Saturday 23 December 2017

The New Middle-East UPDATED

Since the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, the Arab world has undergone its largest geopolitical shifts since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the state of Israel.

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a Shi'ite government in Iraq swung the balance decisively away from the Arab Sunni world and gave Iran a new ally. For the first time in almost 25 years, the United States was once again allied to a Shi'ite Muslim government. The forces unleashed during the Iraq War still haunt the region to this day.

The Obama-endorsed Arab Spring did much to inflame terrorism across the region, particularly in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While withdrawal from Iraq was endorsed at the time, Obama's Syria policy fueled Iraq's worst enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq, turning it into ISIS, a group so brutal that Al-Qaeda disavowed it. Had Obama supported a ceasefire in Syria, it is unlikely ISIS would have grown as large as it did.

Obama's Syrian policy inflamed the instability which spilled over from Iraq. Thankfully, Russia has had a pragmatic approach to Syria. Their Syrian campaign (2015 to present) has seen an historic reduction in violence and terrorism across the entire region. Russia is currently playing the lead role in ending the conflict in Libya, while also strengthening already strong ties with the autocratic government of Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

All 3 Arab countries which suffered from the Obama-era interventions - Egypt, Libya and Syria - are now closer to Russia than ever. President Trump has been unable or unwilling to stop this, given his focus on Afghanistan and Iraq with a war-weary America.

For Libya, President Trump is quoted as saying he would only commit to destroying ISIS there, not to a political settlement. For Syria, the State Department has released a statement that the US will be leaving Syria after they are certain ISIS has been defeated there. Though President Trump has extended his hand in alliance to Egypt, the damage of the last 3 years of the Obama Administration has meant that Egypt has looked on the US with the question: will this alliance outlast President Trump?

President Trump's largest challenges remain the same as those of Presidents Bush and Obama: Iraq and Afghanistan. While the US is engaged militarily in those two countries and initiating its pivot towards Asia, this leaves other regional forces - such as Russia, Iran and Turkey - more space to intervene in other areas of the Middle-East.

These developments have left Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia increasingly vulnerable to instability and chaos. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, the son of the current king, is increasingly being used by Al-Qaeda and ISIS as the figure head of everything wrong with the kingdom. Even the less radical side of Saudi Arabia is appalled at Bin Salman's handling of the Yemeni crisis. Should he descend to the throne, civil war will likely follow him.

With Russia strongly backing autocratic regimes in Egypt, Syria and Libya and strengthening ties with Islamist countries Iran and Turkey, the US is left on the back foot. Their own hold on Turkey is slipping; Iraq and Afghanistan are still unstable after years of intervention and, worst of all, the Arabian Peninsula is creeping towards chaos as terrorism is uprooted from other regions.

This will leave Russia dominating much of the Middle-East, while America will be forced to continue their strategic withdrawal and focus on stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is the new Middle-East: a Middle-East divided between US and Russian influence; divided between Russian-supported autocratic regimes, US-supported democratic institutions and sponsors of terrorism threatened by terrorists returning home disillusioned and beaten.

This New Middle-East heralds the dawn of a new, even more uncertain era.

Saturday 9 December 2017

4 Predictions for Saudi Arabia



In this article I will be outlying a series of predictions for Saudi Arabia over the next 5 years:

1) Mohammed Bin Salman will be forced to abdicate from ruling Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is next in line for the throne after his father, King Salman. However, unlike his father, Mohammed Bin Salman is reforming the country at too fast a rate for the kingdom to cope with.

Not to mention: Bin Salman's foreign policy blunders have been exceptional: from Yemen, to Qatar, to Lebanon - he has shown himself to be too reckless and not measured enough to rule a kingdom as dynamic and conservative as Saudi Arabia.

2) Mohammed Bin Nayef will be made king of Saudi Arabia.

Unlike Mohammed Bin Salman, Mohammed Bin Nayef is the Al Saud family favourite for the throne. Though he has been currently forced to abdicate by his cousin and uncle, the Saudi establishment will look to him to lead the country after the folly of bin Salman's policies has been fully revealed.

3) ISIS will come to Saudi Arabia.

Scarily, Mohammed Bin Salman's push for modernization makes ISIS coming to Saudi Arabia all the more likely. What is even worse is his desire to push for public ties with Israel.

This has happened before: in the 1970's the Shah of Iran pushed for public ties with Israel. That, along with economic instability, led to his downfall in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini took over the country in the Iranian revolution.

A Saudi revolution benefits ISIS, and ISIS only. ISIS is a neo-Ikhwani expansionist project in the tradition of Ibn Abdul Wahhab and, according to Alistair Crooke, after invading Iraq, ISIS inserted a time bomb into the heart of the Middle-East, into Saudi Arabia. Alistair Crooke maintains that the kingdom is more vulnerable to ISIS under a modernizing ruler like Mohammed Bin Salman than under a more conservative ruler like Mohammed Bin Nayef.

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-aim-saudi-arabia_b_5748744.html

4) With ISIS will come war to Saudi Arabia

Whether the Al-Saud royal family will be eventually forced out by ISIS is difficult to assess, but what is likely is that, like Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen in recent years, different Arab tribes will pick different sides. Some will remain loyal to the Saud royal family - some will join with ISIS.

Unlike the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Saudi revolution will quickly turn into a civil war, one in which millions of Muslims will fight, either for or against ISIS. What the Trump Administration does in such a scenario is difficult to assess - American airstrikes on Islamic holy land will further exacerbate such a conflict.

Wednesday 6 December 2017

the new Middle-East



Since the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, the Arab world has undergone the largest geopolitical shifts since the Ottoman Empire.

Though responsible for the death of Osama Bin Laden, President Obama's Middle-East strategy has been misguided. The Obama-endorsed Arab Spring did much to inflame terrorism across the Middle-East, particularly in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While withdrawal from Iraq was endorsed at the time, Obama's Syria policy fueled Iraq's worst enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq, turning it into ISIS, a group so brutal that Al-Qaeda disavowed it. Had Obama supported a ceasefire in Syria, it is unlikely ISIS would have grown as large as they did.

Unlike President Obama, Russia has had a pragmatic approach regarding the Middle-East. Their Syrian campaign (2015 to present) has seen an historic reduction in violence and terrorism across the entire region. Russia is currently playing the lead role in ending the conflict in Libya, while also strengthening already strong ties with the autocratic government of Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Obama's push for democracy across the Middle-East backfired badly. Not only has Russia been consolidating alliances in many Middle-East countries not wanting Obama-doctrine democracy, but President Trump has been, implicitly, welcoming Russian intervention in such countries. The reason for this is that President Trump does not wish to have as large a US footprint internationally as under the Obama or Bush Administrations and wants to focus more on domestic issues.

Not only so, but President Trump has made sure that President Obama's Arab Spring interventions - such as those Libya and Syria - are not engaged militarily by the US in the future and left instead to the Russian sphere of influence. For Libya, President Trump is quoted as saying he would only commit to destroying ISIS there, not to a political settlement. For Syria, the State Department has released a statement that the US will be leaving Syria after ISIS is defeated there.

In spite of this, there is growing tension between Russia and the US in the Middle-East. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has been asking for the removal of Bashar Al-Assad, something Russia is highly unlikely to do, while Russia has also been linked to supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and attempting to gain influence over Iraq. While the war on terror is being won by both President Putin and President Trump, both are doing so in competition - not in harmony - with each other.

President Trump's largest challenges are the same as those of Presidents Bush and Obama: Iraq and Afghanistan. Because Iraq is allied with Iran, it is easier for Russia to try and wrest control of it from the US. However it is more likely that the US will prioritize relations with Iraq and Afghanistan over any other Middle-East nation (with Israel as an exception), to keep them out of Russian hands.

Enter Saudi Arabia. Under the Obama Administration, relations deteriorated badly between the US and the conservative kingdom, due in no small part to the Iran Nuclear Deal and Obama's endorsement of the Arab Spring. Though relations between the Trump Administration and Saudi Arabia are strong currently, there is every reason to suspect that, as Salafi terrorism continues to be funded worldwide by the Saudis, relations between President Trump and Saudi Arabia will sour, and sour quickly.

This will leave Russia dominating much of the Middle-East - Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen - while America will continue make their strategic withdrawal and focus on solidifying relations with Iraq and Afghanistan. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan will likely suffer the most from the American withdrawal, and may end up plagued by instability.

This is the new Middle-East: a Middle-East divided between US and Russian influence; divided between Russian-supported autocratic regimes, US-supported democratic institutions and sponsors of Salafi terrorism under sanctions.

In a Middle-East like this, terrorism may actually be defeated.

Trump's Saudi comment may signal end of long alliance



Earlier today, Donald Trump called on Saudi Arabia to end the Yemeni blockade immediately. Saudi Arabia is currently blocking many food stuffs from entering Yemen, driving the country to famine on an industrial scale.

Added to this strain has been Saudi Arabia slamming Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. That aside, Trump's comments about Yemen have come at a particularly hard time for Saudi Arabia, having just lost Ali Abdullah Saleh as leverage over the Houthis.

It is entirely possible that this is the beginning of the end of the Saudi-US alliance, an alliance which began with the intention of frustrating Soviet ambitions in the Middle-East and curbing their influence. The reason why this may come to an end is two-fold: either Saudi Arabia will cut their losses and become more anti-American, or they will remain pro-American and suffer from plaguing instability.

