iraq's largest cities, which has been under ISIS control for over 2 years. On the northern side of Mosul is the Kurdish Peshmerga - both are moving in to wrest this city back from ISIS control.

But few pundits give thought to what is likely to happen after ISIS is removed from Mosul and from Iraq. But the signs are telling, and the answer is clear: ISIS will not leave Iraq, more blood will be shed, and a revolution will take place.

 I will answer each of these points below:

1) ISIS will not leave Iraq. This does not mean that ISIS will immediately return to the Sunni areas of Iraq as soon as America withdraws - they will not have the popularity from the Sunnis to do so as of yet - but they will use Iraq as a hideout from which to plan terrorist attacks across the world.

ISIS is interested in sparking a Sunni-Shi'ite conflict across the entire Middle-East - they have succeeded to do this in Iraq and in Syria, but their new target has been Saudi Arabia.

If Bashar Al-Assad remains in power in Syria, Saudi Arabia will be faced with the ISIS threat immediately. The image of Saudi Arabia losing the Sunni-Shi'ite war to Iran would cause Saudis to look elsewhere for inspiration. ISIS provides the most tempting inspiration of all.

If Assad does remain power in Syria and after losing its territories in Iraq and going underground, ISIS would be likely to direct the majority of its resources to destabilizing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and it would do this from its base in Iraq, secured in the utter chaos that is post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

ISIS is, unfortunately, likely to succeed in destabilizing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Were a war to break out in the Kingdom, ISIS would be able to hop across from Iraq's southern border, control territories in the north and east of Saudi Arabia then, after succeeding in pushing Shi'ite Saudis into the ocean and establishing dominance in the region, it may be able to invade Iraq from the south.

Yes: after the Syrian Civil War spilling into Iraq, a Saudi Civil War could also spill into Iraq.


2) More blood will be shed. But more immediate is what will happen after ISIS is temporarily defeated in Mosul. What is likely to happen is that the Sunni Arab tribes of Iraq would not have the power or military might to govern or defend themselves: Shi'ite Arabs would likely take control of their regions after ISIS does.

This would mean life would be miserable for many Sunni Arab Iraqis, but they would be sick of war and retaliation by this stage, and would likely not fight as hard against the Shi'ites as they did - with ISIS - over the past 2 years. They would likely try and blot out the suffering of their own people.

Where a more even-grounded war would be fought would be a war between the Peshmerga - the Iraqi Kurdish forces - and the Iraqi Army and its associates in the Hasd Ash-Sha'abi militias. But without American support, the Shi'ites of Iraq cannot hope to defeat the Kurds. The Kurds would, at a price, win for themselves complete autonomy in northern Iraq.

This would cause many Iraqis not to blame the Sunnis, but the Iraqi government for its problems. In this, Shi'ites and Sunnis would be united: Kurdish separation from Iraq was unacceptable, and significant change must occur to prevent further separation.


3) A revolution will take place. Iraqis are sick and tired of living in violence. They are sick and tired of the corruption in their country, and they are aching for stability. Iraqis from Sunni and Shi'ite Arab regions do not wish to split from each other - they would rather continue killing each other - but they are aware that the international community might split them up if their country does not stabilize.

This fear from both Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq; a loss of territory due to Peshmerga defeating the Iraqi Army and associates; a growing mistrust in the Iranian-backed government; all these factors would lead Iraq in one direction: revolution.

Muqtada Al-Sadr seems the most likely candidate to take advantage of this revolution. Though initially Iranian-backed, he has softened his sectarian rhetoric and focused much more on Iraqi nationalism. That is his defining trait over the Iraqi government: he is more interested in bringing Sunnis and Shi'ites together as Iraqis.

Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi is unable to deliver on the democratic reforms he has promised. He lacks the will and power, whereas Sadr does not. Sadr has influence over much of Shi'ite Iraq - he is perhaps the most influential Shi'ite Iraqi at this moment - and the Sunnis in central Iraq would do anything for representation - maybe even support Sadr.

