Yemen: the next Islamic State 2017 UPDATE

Original article written on 21st of August, 2015

First published on blogger.com on 20th of November 2016

Original article can be found here:

http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com.au/2016/11/yemen-next-islamic-state.html

Since 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War (2003) and built up in the Syrian Civil War (2011), AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with the group have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aim in establishing a caliphate.

The tribes which back AQAP are interested in seeing Southern Yemen looked after more than it was under the previous dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Some groups, like the Southern Movement, want Southern Yemen to break away from Northern Yemen altogether. Other groups, like the tribes allied to President Hadi, would rather see Southern Yemen become more prominent in politics.

AQAP, like ISIS before it, is likely to swallow the smaller groups with different agendas, such as the Southern Movement, the tribes which back President Hadi and Sunni tribes currently under the Houthis, to establish an Islamic Emirate across as much of Yemen as possible, with the southerners on top.

AQAP has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. President Hadi is likely to let AQAP gain strongholds in northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis and deal with the fallout later. Unfortunately, should Houthi-allied Sunni tribes swap allegiance to Al-Qaeda, AQAP would become far more powerful than the current Yemeni President.

The northern Yemeni tribes would only leave the Houthi alliance if they had no other option. If supporting Al-Qaeda or President Hadi become the choices for the northern Yemeni tribes, they would overwhelmingly choose Al-Qaeda and subsequently wage war on the Hadi government.

Northern Yemen hates President Hadi more than Al-Qaeda.

Though AQAP consider Shi'ites (and subsequently Zaidis) as heretics, they believe, as does the rest of Al-Qaeda, that focusing on a Sunni-Shi'ite conflict is counter-productive. This means Zaidi tribes could be won over by AQAP to - implicitly - support the Al-Qaeda war against the Hadi government.

The unfortunate thing is that America is unlikely to realize the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group is headed for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. Should AQAP defeat the Houthis, the power held by Al-Qaeda would force a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and AQAP, first through Saudi's proxy, President Hadi, then against Saudi Arabia itself.

Should this occur, there would be nothing America could do to save the Arabian Gulf from civil war.

NATO is in Iraq

I wish to let you my readers know that I was wrong about NATO and Iraq - NATO, as of January 2017, has been in Iraq training the Iraqi Security Forces.

I wish to apologize for not finding this information out sooner and doing enough research into NATO's involvement in Iraq since Trump became President. Iraq is going to be another NATO project, as Afghanistan is.

This is likely to have several repercussions. It is clear that Iraqi oil is likely to be the great monopoly for not only America, but for all NATO partners. It is also clear that NATO spending will ease American finances in Iraq, which will greatly help America. It will force Russia out of eyeing Iraq as a potential ally and sees western-Iraqi relations increasing to new heights.

Whether Trump will expand NATO intervention into Libya and Syria or not is unclear, as this may hinder Trump's desire to 'get along well with Putin,' as the most effective forces in both these countries are backed by Russia. Yemen is even more illusive.

Israel's allies in the Middle-East under Trump

I have predicted some sizable outcomes for the future of the Middle-East. I have predicted that Syria will stabilize under President Bashar Al-Assad; I have predicted Iraq will become stable under Trump's leadership, that Iraq will become the main Arab oil exporter; I have predicted Libya will stabilize under Haftar Al-Khalifa with American and Russian support; I have predicted that, should Trump get a second term, Afghanistan will stabilize under an anti-Iranian dictator.

In light of all this, where would Israel's main Arab allies be? My thoughts:

1) Jordan. The Hashemi ruling elite in Jordan has been backed into a corner by the West. After world war 1, the West has removed the Iraqi and Hijazi kingdoms from the Hashmites and replaced them with dictators and the Saudi royal family in each region respectively. Because of this, King Abdullah of Jordan has been forced into the difficult position of dealing with the largest border with Israel, while maintaining positive relations with Palestine, Palestinians in Jordan, ethnic Jordanians, the entire Middle-East and America.

True to being a Hashemi, King Abdullah of Jordan has managed to beautifully balance all of these requirements and has kept relations with Israel cordial. They remain in good relations while Jordan also maintains good relations with Palestine.

2) Egypt. Egypt has had a history of defeat at the hands of Israel during the 6-day war, while also signing peace agreements under Mubarak, the previous dictator of Egypt. With Islamism on the rise, Abdul Feteh As-Sisi is desperate for anti-Islamist allies, including Israel. Trump has called for not only an alliance but a friendship with Sisi, and this, together with strong ties to Israel, should see relations improve strongly between the three countries.