Saudi Arabia is losing every proxy war they have been engaged in. From Syria, to Iraq, to Yemen, to Afghanistan - their proxies are being defeated and replaced with either pro-American or pro-Iranian forces in the region. As it becomes clearer that Saudi Arabia will not detract itself from Salafi terrorism, the US look to other Middle-East allies as better alternatives, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

If Saudi Arabia end the blockade in Yemen and stop funding for radical Islamic terrorism, it is very likely the Houthis will win the war and Saudi Arabia will be faced with Iranian proxies everywhere. This will cause a geo-political shift unlike any we have seen since the Iranian Revolution in 1979: Saudi Arabia will likely suffer both revolution and civil war, with the clear benefactor being ISIS.

How America respond to such instability in yet another Middle-East country is unclear. What is clear is that the Al-Saud government's rule has never been shakier, and could easily be swept away by instability and chaos.

Saturday 11 November 2017

If John Waver had been Donald J. Trump (2016 - 2017)



This article will focus on where John Waver would have deviated from Donald Trump's own foreign policy of the last twelve months, particularly in how it relates to the Middle-East.

For the most part, Donald Trump has done well in the Middle-East. He has certainly done better than Barrack Obama, though it is contestable as to whether he has done a better job than George W. Bush. This is because like W. Bush, Donald Trump is fighting in a war that cannot be won. George W. Bush fought the Iraq War. Donald Trump is supporting the Saudis in their war on Yemen.

1) John Waver would have withdrawn from Syria as soon as possible.

The American people are war-weary. Like Donald Trump, John Waver would have wanted to minimize the Obama legacy as much as was possible, and one way to do this would be to withdraw from the conflict the US had the least to lose by leaving: Syria.

Syria is complicated. With Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war, regime change in Syria is all but impossible without an exacerbated conflict between Russia and the United States. Simultaneously, John Waver would have pulled all troops and aviation out of Syria, to stop the war on ISIS in Syria, while also withdrawing all funds for the Syrian rebels. That way Russia would have been under further economic and military strain to end the conflict in Syria, keeping them occupied in Syria so the United States could have more breathing space to fix up other problems it has in other areas of the Middle-East.

Temporarily this would have given ISIS a firmer safe haven in Syria, but it would have meant that relations between the US and Turkey would not have deteriorated as rapidly as they have this year. Relations between the two NATO allies have deteriorated largely because the Kurds in Syria have been funded by the US to fight ISIS. Withdrawing all support for the Syrian Kurds would have meant that Turkey would have felt more at ease on its large southern border, and would instead have been able to work out with Russia and Iran how to deal with the ISIS threat in Syria.

2) John Waver would have pushed Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fly sorties against ISIS exclusively in Iraq.

While ISIS in Syria could be dealt with by Russia, Turkey and Iran, ISIS in Iraq would have remained the responsibility of the US. But rather than the US fighting ISIS alone in the air, encouraging allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fly sorties over Iraq would have been a positive step for the region. While Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been expanding their ties recently, these have largely been after the war against ISIS has been won, and not before then.

Iraq being welcomed earlier into the Arab world would have given Iraq more time to wrest itself free of Iranian control. Such ambition will undoubtedly take years, but Sunni Arab help in Iraq against ISIS would not have gone astray to ending the sectarian bloodletting there.

3) John Waver would have held the same course as Trump in Afghanistan - with one ISIS exception.

One of the things underestimated by the US is the ability to manipulate an intra-jihad war between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In the case of Afghanistan, while Trump's policy is sound, further pressure could be put on the Taliban if it were hammered by not only the US-backed government in Kabul, but also by ISIS militants.

ISIS is small in Afghanistan. Turning a blind eye to it growing in size at the expense of the Taliban would have made it easier for certain tribes within Afghanistan to reconcile themselves with Ashraf Ghani's government. Provided ISIS received no weapons, training, or finance from the US, it could still be used to weaken the Taliban and provide the Afghan Army with further relief.

The Taliban, not ISIS, is the major threat to stability in Afghanistan. Until the Taliban is destroyed, the world will not be safe from the powers that enabled 9-11.

4) John Waver would have divided Yemen into two parts - north and south

The bloodletting in Yemen is beyond a catastrophe. It has happened because Saudi Arabia has felt surrounded by Iranian proxies - across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and now Yemen. President Donald Trump's support of the Yemeni civil war is reprehensible.

Understanding such concerns, but also realizing the limitations of Saudi air power, John Waver would have dissolved the Hadi Government and replaced it with a government headed by the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement, under a UAE-friendly dictatorship, would then be able to drive Al-Qaeda militants out of Southern Yemen and into the north, forcing Al-Qaeda to fight the Houthis until the Houthis accepted Yemen would no longer be two states.

It would be crucially important that food, water and sanitation be allowed into northern Yemen, while the Houthis' own supplies of weapons and military bases would be targeted. This would have helped avoid famine and the current Cholera outbreak in Yemen while also avoiding the current Al-Qaeda safe haven in the south of the country.


Perhaps this would have been more effective than President Trump's foreign policy - perhaps it would have been less effective. It is open for discussion, and overall I am happier with Trump's progress in the Middle-East than with Presidents' Obama and Bush.

Monday 11 September 2017

With Assad victory certain, Israel's anxieties are growing



For the world, peace in Syria is desirable. For Israel, Syrian peace is a nightmare turned reality.

Like much of the world, Israel was anticipating the fall of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad early in the Syrian civil war. As the conflict continued, Israel continued to condemn the Assad Government and called for rebels to take control of the country. At times Syrian rebels have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At other times, ISIS had been advocated by Israelis as a more desirable neighbour than the Syrian Government.

Like Saudi Arabia, Israel is threatened by the rise of Iran in the region. The war on ISIS has largely benefit the Iran-allied Iraqi government and the Syrian Government, though for both Israel and Saudi Arabia, the recovery of the Syrian Government is the worse predicament. The revival of Bashar Al-Assad means that Hezbollah will continue to be funded, Hamas will continue having dominant support from Iran and Syria and, unlike Iraq, Syria will remain staunchly anti-Israel and anti-American at any cost.

Yet as the Syrian rebels continue to be weakened, both Israel and Saudi Arabia are turning to the Kurds as new proxies. The Kurds remain largely autonomous in both Iraq and Syria, and thus could, theoretically, offer a counterbalance to Iran in the Middle-East. However, all of the Kurds' neighbours are anti-Kurdistan: Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. In Syria, extensive financial aid would be needed for the Kurds to defend themselves from Assad's Government. In Iraq, the chances are better for the Kurds to break off, as the Iraqi government is the weaker link.

Though Benyamin Netanyahu and other Israelis are anxious about the coming end of the Syrian civil war, perspective is needed here. While the Kurds might succeed in breaking off from Iraq and Syria to provide Israel with a new ally, there are other gains for Israel in recent years which should not go unnoticed. Jordan, an Israeli ally, remains stable in spite of neighbouring conflict; Sisi, the President of Egypt, is working with Israel to fight ISIS; Haftar Al-Khalifa, strongman of Libya, is also strengthening ties with Israel. And the Gulf states, set to be plagued by instability, are deepening their ties with Israel as a buffer to the threat of Iran.

But where Israel should look for expansion in ties with Middle-East countries is in Iraq. Iraq is a shadow of its former strength, but it can still act as a front line in the war against Iran. Many Iraqis are sick and tired of Iranian influence in their country, and the country is on the edge of an intra-Shi'ite conflict. Like Saudi Arabia, Israel would do well to work at - very secretly - pursuing closer ties with Iraq to quash an Iranian presence there.

Israel should, however, stop endorsing terror organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda as a better alternative to Iran. Such Israeli policy is most unwise and has alienated parts of the civilized world from them.

Tuesday 29 August 2017

How Australia should have handled Iraq and Afghanistan



The following is a post about the course the Australian government should have held in their role in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003.

The dilemma faced by then Australian Prime Minister John Howard was how to stick by the United States through thick and thin, to be a most treasured ally. Unfortunately, engaging in the Iraq War was not an intelligent way to do that.

The Iraq War was a complete disaster. Any gains made in the Afghan War were quickly undone by a war that failed so spectacularly a new terror organization has since emerged, and one more brutal than Al-Qaeda. ISIS was forged in the furnace of the Iraq War.

Australian commitment to Iraq greatly undermined Australia's standing internationally, as it did to Britain and the US. Another approach could have been taken other than destabilizing Iraq.

Instead of committing troops to the Iraq War, Australia should have committed thousands of extra troops to Afghanistan, to free up US military to go into Iraq.

By shouldering more burden in Afghanistan, Australia would have been able maintain its international reputation while also not leaving the US entirely isolated. Afghanistan was a cause worth fighting for - Iraq was not. However, if the US wanted to send more troops to Iraq, Australia could have supported the US by sending more Australian troops to Afghanistan, to ease the US burden as they fought in Iraq.

Such policy is worth considering for the Australian Government, next time a partner makes a foolish decision like President George Bush did in Iraq. Such a decision would show independence, integrity and solidarity, while not engaging in blunders as erroneous as the one Prime Minister John Howard led Australia into.