Sadr would then likely rein in the Shi'ite militias in the Sunni territories, tone down the sectarianism and work hard at uniting Sunni and Shi'ite Iraq to each other.

If Sadr fails to end the sectarianism, nothing will change in Iraq. ISIS would return, likely from the south, and likely sacking Baghdad the next time, and Iraq would be broken into three states.

Either way, the revolution is on its way. Let it not take you by surprise when it happens.

If Assad loses the Syrian civil war

This is to give an analysis of the frightening possibility of Assad losing the civil war. In this scenario, Hillary Clinton would be the reason for the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad.


1) America would be despised by Syrian Arabs. Many Syrians see the civil war not as a war between Syrians, but a war between Syrians (on Assad's side) and the international community that wishes to destroy them. It would be mainly the Arabs - Alawite, Christian, Druze and even Sunnis - that would hate America; the Kurds would not.

This contrasts to Iraq. Shi'ite Iraqis are - quite secretly - very thankful to America for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. For Shi'ite Iraqis, they see the current situation in Iraq as preferable to the days of Saddam Hussein. Sunni Arabs, by contrast, pay lip service to yet hate America very much. Iraqi Kurds both pay lip service to and love America.


2) The Muslim Brotherhood would nominally control Syria. From the beginning, Hillary Clinton has used the Arab Spring as an attempt to bring the Muslim Brotherhood into power. It is likely this is because she has been paid substantial amounts of money by pro-Muslim Brotherhood, resource-rich country Qatar - as long as she gets her money, who cares what her decisions cause in Libya, Egypt or Syria?

This is also likely because Turkey has been the main antagonist of the Syrian civil war. Erdogan is very pro-Muslim Brotherhood, and so together with support from Qatar would very likely open the door for a Muslim Brotherhood President.

With the absence of strong man Bashar Al-Assad, the Muslim Brotherhood government that would follow would be hopeless. It would be as chronically weak as the curent Iraqi or Afghani Governments.

3) Al-Qaeda and ISIS would win another victory in the war on terror. Hillary Clinton's "war on terror" policies should be changed to "war for terror," because her greatest accomplishments as Secretary of State were the establishment of terrorist hub Libya, along with the moving of the Libyan Government's weapons from Libya to Syria to substantially - and cheaply - arm the rebels in the Syrian Civil War. She also supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who were known for their disdain and abuse of Egyptian minorities.


Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are three examples of America's failed foreign policy. It has failed because it rests on the assumption that the Middle-East region is ready for democracy. As I have said before, "the war for democracy must wait until the war on terror is won." America cannot fund both extremists and moderates at the same time without the extremists taking control.

For Hillary Clinton to add Syria to her list of failures would mean that both ISIS and Al-Qaeda would control substantial chunks of Syria, with the chronically weak Muslim Brotherhood Government not strong enough nor united enough to wrest control of them back. It would make trade with Iraq and Turkey very difficult - ISIS would be engrained in the Bedouin tribes of Syria, west of Iraq; Al-Qaeda would rest up around Idlib and Aleppo provinces, south of Turkey - which would only add to Syria's problems.

4) Hezbollah would grow in Syria. One of the better side-effects of the Syrian civil war would be the weakening of anti-Israeli pro-Iranian Hezbollah - which is, of course, the main reason why the war is being supported by America: to destroy Hezbollah.

Lebanon's stability rests on the stability of Syria. If Bashar Al-Assad is overthrown, Hezbollah's main ally would be gone and Hezbollah would be vulnerable, so vulnerable they may try and take control of Lebanon to ensure they remain in the region.

If something like this happened, Sunnis, Christians and other groups would likely rally behind the Lebanese government in a show of strength to stop Hezbollah from taking control of their country. (This would likely be encouraged by the same countries which funded the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad.)

