Missiles and Protests - how US policy to weaken Iran is working

On September 14th 2019, missiles hit the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, which damaged oil production and dampened prospects for international investment so crucial for Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision. Iran-allied Houthis in Yemen claimed responsibility, but Saudi Arabia, the US and others blamed Iran.

Little over two weeks later protests erupted in Iraq, demanding an end to corruption and incompetence which has classed the political elite since the Iraq War. On the 17th of October, little over a month after the Abqaiq/Khurais attack, protests also erupted in Lebanon against their own leadership class.

Contrasting previous administrations, the Trump Administration has kept remarkably silent about the Lebanese and Iraqi protests. To the majority of pundits, this suggests indifference to the suffering in Lebanon and Iraq. Far more likely, however, is that everything is going exactly as planned for the Trump Administration, and any show of US support could spoil the movements in either country, which are currently leveling their frustrations against corrupt political elites backed by Iran.

While Iran - whether by proxy in Iraq or Yemen or directly from its own country - had to resort to missiles and drones to strike at US interests in Saudi Arabia, the Trump Administration is showing it does not need boots on the ground nor does it need resort to conventional warfare to further its aims in weakening Iran. The Trump Administration is using finance and economic warfare to siege Iran, which is weakening its hold on Iraq and Lebanon and eliciting protests in both countries.

To add to the quagmire, on the 16th of November Iranians also began to protest, this time because of their own rising fuel prices. The leadership in Tehran are stuck: on one hand, they could turn their scarce finances to better the lives of ordinary Iranians, but doing so would mean losing their foothold in countries like Iraq and Lebanon. To so obviously focus on domestic policy over foreign policy would mean publicly conceding that the Trump Administration's economic warfare on Iran - to change its behaviour - is working.

In this case, having proxies has worked against Iran: in the past, proxies in these countries - Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi in Iraq - have prevented war from arriving on Iranian borders; currently, with such crippling economic sanctions and an unwillingness to change its foreign policy, these proxies have become a financial drain for the Iranian regime and a source of frustration for the Iranian people.

While the protests in Iran are unlikely to materialize into any substantial gains this time around, in Iraq and Lebanon the situation looks very uncertain. Of the three countries, Iraq is the most likely to experience regime change away from Iran - in Lebanon, the country could be plunged back into civil war. The difference between Iraq and Lebanon is that Iraqis have been suffering under the more appalling conditions since 2003, and so Iraqis are more likely to have the grit to emerge victorious against the Iranian proxies in their country. In Lebanon, the people are less likely to want to fight hard against Iranian proxies like Hezbollah should civil war ensue. In fact, such a war might propel Hezbollah into a position of even more centralized leadership.

In Iraq, the government has little real power to stop the momentum of these protests. Cosmetic changes to Iraqi leadership will no longer suffice. Far more likely is a regime overhaul, with an anti-Iran leader rising to power, realigning with its Arab neighbours and forcing Iranian proxy Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi to choose between Iraq and Iran.

All of this keeps Iran very much occupied with affairs closer to home and less concerned with provoking the US by attacking oil facilities like those in Abqaiq and Khurais. Iran holds much hope in outlasting the Trump Administration. But should Donald Trump get reelected in 2020, protests in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran will be just the beginning of an avalanche that will redefine the Middle-East as we know it.