Thursday 27 July 2017

Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the Reformation of Islam



One of the problems with the push for reformed Islam is that it has been reformed before.

In the 18th century, Ibn Abdul Wahhab, a prominent cleric in the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula, was faced with a moral dilemma. Around him Arabians were praying to deceased Muslims and, increasingly, Islam was being taken away from its historical roots due to western influence and in the name of modernity.

So Ibn Abdul Wahhab put forward the idea that anything additional to the Qur'an and the Sunnah - the holy book of Islam and the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed - adds unneeded context to the pure, original form of Islam as heralded by the first generation of Muslims. This belief, though unpopular at the time, heralded the dawn of a reformed Sunni Islam today known as Salafiya or, by a more derogatory name, Wahhabism.

This led to the Wahhab-Saud pact of the 18th century, a deal which was struck between the house of Al-Saud and Ibn Abdul Wahhab, that the Al-Saud family would protect the ideology of Ibn Abdul Wahhab and in exchange the Al-Saud family would be allowed to rule over a Salafi-Islamic state. That deal resurfaced last century: between the Al-Saud ruling family in Saudi Arabia and the Al-Sheikh family, the descendants and heirs of Ibn Abdul Wahhab.

Although the first Saudi state was crushed by the Ottomans, it resurfaced in the 20th century as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - with the help of the British, as Salafiya was still too unpopular for the majority of the Arabian Peninsula. With the potent combination of Arabian oil and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979, Salafiya has been enormously influential in the push for defining Sunni Islam in the modern world. This was condoned by Britain in order to control the Muslim world. And, for a time, it worked.

Today, most Sunni Muslims are at least partially influenced by the Salafi mindset. Those who are not, such as Sufis or the secular Muslims of Syria, are deemed as Kufr (heretics who must be killed) by the larger Sunni population and, for some, seculars and Sufis are considered worse heretics than the Shi'ites.

The need for reformation in Islam is seen by many as obvious.  Even those of the Sufi and secular Muslim mindset would still be willing to genocide Israel to protect Islam - and this is worth noting. However, Islam has been reformed before, and this resulted in the rise and exporting of Salafiya in the Muslim world.

While this did benefit Britain - Salafiya forces Muslims to be purified before attacking non-Muslims - it has now reached the stage where hundreds of thousands of Sunni Muslims are united behind the Salafi doctrine, and so it can no longer be used as a tool by the west for controlling the Muslim world. With the emergence of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, this is obvious to many.

However, if Ibn Abdul Wahhab reformed Islam before, pulled away centuries of Islamic tradition to reveal how the first generation of Muslims behaved, it is clear that there is something at Islam's core that may be considered problematic.

Therefore, reforming Islam to create a more modern religion may actually cause more division and more bloodshed. A modern Islam will be deemed by hundreds of thousands of Muslims as Satanic and, though a popular notion in the west, may just lead to more bloodshed and more harm for Muslims across the globe.

To truly reform Islam would cross boundaries uncrossable for the majority of Muslims. It would involve denouncing actions attributed to the most pious of Muslims, rejecting the Hadeeth and changing the structure of the Qur'an so completely it would be unrecognizable. Sunni Islam may sooner be destroyed completely than reform into an acceptable, modern version that many so desperately want.

Friday 14 July 2017

Iran is winning its proxy wars, Ikhwan and Salafis fight for the remnants



In Iraq, Syria and Yemen, Iran has been winning its proxy wars.

With the continued destruction of ISIS in Iraq, Shi'ite militias Hashd Ash-Sha'abi are consolidating control of Sunni or mixed areas in Iraq. The battle for Mosul has left the Iraqi Army - comprised of Sunnis and Shi'ites - decimated, so the Iraqi Government will be forced to rely more extensively on Hashd Ash-Sha'abi. Since the militias are fuelled by Islamic Shi'ism, it is not hard to see how Iranian dominance in Iraq is increasing.

The Syrian Arab Army is regaining control of the eastern half of Syria in the provinces of Aleppo, Homs, Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor. ISIS is steadily losing ground, is unable to gain the city of Deir Ez-Zor as its new capital, and is losing dozens of soldiers in every assault by the Syrian Arab Army. This, together with the victory over the cities of Aleppo and Homs, assures that Bashar Al-Assad will not only control western Syria, but control southern and eastern Syria as well.

In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition has so far failed to dislodge the Houthis from northern Yemen - in fact, the Houthis are currently winning the war against them. With the destruction of ISIS in Syria and Iraq looming, Saudi Arabia may be forced to augment its funding for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the hope of dislodging the Houthis from Yemen - however such increased funding would hardly sit well with the Trump Administration and force other world powers, such as Russia, to step in to end the conflict in favour of the Houthis.

With Iraq, Syria and Yemen all set to benefit Iran's political standing in the region, the Salafi worldview - championed by Saudi Arabia - and the Ikhwan worldview - championed by Qatar and Turkey - are fighting over the remains of strategic influence. These will be discussed in more detail below:

1) Egypt

The ousting of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi (2013) has meant that Abdul Feteh As-Sisi has gained control of Egypt and is cracking down hard on support for the Ikhwan, or Muslim Brotherhood. Though Sisi himself is not a Salafi, he is supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE (Dubai) so as to deny the Ikhwan a safe haven in the largest Arab country. The Ikhwan countries of Qatar and Turkey, correspondingly, have been funneling funds to Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula through Hamas, to weaken the Sisi government and enable the Muslim Brotherhood to get stronger once again.

2) Libya

As a result of the overthrow of Libyan President Qaddafi, two governments have established themselves in Libya: the Tobruk-based government, assisted by strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa and the Tripoli Government of National Accord, whose tribes overwhelmingly support the Muslim Brotherhood. Again, a proxy-war between the Salafis and the Ikhwan is being played out here.

Though Haftar Al-Khalifa and the Tobruk-based government are not Salafi, they are seeking to quash political Islam, and the Ikhwan in Libya are their priority target, like for President Sisi in Egypt. So far, the Tobruk government (backed by Saudi Arabia) has the upper hand, because its forces are united and the Tripoli-based government (backed by Qatar and Turkey) is experiencing too much infighting. The Tobruk government also has the advantage in Russian support, whereas the Tripoli government does not have the unilateral backing of a superpower.

3) Syria and Iraq

The victory of Iran against ISIS in Syria and Iraq has forced Saudi Arabia and the Ikhwan to pick new sides. The Ikhwan, led by Turkey, have been forced by Russia into supporting peace in Syria with Bashar Al-Assad as its President. This has been agreed to with an implicit understanding that Turkey would be able to later weaken Kurdish influence in Syria.

However, with Salafi frustration at Iranian dominance looming, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been sending more funds to the Syrian Kurds. Though Kurds do not share the Salafi principles, like the Torbuk government in Libya and President Sisi in Egypt, the Kurds are a valuable proxy in the fight against Iran. Saudi Arabia has also been signalling support Iraqi Kurds in their referendum for independence.

Should the Kurds in Syria and Iraq reach independence, Iran would be threatened from within by its own Kurdish population, which is perhaps what Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman means by "bringing the fight to Iran". Rather than a direct confrontation - which is impossible for Saudi Arabia, given they are currently fighting Yemen - enabling the Kurds in Syria and Iraq to create their own autonomous region would be a blow to Iran of enormous proportions.

Yet this would also greatly anger Turkey, which leads to the current Gulf crisis with Qatar.

4) Qatar

Though Saudi Arabia is experiencing political victories over its Ikhwan counterparts in Egypt and Libya, it has grown increasingly frustrated with Qatar's Ikhwan support in Egypt and Libya, its support for Shi'ite groups and serving as a satellite broadcaster of the Ikhwan agenda with Al-Jazeera. Qatar and Turkey both have strong relations with Iran, and this threatens Saudi Arabia's Salafi ideology enormously, which prefers war between Sunnis and Shi'ites over strategic peace which the Ikhwan supports.

(Interestingly, Al-Qaeda also shares this Ikhwan principle of not deliberately stirring a Shi'ite-Sunni war and instead focusing on attacking the west and Israel. ISIS, on the other hand, shares the Saudi desire to wage a war on the Shi'ites by the larger Sunni population.)

In the blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia and her allies against Qatar, Iran and Turkey have rushed to Qatar's aid, which has meant that Turkish-Saudi relations are deteriorating. This means that Saudi Arabia is no longer able to be hindered by Turkey in potential support for the Kurds. This has meant that Saudi is likely to fund the Kurds in Syria and Iraq and, in the future, in Turkey and Iran as well, to decrease Iranian/Ikwhani dominance in the region.



What is really happening is that Iran has largely won the conflicts of Iraq and Syria and is very likely to win in Yemen. The Ikhwan and Salafis are no longer in a position to challenge Iranian dominance in the Middle-East through their ideologies, so instead must use other proxies to defeat one another.

Another proxy war within Islam is being waged. Rather than the Sunni-Shi'ite war of Iraq, this war is a Sunni war between the Salafis and the Ikhwan, and the victor will determine the future direction of political Sunni Islam.

Thursday 13 July 2017

Iran, Ikhwan and Salafi politics realigned



In the modern Middle-East, the worldviews of Iran, the Ikhwan and the Salafis are the most prominent.