Currently, relations between Egypt and Israel are good; relations between Palestine and Egypt have turned sour. Sisi has done this to contrast from Mohammed Morsi, the last President of Egypt, who was from the Muslim Brotherhood and loved Palestine and Iran. Sisi likes neither country, and seems intent on not only maintaining but increasing good relations with Israel. This would be why Trump has extended such a warm invitation of friendship to Egypt under Sisi.

3) Saudi Arabia. While relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia are at an all-time high, I do not expect this to last at all. This is not because Iran will no longer be a regional threat, but rather because Mohammed Bin Salman is likely to increase relations with Israel to an unbearable point for the Saudi people. Like Iran in 1979, Saudi Arabia runs the risk of revolution should Mohammed Bin Salman work towards not only strong relations with Israel - which Saudi currently enjoys - but more public relations with Israel.

So while in the short-term relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel will be maintained and also increase, in the long-term Saudi Arabia is likely to turn violently anti-Israel. Whether this surfaces in an ISIS takeover of the country, or an Al-Qaeda takeover, or a Muslim Brotherhood revolution, or a more conservative branch of the Saudi royal family taking control, is irrelevant: relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel are likely to deteriorate.

4) Iraq. Currently relations between Iraq and Israel are terrible. Like under Saddam Hussein, the current Iraqi government has no desire to improve relations with Israel.

However, a revolution in Saudi Arabia would likely change all that. While needing security from Iran and America - in an attempt to perhaps show America that Iraq is not dominated by Iran - secret efforts to increase cooperation with Israel might be implemented. This was how Saudi Arabia began its relations with Israel - Iraq would likely do the same should Saudi Arabia implode.


These are the four countries which I believe are worth observing regarding Israel. Watch this space!

NATO, Russia and America in Libya

Very interesting developments are occurring in regards to Libya, Russia, America and NATO.

Other members of NATO are not paying their fair share. NATO is, in many ways, obsolete, with America always having to bear the brunt of the burden and financial cost, and with NATO mainly directed to Russia and not to radical Islamic terrorism.

Libya is the ultimate way for Trump to revolutionize NATO. How? By abandoning it. Instead, Trump would wage a war for Libyan security with a Russian-American alliance.

Russia and America share an ally in Egypt. Abdul Feteh Sisi has strong ties to Russia, dating back to the beginning of Sisi's military coup in 2013, when Obama wanted nothing to do with Egypt but Putin did. Now that Trump is promising not only an alliance but a friendship to Sisi, in Libya we see American and Russian interests are very similar: stability in Libya to protect Sisi to his west, which means Haftar Al-Khalifa.

Thus it may be in Libya where American-Russian relations bud to fruition rather than in Syria. In Syria it is a quagmire like no other, and should America bomb ISIS with Russia in Syria, it would be perceived to benefit Iran.

Not only so, but such a Libya strategy would result in a serious wake up call to NATO. They would know that America has other options, unless they pay their fair share of the wage and focus more on radical Islamic terrorism than Putin.

Thus would be a win-win situation for both Putin and Trump, but particularly for Trump: it would improve ties with Russia, force NATO to pay their fair share, stabilize Libya and fulfill his promise to Egyptian President Sisi to not only alliance but friendship.

This is the likely outcome for Libya. And it is one that would show that the Trump-doctrine is just what the world needs right now.

If John Waver had been Barrack Obama

Forget that I'm not Barrack Obama, but let's just imagine that I, John Waver, had been in 2008 elected to be President of the United States of America, as I am today. What would have President John Waver done in Foreign Policy?

I would have been different from Obama in a number of ways. However, on Iraq, I would have been in accord: it was time to get out, or at least leave a residual force behind if allowed by the then Maliki government.

From the start of 2008 in Afghanistan, however, I would have implemented a vastly different policy to that of Obama's. Rather than give in to demands for a troop surge in Afghanistan, I would have surged airstrikes in Afghanistan to support existing American/NATO troops and bolster morale for Afghani troops.

From the beginning, I would have implemented an "Iraq War in Reverse" mentality in Afghanistan. I would have allowed - and even encouraged - then leader of Afghanistan Hamid Kharzai to remain in power indefinitely as a dictator so he could crack down hard on the Taliban.

I would have had a "no tolerance" approach to the Taliban, who had harboured Al-Qaeda preceding 9-11. I would have pushed Hamid Kharzai for mass arrests of Taliban members and for members of the Taliban to be held in high security prisons. Rather than putting lots of money into Afghani infrastructure - that was so frequently blown up again and again - I would have put the money into border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to make sure no Pakistani Taliban would come through to Afghanistan.

I would not negotiate with the Taliban. I would make sure that a dictatorship under Kharzai was fiercely anti-terrorism and anti-Taliban, and - once a much stronger country - encourage for Kharzai to stand up to Iran, like Saddam Hussein did, to assist America in that regard.