Though it is possible that Hezbollah would be severely weakened in Lebanon, there is every chance that main Hezbollah headquarters would be relocated to the Syrian Alawite region. Many Syrian minority groups would take refuge there if unable to leave, and there many minorities would join forces, under Hezbollah, to fight tooth and nail any radical Sunni group that dares approach them.

This would mean that not only would there be radical Sunni terrorists in Syria in the forms of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, but also there would be radical Shi'ite terrorists that would make the current Iraqi government blush. A radicalised Syrian Hezbollah would likely match at least Al-Qaeda in brutality; they would have to be radical, otherwise they wouldn't survive in "Free Syria."

What is surprising is that many Syrian Sunnis may join Hezbollah as well. The Syrian Civil War has often been painted as a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shi'ites, but the reality on the ground suggests an inter-Sunni civil war between Hanafis and Hanbalis, or, to put it in simple terms, between moderates and extremists. Many Syrian Sunnis are appalled with the brutality of groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, and those who felt strongest about Bashar Al-Assad would likely join with his closest ally in his memory: they would fight for Hezbollah.

So in fact, as ISIS threatened the Iraqi Government in 2014, in the future we may see a large Hezbollah force threatening the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Government with more support and strength than either Al-Qaeda or ISIS. Sure, Hezbollah would no longer threaten Israel, but it could drag America back into the region to prop up its government in Syria.

5) Anti-Israeli groups would be largely Sunni. If Hezbollah was no longer able to fight Israel, radical Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat Al-Nusra, Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham - whatever you want to call it) would make the quiet Syrian border with Israel no longer quiet. Such Sunni extremism against Israel would have support from the new Syrian Government, and likely also have support from the wider Sunni Arab world.

The danger perhaps unbenownst to Israel is that in destroying Shi'ite enemies and creating Sunni ones, it stands against a far larger and more deadly enemy. Sunni Muslims make up a larger portion of the Middle-East (and the world) than Shi'ite Muslims - if the Sunnis destroy the Shi'ite powers and then turn their attention to Israel, it will be larger armies and bigger forces heading for Israel than what is currently being seen.

Israel should indeed think hard about whether the destruction of Hezbollah is worth the revival of what has been - since the days of Saddam Hussein - a sleeping giant.

6) Palestinians may become even more radicalised. With Syrians embracing Al-Qaeda and fighting Israel, Palestinians, kin in the Sham region, would likely do the same. Then Israel would have more support in forcing Palestinians out from their regions from the international community than they currently do.

Such Palestinian-Israeli problems worsened would cause headaches for King Abdullah of Jordan. Though not likely at all to be kicked out of Jordan, Abdullah may face a period of instability in the readjustment of a Free Syria unleashed on the Middle-East and the resulting consequences thrown at Palestine as a result.

7) Many massacres would take place. This is one of the saddest results of the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad: Alawites, Druze and Christians would immediately experience genocide as retaliation from extremists in Syria.

Hezbollah may protect these minorities in Syria, especially around the Latakia/Tartus regions, but this would strain their resources and cause problems for them in their base in Lebanon.

8) America would go bankrupt. In the corporate neo-con greed of current America not knowing when to stop, they would likely be faced with war with Putin for overthrowing Bashar Al-Assad - in all likelihood this may happen earlier, as soon as Hillary Clinton installs a "no-fly-zone" in Syria.

Such a war would probably bankrupt America. Already 20 trillion - yes, trillion - dollars in debt, it is unlikely America would have the financial strength to fight such a war to completion.

So terrorist groups, like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, who have spent all their time trying to destroy America and everything they stand for, would have got their wish: America would be the great power that was, over the mid-20th century to early 21st century, destroyed because they tried to fight the war on terror on two fronts: by both creating it and destroying it.


There is much more to say - how such a defeat would destabilize Turkey and the Gulf - but for the sake of your time, I will leave it here. God protect us all from what could be the worst decision ever made by America...