Iran's influence on the Middle-East has manifested itself in a variety of different ways. Since the revolution of 1979, it has developed its reputation as a meddler in Arab affairs through creating Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 and backing Palestine against Israel. As a result of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran and Syria created an alliance, which has benefited both countries.

Because of the Iraq War (2003), Iranian and Shi'ite dominance in the Middle-East increased greatly. This has been further consolidated by Iranian support for Bashar Al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, and the Arab Spring even allowed Iran to extend its influence into Yemen (though Iran's influence on the Houthis is mostly political, counter to the Media's narrative.) In any case, Iran has benefit enormously from the affairs of Arabs.

The Ikhwani influence on the Middle-East was most prominent in Egypt, where President Mohammed Morsi rose to power in 2012. The Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood, have long dwelt in Egypt, but never held power before 2012. However, 2013 saw a great reversal in Ikhwan dominance, with Egyptians protesting Mohammed Morsi's rule and forcing him out of office. The Egyptian protest of 2013 was the largest protest in history.

Under the Morsi government, ties between Iran and Egypt were strengthened after decades of hostility. This mirrors Iran's strong ties to Qatar, Turkey and Hamas. In every country where the Ikhwan worldview dominates, a close yet complex relationship develops between said countries and Iran. Both the Iranian and Ikhwan worldview are more pro-Palestinian than their Salafi counterparts.

Understanding this, then, helps us glimpse into what is going on between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia would like Qatar not to continue its support for the Ikhwan ideology and stop being as close to Iran. This is an affront not only against Iran, but also against Turkey and Hamas, who share Qatar's ideology. UAE (Dubai) and Egypt have sided with Saudi Arabia because the Ikhwan threatens the Egyptian government, which the UAE supports.

Dangerously for Saudi Arabia, targeting Qatar for supporting the Ikhwan exposes Saudi Arabia's own implicit alliance with Israel. The reason for this alliance is that Israel benefits from the instability created by Salafi ideology in Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Israel benefits from its enemies fighting each other, and Saudi Arabia provides the perfect ideology from which wars and instability are created.

However, the US is showing impatience at Saudi's own meddling and churning of instability. The US has remained in Afghanistan for the past 16 years and has been in and out of Iraq, from 2003 - 2011 and then from 2014 until present, and the instability in both countries is set to continue. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has continued fighting proxies of Saudi Arabia with no end in sight.

What we are currently witnessing is a realignment of political alliances as a result of impending peace in Syria. In Syria, the Salafis and the Ikhwan were allied against Iran and the Syrian Government. But Russia has forced Turkey - and with it, the Ikhwan support of the Syrian Opposition - into dialogue, and violence has correspondingly been greatly reduced in Syria.

However, with two of Iran's allies decimated - Syria and Iraq - and with the Ikhwan suffering yet another terrible loss, both the Ikhwan and Iran are looking for a new target. Saudi Arabia is that target. This is signaled by Iranian and Turkish support for Qatar in the Gulf crisis.

It seems that, instead of the more recent Qatar-Turkey-Saudi axis against Syria, the Qatar-Turkey-Iran axis will be formed against Saudi Arabia. The deal between Iran and the Ikhwan is probably for the destruction of the Saudi state, replaced by a state run by the Muslim Brotherhood, to decimate Salafi doctrine and reward Turkey for its role in restoring peace to an Iran-backed Syria.

However, such a project would be dangerous at the least. ISIS is eyeing Saudi Arabia as its next target, so the Iran-Ikhwan plan may backfire, and badly.

Friday 7 July 2017

The divide across Europe



There is a divide across Europe between Globalists and Nationalists, a divide which President Donald Trump is making more observable to the world.

Across the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Netherlands and France, there is a championing of the perspective of the EU, globalism and heightened immigration. In other central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, there is a drive to preserve national identity, borders and stem Muslim immigration.

Enter President Trump. His decision to begin his second visit in Poland signals to Europe that the American priorities are changing. The US is stepping into a void - a central Europe alienated by the EU. This alienation was caused by economic sanctions on EU countries who resist legislation on immigration. Prior to President Trump, Russia was starting to fill the void in central Europe. Now, the US is signalling that it intends to fill that void.

We are witnessing a realignment of global politics. Poland is now a more significant player than before. The opinions of France and Germany matter less to the US than before. Three different superpower blocks are emerging: one, dominated by Russia and China, succeeding the previously socialist block; the second, with the US, India, Japan, South Korea and central Europe, in which capitalist nationalism is pertinent; the third, with the EU and Turkey leading the way in tense but reciprocal ways.

This rupture between EU and self-determining European countries - created by alienating EU policies - is welcome news by Russia and China. However, it presents a difficulty for Britain. While it has voted for Brexit, there is much damage that has been caused by previous immigration policies similar to those of the EU, and much pressure from the political left to implement a soft Brexit, which would keep Britain in the orbit of the EU. Britain is stuck between the two worldviews of the EU and self-determining nationalism of President Trump.

Western Europe, under the grossly ideological views of the EU, is set to collapse and perhaps even become a new area of dominance for the Islamic world. Time will tell how this will affect the western nationalist and Russian/Chinese blocks. Sadly, for Britain, such a collapse might lead to unrest and even civil war.

Thursday 22 June 2017

Mohammed Bin Salman named Crown Prince - Saudi civil war now inevitable



Now that Mohammed Bin Salman has replaced his cousin as the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the odds of civil war rising out of the monarchy have increased exponentially.

Mohammed Bin Nayef and King Salman have a history of cautious decision making in the kingdom, balancing the various powers and religio-political structures through their roles as King and Crown Prince, and in their previous positions as well. By contrast, Mohammed Bin Salman is hopelessly outmatched in every arena.

As Minister of Defense, Mohammed Bin Salman orchestrated the Yemen war, which has led to military failure and stalemate, an Al-Qaeda stronghold and famine in northern Yemen. Mohammed Bin Salman has been pushing for the 2030 Vision, an ambitious project that seeks to modernize the kingdom and take it further away from its roots in Salafi doctrine, to move it towards modernity, to solidify its position as the US' top Arab partner.

ISIS and Al-Qaeda have been already using Mohammed Bin Salman as their personification of everything wrong with Saudi Arabia. From the terror groups' perspective, Mohammed Bin Salman represents the poison of America, staining the land of the two holy mosques with an implicit alliance with Israel against Iran - and, by extension, against the Palestinians.

But with Mohammed Bin Salman's plan of internal modernization to be coupled with curbing of external "Salifization" - the process of making the Sunni Muslim world identify more with the Qur'an and the Sunnah, without modern contextualization, which leads to ISIS ideology - the only place where Salifization would be able to occur would be from within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia against Mohammed Bin Salman in either a civil war or a revolution.

In fact, unlike King Abdullah, King Salman and former Crown Princes Muqrin and Mohammed Bin Nayef, Mohammed Bin Salman is severely handicapped by one thing above all others: age. His age, 31, gives more reason for Saudis to doubt his ability. This is not only linked to a lack of experience - which he has shown - but also to the innate Arabic culture which respects men with white hair and white beards more than any others. Should Mohammed Bin Salman rule Saudi Arabia as king, he will be younger than self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS. And this matters in Arabic culture.

With Sunni-Shi'ite tensions rising in the Gulf; with the Yemeni war showing no end in sight; with Syria stabilizing; with Iran showing dominance across many countries surrounding Saudi Arabia; with Turkey standing against Saudi Arabia with Qatar; and, most of all, with Mohammed Bin Salman leading the kingdom from one foreign policy blunder to another, civil war in Saudi Arabia now seems inevitable.

The only one who may have been able to stop such a civil war is an older member of the Saudi royal family. A king Mohammed Bin Salman is incapable of such a task - even worse, his life is at risk.

Saturday 10 June 2017

How the Afghan War stopped Syrian chaos



Obama withdrew from Iraq in 2011, saying that Iraq's future was now in the hands of its people. At the same time, Obama overthrew Libyan President Gidaffi in a limited air strike campaign, endorsed the Arab Spring and sent Libyan National Army weapons to Syria to help fund the rebels - all the while refusing a peace agreement in Syria until Bashar Al-Assad had stepped aside.

The following should be stated more often: It is more important to win the old wars than to start new ones. It is much easier to start a war than to win a war. Obama himself showed a preference for starting wars over winning wars.

That said, while Obama's withdrawal from Iraq gave him more leeway in interfering during the Arab Spring, he campaigned on fighting the "good war" in Afghanistan. The focus and financial spending on the Afghan War meant that Obama was too invested in continuing said "good war" to really commit in Libya or Syria. In Libya, he limited his airstrikes to overthrowing Libyan President Gidaffi. In Syria, Obama only funded the Syrian rebels and never installed a no-fly-zone to depose Assad, though in 2013 he came dangerously close to doing so.

Trump is also handicapped by the Afghan War and unable to really commit to a ground war in Syria. Like Obama before him, Trump is not as interested in overthrowing Assad as he is in defeating ISIS. Though striking Syria after the alleged chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun, Trump has stated that the US is not going into Syria.

Many of the same voices that scream for the US to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan also scream for the overthrow of the Syrian Government. Neither Trump nor Obama listened to said voices completely, and as a result both committed themselves to fighting the old war in Afghanistan rather than starting a new one in Syria.

Yet unlike Obama, whose policy of withdrawal from Iraq was almost repeated in Afghanistan, Trump is planning to win the Afghan War and to stay in Iraq, which will prevent him from interfering militarily to the same extent Obama had during his Presidency. Trump plans on letting Russia absorb Obama's Syrian and Libyan conflicts, to make sure that, in US foreign policy, Obama's name is forgotten and Trump's name is remembered.

The Afghan War, stated by so many as being a wasted mission, has actually succeeded in a different mission entirely: stopping the US military industrial complex from making the chaos worse in Syria. Bashar Al-Assad is President of Syria to this day, in part, because of the Afghan War. And the world should be grateful for that.

Sunday 4 June 2017

Qatar-Gulf relations in ruins

For more information:

http://www.news18.com/news/world/qatar-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-uae-diplomatic-ties-1421881.html

Saudi Arabia has been leading the way in cutting ties with Qatar over their links to sponsoring Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Countries that are with Saudi Arabia against Qatar include Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (Dubai), Yemen and Egypt.

This news is astonishing. It suggests that Trump's speech in Saudi Arabia has worked in changing the minds of leaders in several Arab countries against terrorism in a strong way. Whatever can be said about other nations' sponsoring of terrorism, Qatar is perhaps the worst sponsor of terrorism in the world, and nations seeking to isolate Qatar for terror-related activities is definitely a step in the right direction.

The rest of the Gulf is as of now blockading Qatar. Should sanctions go on Qatar, the nation itself will be in trouble, as most of Qatar's money comes from their oil and gas reserves. It leaves Qatar more open to instability and terrorism and, should war break out in Qatar, ISIS would find a very receptive crowd there.

It also means that Qatar will try and destabilize its neighbours in hopes of removing the blockade. This makes Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates more vulnerable to ISIS detonation, so while it is commendable that these Gulf countries moved towards decreasing terrorism in the region, it is likely to have a negative impact on the Gulf in the short-term.

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are particularly vulnerable due to flaring tensions between the Shi'ites and Sunnis in the two nations. Should Qatar direct its resources to instability in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain through a Shi'ite-Sunni conflict, surely ISIS would benefit and absorb the smaller kingdoms - and much of Saudi Arabia - into a new Caliphate. This would, inevitably, absorb Qatar as well.

Perhaps ISIS' next capital after Raqqa is Doha. Or perhaps it will be Dubai, or Bahrain. It is a scary time for the Gulf, with the only certainty being that ISIS will come to the Arabian Gulf and destabilize it completely.

Tuesday 23 May 2017

Why the Euro-Islamist Alliance is increasing



The real reason the European Union wants to flood Europe with economic Muslim migrants is out of fear of Russia.

The rise of Russia and China over the last few decades has been remarkable. While China has been steadily growing in production through use of a combination of Capitalism and Communism, Russia has stabilized its areas of instability in the 1990's and, until the trouble in Ukraine began, was doing very well for itself economically.

The Arab Spring and the mess in Ukraine largely took allies away from Russia, but in the face of the current crises in the Middle-East, Russia is set to solidify and gain alliances back. For example, the military intervention against the rebels in Syria has given Russia complete monopoly over Syria and a sure ally in Bashar Al-Assad. With Egypt's help, Russia has also been working on a solution to the Libyan crisis, which would mean Russia would hold sway there as well. Even Russian-Egyptian relations are warming quicker than American-Egyptian relations.

If Russia ends up with military bases in Syria, Libya and Egypt - which I deem likely - that presents a serious threat to hegemony in the EU and even undermines the European Project itself. Therefore, the perceived solution for a weakening Europe is to flood their lands with economic Muslim migrants, because radical Islamic culture is incompatible with Russian influence. Islam represents the best bulwark for Europe against a revived Russia.

Not all EU countries have nor will follow this madness to its conclusion. While Sweden, France and Germany are likely to become part of a Muslim Europe, countries like Poland and Hungary would sooner put past differences with Russia behind them than overrun their country with economic Muslim migrants. Even Britain stands a good chance of resisting this mass emigration, due partially to Brexit and partially to the compartmentalization of Britain into Muslim and non-Muslim areas.

Whatever the case, areas which have resisted Muslim occupation for hundreds and hundreds of years are about to become part of the Muslim world. The EU has valued hatred for Russia over the preservation of its own civilization.

Wednesday 10 May 2017

Macron's victory proves western civilisation's impending collapse



After a society turns hyper-sexual, wait 60 years - then you'll see it implode on itself.

In light of this, however, I was surprised when Britain voted Brexit and, subsequently, America voted Trump . I wondered, huh, maybe the west has avoided the fate of the nations before it.

Then Emanuel Macron won the French election.

Left wing politics have become really stupid. Instead of working out how to solve Climate Change - which is the perhaps most pressing issue of our time - the left cries for secular Arab dictatorships to be overthrown, screams for women to end up with more rights than men, screams about micro-aggressions and welcomes excessive economic migrants from Muslim countries.

It doesn't really make a lot of logical sense - until you realise that western civilisation's collapse is self-made and imminent.

The collapse of western civilisation is rooted in post-modernism - which is the rejection of any form of ideology and the ultimate western-culture-loathing pit. That is how Muslim immigration fits into post-modernism: these westerners actually want their society destroyed and to be overpopulated with Muslims.

While Trump and Brexit suggest a shift to the political right (which will save the English-speaking peoples from collapse) France, Germany and other countries of the EU are still holding onto failed left-wing ideals and failed left-wing immigration policies, which will undoubtedly result in the destruction of western culture in countries like France, Germany and Sweden. Western and Central Europe will become Muslim Europe.

Even "better" is that they will have a strong, Muslim leader to bring the Ottoman Empire back to life: Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. He has systematically destroyed the secular ideology of Ataturk - upon which Turkey was founded - and seeks to bring back the Ottoman Empire. While unlikely to be able to rule the Middle-East - given Russian and American strong ties to the region - the Ottoman Empire spreading out into Europe seems eerily familiar: after the fall of Constantinople, the Ottomans conquered their European empire before conquering the Middle-East.

With Macron elected as President of France, it isn't hard to see how Turkey may actually become part of the European Union in the future, and through the EU remake the Ottoman Empire.

But what about Le Pen? If she couldn't win this time in 2017, there is no way she will win in 2022. With the amount of Muslims Macron is planning on bringing into France, that will shift the population decisively away from Le Pen.

Western collapse is impending in Europe. Civil war is likely to light up the continent as people to the political left and right will tear each other to shreds. I am confident right-wing Britain may actually be victors in such a war, but Sweden, France and Germany (Germany provided a pro-EU chancellor wins this year, which I believe likely) are likely to fall to left-wing/Muslim immigration policies permanently, until Muslims end up ruling western and central Europe.

Soon we are going to see a very different Europe. This next Europe will be supported by either Turkey, Britain/US coalition or Russia. It will be a very dangerous time, a time in which Turkey will become increasingly isolated and nations surrounding Turkey - like Syria, Iraq and Greece - will turn to Russia or America for protection against it.

It is the end of western civilisation as we know it.

Friday 28 April 2017

Instead of attacking Yemen



I personally believe that Saudi Arabia has made an enormously erroneous move by attacking the Houthis in Yemen and being stuck in a war that only benefits Al-Qaeda.

But I understand that sometimes countries need to exert their influence to make the world a better place. So the question therein lies: what would have been a better alternative for Saudi Arabia than attacking Yemen?

Well, attacking Syria would have been even more disastrous. Russia would have stepped in and completely pushed back Saudi Arabia from overthrowing the Assad Government.

In order to decrease Iranian influence in the region, it would have better served Saudi Arabia to exert an enormous amount of air power in Iraq against ISIS - maybe even send troops there. Such a move could have been supported with the opening of a Saudi Embassy in Baghdad, high level meetings between their two governments and Saudi promising to invest in Iraqi infrastructure after ISIS' defeat.

ISIS represents an even greater threat to Saudi Arabia than Iran does. So it is in Saudi's interest to destroy ISIS at all costs, especially when Iraq borders Saudi Arabia.

But in addition to this, Saudi Arabia could strengthen Iraq as a sovereign nation to get it out of Iranian influence. It could push for the Iraqi Shi'ites to be less obedient to Iran and more obedient to Ayatollah Ali As-Sistani and, subsequently, help fund Sistani's Iraqi Shi'ism against the Iranian Shi'ism, because they are different.

Not only so, but Saudi could have sent its own Shi'ites on scholarship to study Iraqi Shi'ism in Iraq, to stop them being radicalised by Iran. Iraq could have even been invited into the GCC. That would be one way to certainly make Iraq more balanced between Iran and the Gulf states.

If strengthening relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia wasn't enough, Saudi could have perhaps done an air campaign in Libya on the side of Haftar Al-Khalifa. This would have also strengthened Saudi's position in the region far more than an attack on the Houthis has.

Correspondingly, Saudi could have withdrawn from the ISIS campaign in Syria and cut off all diplomacy with the Houthi-occupied Yemen. That way Saudi would have still been seen as "sticking it" to Iran while also helping make the region more stable.

There are more ways to defeat Iran than just by bombing their allies.

Tuesday 25 April 2017

Why North Korea Debacle is great for the Middle-East



Trump ran on an non-interventionist campaign, but the Establishment hates him for it.

There has been enormous pressure on Trump to act in a wide variety of Middle-East conflicts, such as in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the most part, Trump has resisted pressure of unwise escalation, with the exception of an airstrike on a Syrian Government airbase a couple weeks ago.

But the risk is that the Washington Establishment (or, as Trump calls it, the Swamp) will want him to escalate more Middle-East wars to keep the Establishment going. Obama succumbed to the pressure from the Establishment in Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia - whereas in Iraq he made his own decision: pulling out. (As for Obama-Establishment tensions on Syria, it is more complicated than a simple one or the other.)

While refusing to exit from any of the Middle-East conflicts thus far, Trump has so far mostly escalated the conflicts against terrorist networks rather than against governments in any area. As of now, Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Iran and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya are all still standing, and Trump has not attacked any of them - with the exception of one airstrike two weeks ago against Syria.

North Korea only increases the likelihood that Trump will not escalate against Bashar Al-Assad, the Houthis, Iran or Haftar Al-Khalifa. With North Korea looking so incredibly unstable and with war between the US and North Korea looking possible, the Establishment would be satisfied with a Korean War over and above many of the piecemeal conflicts in the Middle-East.

This gives Trump the gateway through which he may be able to withdraw from several conflicts in the Middle-East. He has stated that he will give Prime Minister Abadi "strong, firm support" calling them "important partners", so it is unlikely Trump will withdraw from Iraq. He is also unlikely to withdraw from Afghanistan, as winning the Afghan War would make Trump go down in history as a great President. And it is possible that Trump could win this war before he leaves the Presidency.

However, regarding Libya, Trump has shown incredible resistance to interfering with Russian/Egyptian plans in the country, which has caused frustration for Europe but popular support from Americans. Trump has also shown resistance to attacking the Houthis in Yemen. He is also not interested in invading and overthrowing the Syrian Government. In addition to all this, Iran has quietened down in the face of being put "on notice" by the US government.

North Korea, therefore, presents a piecemeal offering Trump may offer to the Establishment, in exchange for withdrawal from Syria after the destruction of ISIS, as well as non-interference against Libya, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran. Because of this, the Middle-East might be spared more regime change madness and be given a chance at some sort of recovery after the disastrous Obama years.

Monday 24 April 2017

If John Waver had done an Iraq War



I would never have done it in 2003. For what I would have actually done in response to 9-11 if I had been in George Bush's shoes, see the following article:

http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com.au/2017/03/if-john-waver-had-been-george-w-bush.html

But let's just say that George W. Bush invaded Iraq, took control of Baghdad, had a heart-attack and John Waver happened to be the Vice President. What would have I done to limit the Iraqi debacle?

Of course I would've found Saddam Hussein and I probably would have exiled him rather than execute him.

I would not have handed Iraq over to the Shi'ite Arab population, as Bush did. Nor would have I kept another Sunni Arab Ba'athist dictator in power.

I would have formed a Kurdish government to control Iraq.

Iraq is a completely unstable nation. That is why someone like Saddam Hussein was needed to keep the lid on it. The only force capable of keeping Iraq together - other than the Arab Ba'ath party - is the Kurds. They may not be the most populous group on the ground, but they are certainly the most driven group on the ground.

I would have let the Iraqi Army still serve, under the Kurds - together with their Peshmerga. The advantage of having Kurds control Iraq is that the Kurdish problem in Iran, Syria and Turkey would almost be solved overnight - they would emigrate to Iraq and not stay in the other countries. It would mean borders would not need to be changed for the Kurds to control a country.

Kurdish populations would have moved into Baghdad and would have moved the Sunni Arabs out of historically Kurdish regions, like Kirkuk - called the Kurdish Jerusalem - and into other Iraqi regions. The Kurds would have kept tight control on the Sunni and Shi'ite Arab populations and would have restricted immigration to just Kurds from Syria, Iran and Turkey to balance out the population in favour of the Kurds.

It would have sent a shockwave of enormous proportions throughout the Middle-East. Under the Kurds Iraq would have established public ties with Israel. Also, Saudi Arabia and Iran would have funded terrorism in Iraq like crazy - but instead of one terror group controlling the country - Iran-backed militias - and the other treated the enemy - Al-Qaeda in Iraq/ISIS - both would be seen as the enemy, making Iran-backed militias and ISIS-minded jihadists less popular than they are today.

It would have caused outrage from the other Arab nations, as well as Turkey and Iran. But it also would have solved the Kurdish issue, given Israel an ally, protected the Yazidi and Christian minorities, and prevented terrorism from spreading as far and wide as it did in Bush's Iraq War and in Obama's Syria War.

It would not have been perfect, nor would it have been as stable as under Saddam Hussein. But it would have been one of the best scenarios in what was the epic debacle of the Iraq War.

Tuesday 28 February 2017

Yemen: the next Islamic State 2017 UPDATE

Original article written on 21st of August, 2015
First published on blogger.com on 20th of November 2016
Original article can be found here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2016/11/yemen-next-islamic-state.html





Since 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are interested in seeing Southern Yemen looked after more than it was under the previous dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Some groups, like the Southern Movement, want Southern Yemen to break away from Northern Yemen altogether. Other groups, like the tribes allied to President Hadi, would rather see Southern Yemen become more prominent in politics.

AQAP, like ISIS before it, is likely to swallow the smaller groups with different agendas, such as the Southern Movement, the tribes which back President Hadi and Sunni tribes currently under the Houthis, to establish an Islamic Emirate across as much of Yemen as possible, with the southerners on top.

AQAP has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. President Hadi is likely to let AQAP gain strongholds in northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis and deal with the fallout later. Unfortunately, should Houthi-allied Sunni tribes swap allegiance to Al-Qaeda, AQAP would become far more powerful than the current Yemeni President.

The northern Yemeni tribes would only leave the Houthi alliance if they had no other option. If supporting Al-Qaeda or President Hadi become the choices for the northern Yemeni tribes, they would overwhelmingly choose Al-Qaeda and subsequently wage war on the Hadi government.

Northern Yemen hates President Hadi more than Al-Qaeda.

Though AQAP consider Shi'ites (and subsequently Zaidis) as heretics, they believe, as does the rest of Al-Qaeda, that focusing on a Sunni-Shi'ite conflict is counter-productive. This means Zaidi tribes could be won over by AQAP to - implicitly - support the Al-Qaeda war against the Hadi government.

The unfortunate thing is that America is unlikely to realize the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group is headed for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. Should AQAP defeat the Houthis, the power held by Al-Qaeda would force a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and AQAP, first through Saudi's proxy, President Hadi, then against Saudi Arabia itself.

Should this occur, there would be nothing America could do to save the Arabian Gulf from civil war.

Saturday 25 February 2017

NATO is in Iraq



I wish to let you my readers know that I was wrong about NATO and Iraq - NATO, as of January 2017, has been in Iraq training the Iraqi Security Forces.

I wish to apologize for not finding this information out sooner and doing enough research into NATO's involvement in Iraq since Trump became President. Iraq is going to be another NATO project, as Afghanistan is.

This is likely to have several repercussions. It is clear that Iraqi oil is likely to be the great monopoly for not only America, but for all NATO partners. It is also clear that NATO spending will ease American finances in Iraq, which will greatly help America. It will force Russia out of eyeing Iraq as a potential ally and sees western-Iraqi relations increasing to new heights.

Whether Trump will expand NATO intervention into Libya and Syria or not is unclear, as this may hinder Trump's desire to 'get along well with Putin,' as the most effective forces in both these countries are backed by Russia. Yemen is even more illusive.

Thursday 23 February 2017

Israel's allies in the Middle-East under Trump



I have predicted some sizable outcomes for the future of the Middle-East. I have predicted that Syria will stabilize under President Bashar Al-Assad; I have predicted Iraq will become stable under Trump's leadership, that Iraq will become the main Arab oil exporter; I have predicted Libya will stabilize under Haftar Al-Khalifa with American and Russian support; I have predicted that, should Trump get a second term, Afghanistan will stabilize under an anti-Iranian dictator.

In light of all this, where would Israel's main Arab allies be? My thoughts:

1) Jordan. The Hashemi ruling elite in Jordan has been backed into a corner by the West. After world war 1, the West has removed the Iraqi and Hijazi kingdoms from the Hashmites and replaced them with dictators and the Saudi royal family in each region respectively. Because of this, King Abdullah of Jordan has been forced into the difficult position of dealing with the largest border with Israel, while maintaining positive relations with Palestine, Palestinians in Jordan, ethnic Jordanians, the entire Middle-East and America.

True to being a Hashemi, King Abdullah of Jordan has managed to beautifully balance all of these requirements and has kept relations with Israel cordial. They remain in good relations while Jordan also maintains good relations with Palestine.

2) Egypt. Egypt has had a history of defeat at the hands of Israel during the 6-day war, while also signing peace agreements under Mubarak, the previous dictator of Egypt. With Islamism on the rise, Abdul Feteh As-Sisi is desperate for anti-Islamist allies, including Israel. Trump has called for not only an alliance but a friendship with Sisi, and this, together with strong ties to Israel, should see relations improve strongly between the three countries.

Currently, relations between Egypt and Israel are good; relations between Palestine and Egypt have turned sour. Sisi has done this to contrast from Mohammed Morsi, the last President of Egypt, who was from the Muslim Brotherhood and loved Palestine and Iran. Sisi likes neither country, and seems intent on not only maintaining but increasing good relations with Israel. This would be why Trump has extended such a warm invitation of friendship to Egypt under Sisi.

3) Saudi Arabia. While relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia are at an all-time high, I do not expect this to last at all. This is not because Iran will no longer be a regional threat, but rather because Mohammed Bin Salman is likely to increase relations with Israel to an unbearable point for the Saudi people. Like Iran in 1979, Saudi Arabia runs the risk of revolution should Mohammed Bin Salman work towards not only strong relations with Israel - which Saudi currently enjoys - but more public relations with Israel.

So while in the short-term relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel will be maintained and also increase, in the long-term Saudi Arabia is likely to turn violently anti-Israel. Whether this surfaces in an ISIS takeover of the country, or an Al-Qaeda takeover, or a Muslim Brotherhood revolution, or a more conservative branch of the Saudi royal family taking control, is irrelevant: relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel are likely to deteriorate.

4) Iraq. Currently relations between Iraq and Israel are terrible. Like under Saddam Hussein, the current Iraqi government has no desire to improve relations with Israel.

However, a revolution in Saudi Arabia would likely change all that. While needing security from Iran and America - in an attempt to perhaps show America that Iraq is not dominated by Iran - secret efforts to increase cooperation with Israel might be implemented. This was how Saudi Arabia began its relations with Israel - Iraq would likely do the same should Saudi Arabia implode.


These are the four countries which I believe are worth observing regarding Israel. Watch this space!

Tuesday 21 February 2017

NATO, Russia and America in Libya



Very interesting developments are occurring in regards to Libya, Russia, America and NATO.

Other members of NATO are not paying their fair share. NATO is, in many ways, obsolete, with America always having to bear the brunt of the burden and financial cost, and with NATO mainly directed to Russia and not to radical Islamic terrorism.

Libya is the ultimate way for Trump to revolutionize NATO. How? By abandoning it. Instead, Trump would wage a war for Libyan security with a Russian-American alliance.

Russia and America share an ally in Egypt. Abdul Feteh Sisi has strong ties to Russia, dating back to the beginning of Sisi's military coup in 2013, when Obama wanted nothing to do with Egypt but Putin did. Now that Trump is promising not only an alliance but a friendship to Sisi, in Libya we see American and Russian interests are very similar: stability in Libya to protect Sisi to his west, which means Haftar Al-Khalifa.

Thus it may be in Libya where American-Russian relations bud to fruition rather than in Syria. In Syria it is a quagmire like no other, and should America bomb ISIS with Russia in Syria, it would be perceived to benefit Iran.

Not only so, but such a Libya strategy would result in a serious wake up call to NATO. They would know that America has other options, unless they pay their fair share of the wage and focus more on radical Islamic terrorism than Putin.

Thus would be a win-win situation for both Putin and Trump, but particularly for Trump: it would improve ties with Russia, force NATO to pay their fair share, stabilize Libya and fulfill his promise to Egyptian President Sisi to not only alliance but friendship.

This is the likely outcome for Libya. And it is one that would show that the Trump-doctrine is just what the world needs right now.

Sunday 12 February 2017

If John Waver had been Barrack Obama



Forget that I'm not Barrack Obama, but let's just imagine that I, John Waver, had been in 2008 elected to be President of the United States of America, as I am today. What would have President John Waver done in Foreign Policy?

I would have been different from Obama in a number of ways. However, on Iraq, I would have been in accord: it was time to get out, or at least leave a residual force behind if allowed by the then Maliki government.

From the start of 2008 in Afghanistan, however, I would have implemented a vastly different policy to that of Obama's. Rather than give in to demands for a troop surge in Afghanistan, I would have surged airstrikes in Afghanistan to support existing American/NATO troops and bolster morale for Afghani troops.

From the beginning, I would have implemented an "Iraq War in Reverse" mentality in Afghanistan. I would have allowed - and even encouraged - then leader of Afghanistan Hamid Kharzai to remain in power indefinitely as a dictator so he could crack down hard on the Taliban.

I would have had a "no tolerance" approach to the Taliban, who had harboured Al-Qaeda preceding 9-11. I would have pushed Hamid Kharzai for mass arrests of Taliban members and for members of the Taliban to be held in high security prisons. Rather than putting lots of money into Afghani infrastructure - that was so frequently blown up again and again - I would have put the money into border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to make sure no Pakistani Taliban would come through to Afghanistan.

I would not negotiate with the Taliban. I would make sure that a dictatorship under Kharzai was fiercely anti-terrorism and anti-Taliban, and - once a much stronger country - encourage for Kharzai to stand up to Iran, like Saddam Hussein did, to assist America in that regard.

While withdrawing from Iraq in 2011, I would have marked the war as a defeat, not a victory. I would tell the American soldiers that their fight was tough and was not in vain, but that as of now, America had lost the Iraq War. I would encourage them to stiffen their resolve in fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan and that, should the Iraqis ever need our help, the United States would be their top ally and friend and return swiftly.

In the 2010 Iraqi elections, I would have pushed for Ayad Allawi to become the Prime Minister, as he was supposed to be. Though I would have supported Iraq no matter the Prime Minister, I would have at that time criticized Al-Maliki for his policies which alienated Sunni Arabs from belief in Iraq, and blamed him for Iranian takeover of Iraq, to weaken him and strengthen Allawi. Assuming I failed in diplomacy, I would still have remained in support of Iraq under Maliki.

I would not have endorsed the Arab Spring at all. I would not have overthrown Gidaffi in Libya, nor pushed to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, nor would have I encouraged the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. I would site the Iraq War as the top reason.

The result of this would have meant no ISIS in Syria or Libya, and no Al-Qaeda there either.

With no S in ISIS - S for Syria - the Islamic State of Iraq, under Al-Qaeda, probably would have still reared its ugly head in 2014. I would have immediately put in a "safe zone" in Nineveh Province to prevent Christian and Yazidi genocide and, if necessary, would have put in American ground troops in that safe zone to prevent it.

But I would not expand military operations in Iraq beyond the Nineveh safe zone until Allawi were made Prime Minister of Iraq, as he should have been in 2010. I would have repeated my claims about Nouri Al-Maliki's leadership. Perhaps then, Allawi would become the Prime Minister following the crisis in 2014.

Had Allawi become Prime Minister, I would then give him firm and strong support via airstrikes to protect Baghdad and the oilfields of Kurdistan. I would have prioritized northern Iraq before Anbar Province, to make Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan work hard to prevent infiltration from ISI, while securing Christians and Yazidis from genocide and slavery.

The result may have been that ISI would have been driven out of Iraq by the end of my second Presidential term, because there would be no significant amounts of funding from the US to ISI to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad, but also because ISI would not exist in Syria and not exist as a Caliphate.

While destroying ISI - or at least driving it underground - I would tell Allawi I planned to prioritize oil exports from Iraq over every other country. I would have drastically increased the oil exports from Iraq, and drastically decreased them from countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to bankrupt them so they would be no longer able to fund their projects.

Thus, in my view, Afghanistan and Iraq would have been drastically more stable than they are today. Yes, Obama: I could've beat you on Foreign Policy in the Middle-East.

Friday 10 February 2017

Positioning NATO towards radical Islam PART TWO



Now that Trump has been President for almost 1 month, his intentions behind NATO are more clear.

It seems that Trump intends for the Afghan War to become purely a NATO war, not an American-NATO war. It is in Afghanistan that Trump sees his idea of positioning NATO towards radical Islam to be the easiest to implement.

It would force all partners within NATO to work towards a solution to the Afghani conflict - which will only occur once all members of NATO are convinced to prioritize stability over democracy. America under Trump sees this - so does, interestingly, Erdogan of Turkey. But few other NATO allies do.

It is very unlikely that NATO would be positioned within Syria or Libya, as Trump seems content for these conflicts to end up in Russia's hands. Putting NATO in Syria and/or Libya adds risk to conflict between NATO and Russia, which Trump is against.

It is also unlikely that NATO would be positioned in Iraq. NATO would get in the way of Trump's desire for a largely American victory in Iraq.

As for Yemen, that is the now uncertain arena in regards to NATO. At the moment, Trump is happy to work with the Saudi government against the Iran-sympathetic (but not Iran-backed) Houthis, but will that last after stability is reached elsewhere? Will Trump betray Saudi Arabia after stability returns to Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan? Or will he increase NATO involvement on the southern neighbour of the Arabian Peninsula?

The first is more likely, but with Trump, things are not always as they seem.

Thursday 2 February 2017

The only solution to the Afghan War



It should be obvious to pundits that the only country who really has the right idea about how to defeat terrorism is Russia.

Their historic 'Iraq War in reverse' in Syria has seen drastic levels of stability reached all across the country. Once ISIS and Al-Qaeda are cleared out from Syria, Bashar Al-Assad will make sure that his country will no longer be a terrorist haven.

This lesson has profound implications for Afghanistan. Meanwhile, other journalists are calling for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table as part of the peace process. The Taliban! The group who harboured Al-Qaeda and caused 9-11!

Of course, Trump will not focus on Afghanistan until Iraq is stabilized. His plan to stabilize Iraq involves destroying ISIS, giving Sunni Arabs more of a say in their government, quenching Iranian influence from the country, and upping oil relations between Iraq and the West. Let's hope it works.

But the solution for Afghanistan is clear: an 'Iraq-War in reverse' must be waged. Rather than engaging in dialogue with the Taliban, the Taliban need to be ruthlessly driven out of Afghanistan into Pakistan - either that or mass Taliban imprisonment.

A strong man must take charge of Afghanistan; whether he be an Afghan general or someone else, a coup must be supported by the United States to enable strong government to exist in Afghanistan, to the detriment of terrorism and benefit of the Afghani people.

Wednesday 25 January 2017

Why the Arab Spring was worse than the Iraq War



The Arab Spring destroyed more countries than the Iraq War did.

To be sure, George W. Bush's invasion in 2003 totally and completely destroyed Iraq. It increased persecution of Iraqi minority groups, especially Sunni Arabs and Christians, and gave birth to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004), the organisation which became the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006.

However, when Obama inherited that big mess, he could have very easily left Iraq without sending money to Islamic State of Iraq. Yes, you heard that right: Obama sent money to the Islamic State of Iraq to get them to be allies in overthrowing the secular Syrian Government.

Did you know that the same year the Iraq War ended, Obama endorsed the Arab Spring and funded terrorists, including ISIS, to overthrow dictators?

In Syria the results have been obvious, because most of the "moderate rebels" defected to then Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or ISIS), the organisation which expanded from the Islamic State of Iraq. ISIS would never have existed in Syria had Obama not supported the Syrian Opposition.

In Libya, much less is seen in the Media, but it is nonetheless horrific. The violence escalated about the same time as ISIS invaded Iraq and declared their Caliphate. In 2014, the remnants of the Libyan Government moved to Tobruk to wage war against mainly Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda militants based in Tripoli. This war, while not as intense as the current Syrian-Iraqi conflict, has still caused untold suffering for the people of Libya.

Yemen is also a very sad story. Obama gave the kingdom of Saudi Arabia the green light to wage a war against the Houthis, a Iranian-friendly (but not Iranian-backed) group hell-bent on destroying Al-Qaeda in Yemen and giving the country much-needed stability. However, Saudi bombing has ended that possibility, with now 7 million Yemenis in famine as we speak,

All three of these conflicts could have never existed had Obama not endorsed in then "Arab Spring." Had Gidaffi crushed the rebellion in 2011; had Assad been able to crush the "moderate rebels" in Syria, the Arab Spring would have undoubtedly dried up.

Syria, Libya and Yemen together affect more people than Iraq does. Iraq has a population of 30 million; the combined population of Syria, Libya and Yemen is 60 million, double that amount.

The difference is that less American ground troops were sent into Syria, Libya and Yemen. This is the reason why Obama's intervention (or compliance over actions of American allies) in Syria, Libya and Yemen has been (until recently) more popular than George Bush's Iraq War. Americans saw Iraq as if it was outside their window - Syria, Libya and Yemen they do not.

But it seems likely that the Obama legacy - and the legacy of the Arab Spring - will be in Russian takeover of each of these 3 conflicts. Russia plans to stabilize Syria by fully allying and cooperating with the government there; in Libya, Russia is currently working with Egypt to stabilize the country by working on a solution through Haftar Al-Khalifa and the remnants of the Libyan Government in Tobruk; in Yemen, Russia is patiently eyeing for the right moment to intervene, likely to occur after significant levels of stability are reached in Syria and Libya.

Thus will it be that Trump's own legacy will be more aligned with that of America: end the Iraq and Afghan Wars properly and proceed to focus on America First. Should Trump remain President for 8 years, I expect he will accomplish these, and these without worrying about Russia cleaning up Obama's mess.

Thursday 12 January 2017

Brexit and Trump, and why millennials need to wake up



Overwhelmingly, millennials are shaken and upset that Brexit and Trump happened.

But I wonder how many millennials have full-time jobs? Or have families to provide for? Or whether they live at home, single, partying like there's no tomorrow with only a mind on themselves.

Selfishness is a trait inherent to millennials. They need to wake up and smell the coffee.

Brexit and Trump happened because many people in Britain and America are able to compare between how these countries were, and how these countries are. Before, Britain and America had independence in trade, foreign policy and immigration. Now the world dictates unfair and unjust trade deals, foreign policy and obscene types of immigration, which has meant the older generations voted for Brexit and Trump.

Obama's foreign policy decisions rival those of George W. Bush. Though not responsible for the Iraq War, Obama's foreign policy decisions in Libya and Syria were abysmal, causing untold suffering for the Middle-East and resulting in the genocide of minorities. That was Barrack Obama - not George Bush.

George Bush, to his credit, didn't invade another country after learning the lesson of Iraq. Barrack Obama's foreign policy saw the destabilization of Syria, Libya, Yemen and even Ukraine. These are Barrack Obama's fault, and nobody knows about it or cares from the millennial generation.

Britain, NATO and the EU wholeheartedly supported Barrack Obama's moves in these countries, which has left the world far less safe than it was 8 years ago. That's Obama, not Bush.

In addition to all this destabilization, the EU and Obama's America have been taking in more refugees, caused by intervention in these countries. Do you see the pattern? Obama destabilizes the Middle-East by forcefully supporting the Arab Spring, then, look at that! Immigration goes up!

Nothing was done by the EU and Obama to respond appropriately to these crises - all the decisions merely inflamed the crises. That's why Brexit and Trump happened, and that's why millennials need to wake up.

The older generations have seen far more of life than millennials have. Can millennials really claim to be well educated when they cry out for Socialism that led to the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union? Or that Socialism is causing the bankruptcy of the European Union? That Greece failed because of the Euro?

Or that Barrack Obama has done more in aid of terrorism in his foreign policy blunders than even George W. Bush?! That Obama is the reason the economy in America is failing? His unwillingness to tackle big banks, wall street and job loss, while everyone says, 'he's a good President' because he's an Afro-American democrat who says nice things?!

The older generations have done you, the millennials, a huge favour. The whining and whinging over their votes for your future is sickening. Read up on the issues, the actual issues, and you will see that Trump and Brexit are the best change we've seen in a quarter of a century of politics.

Sunday 8 January 2017

why an ISIS-Saudi war is not only probable but inevitable



The forces that were unleashed in the Iraq War have not yet been fully realised. This is especially true regarding ISIS and the threat it brings to Saudi Arabia.

Whether the conflicts in Iraq and Syria end or not is irrelevant - either way, the international community will still be faced with an ISIS-Saudi war within the kingdom.

The two options of an ISIS spillover into Saudi Arabia are a 'defeat-spillover' or a 'success-spillover.' A 'success spillover' would mean that ISIS maintain a permanent base in Syria and Iraq and from there are able to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia and destabilize it. In the case of a 'defeat-spillover,' Saudi Arabia would lose the large Syrian-Iraqi proxy war to Iran. This would cause Saudi Arabia to destabilize in favour of ISIS.

Interestingly, Hillary Clinton's foreign policy would have resulted in a 'success spillover,' while Donald Trump's policies are likely to result in a 'defeat spillover'.

Donald Trump is planning on reversing ISIS' gains permanently in Syria and Iraq to such an extent that he is prepared to work with Russia and the Syrian Government, an Iranian ally, to do this. He is also prepared to work towards military, political and economic solutions in Iraq, which might succeed in giving the country stability for the first time since 2003.

Should Trump be successful, the ISIS 'defeat-spillover' would cause Saudis to blame their government, pledge allegiance to ISIS in overwhelming numbers to rid Saudi Arabia of its twin threat: Iran and America.

This war is only inevitable because the forces of the Middle-East have not yet adjusted to the seismic shift caused by the Iraq War. By removing Saddam Hussein, a secular Sunni, and replacing him with a Shi'ite dominated government, Sunni dominance under secular Saddam Hussein was replaced by a struggling Salafi Islam as Saudi Arabia tried to fill a Sunni void in Iraq, a void left by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. This 'filling of the void' in Sunni Iraq gave us ISIS.

Should Iraq and Syria stabilize under regimes friendly to Iran, Saudi Arabia would need to have an internal transformation in order to resist the threat of an Iran-dominated Middle-East. ISIS is of course a natural benefactor, as Saudis will choose ISIS to force their government to act more forcefully against the threat of Iran within their country.

ISIS also gives Saudi Arabia the excuse to rid the Arabian Peninsula of all Shi'ites, likely causing large Gulf Shi'ite emigration to Iraq. This would mean that Iran would have no chance of using the Shi'ite minority in Saudi Arabia for their own gain.

Regarding America, both ISIS and Al-Qaeda provide avenues for Saudis to resist American influence within the kingdom. This would send a clear message to America: Saudis no longer trust Americans because of the Iraq War.

The Iraq War has had implications far beyond the immediate removal of Saddam Hussein. Even should Iraq stabilize, we will still see the consequences of this disastrous foreign policy played out elsewhere.