While withdrawing from Iraq in 2011, I would have marked the war as a defeat, not a victory. I would tell the American soldiers that their fight was tough and was not in vain, but that as of now, America had lost the Iraq War. I would encourage them to stiffen their resolve in fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan and that, should the Iraqis ever need our help, the United States would be their top ally and friend and return swiftly.

In the 2010 Iraqi elections, I would have pushed for Ayad Allawi to become the Prime Minister, as he was supposed to be. Though I would have supported Iraq no matter the Prime Minister, I would have at that time criticized Al-Maliki for his policies which alienated Sunni Arabs from belief in Iraq, and blamed him for Iranian takeover of Iraq, to weaken him and strengthen Allawi. Assuming I failed in diplomacy, I would still have remained in support of Iraq under Maliki.

I would not have endorsed the Arab Spring at all. I would not have overthrown Gidaffi in Libya, nor pushed to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, nor would have I encouraged the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. I would site the Iraq War as the top reason.

The result of this would have meant no ISIS in Syria or Libya, and no Al-Qaeda there either.

With no S in ISIS - S for Syria - the Islamic State of Iraq, under Al-Qaeda, probably would have still reared its ugly head in 2014. I would have immediately put in a "safe zone" in Nineveh Province to prevent Christian and Yazidi genocide and, if necessary, would have put in American ground troops in that safe zone to prevent it.

But I would not expand military operations in Iraq beyond the Nineveh safe zone until Allawi were made Prime Minister of Iraq, as he should have been in 2010. I would have repeated my claims about Nouri Al-Maliki's leadership. Perhaps then, Allawi would become the Prime Minister following the crisis in 2014.

Had Allawi become Prime Minister, I would then give him firm and strong support via airstrikes to protect Baghdad and the oilfields of Kurdistan. I would have prioritized northern Iraq before Anbar Province, to make Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan work hard to prevent infiltration from ISI, while securing Christians and Yazidis from genocide and slavery.

The result may have been that ISI would have been driven out of Iraq by the end of my second Presidential term, because there would be no significant amounts of funding from the US to ISI to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad, but also because ISI would not exist in Syria and not exist as a Caliphate.

While destroying ISI - or at least driving it underground - I would tell Allawi I planned to prioritize oil exports from Iraq over every other country. I would have drastically increased the oil exports from Iraq, and drastically decreased them from countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to bankrupt them so they would be no longer able to fund their projects.

Thus, in my view, Afghanistan and Iraq would have been drastically more stable than they are today. Yes, Obama: I could've beat you on Foreign Policy in the Middle-East.

Positioning NATO towards radical Islam PART TWO

Now that Trump has been President for almost 1 month, his intentions behind NATO are more clear.

It seems that Trump intends for the Afghan War to become purely a NATO war, not an American-NATO war. It is in Afghanistan that Trump sees his idea of positioning NATO towards radical Islam to be the easiest to implement.

It would force all partners within NATO to work towards a solution to the Afghani conflict - which will only occur once all members of NATO are convinced to prioritize stability over democracy. America under Trump sees this - so does, interestingly, Erdogan of Turkey. But few other NATO allies do.

It is very unlikely that NATO would be positioned within Syria or Libya, as Trump seems content for these conflicts to end up in Russia's hands. Putting NATO in Syria and/or Libya adds risk to conflict between NATO and Russia, which Trump is against.

It is also unlikely that NATO would be positioned in Iraq. NATO would get in the way of Trump's desire for a largely American victory in Iraq.

As for Yemen, that is the now uncertain arena in regards to NATO. At the moment, Trump is happy to work with the Saudi government against the Iran-sympathetic (but not Iran-backed) Houthis, but will that last after stability is reached elsewhere? Will Trump betray Saudi Arabia after stability returns to Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan? Or will he increase NATO involvement on the southern neighbour of the Arabian Peninsula?

The first is more likely, but with Trump, things are not always as they seem.

The only solution to the Afghan War

It should be obvious to pundits that the only country who really has the right idea about how to defeat terrorism is Russia.

Their historic 'Iraq War in reverse' in Syria has seen drastic levels of stability reached all across the country. Once ISIS and Al-Qaeda are cleared out from Syria, Bashar Al-Assad will make sure that his country will no longer be a terrorist haven.

This lesson has profound implications for Afghanistan. Meanwhile, other journalists are calling for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table as part of the peace process. The Taliban! The group who harboured Al-Qaeda and caused 9-11!

Of course, Trump will not focus on Afghanistan until Iraq is stabilized. His plan to stabilize Iraq involves destroying ISIS, giving Sunni Arabs more of a say in their government, quenching Iranian influence from the country, and upping oil relations between Iraq and the West. Let's hope it works.

But the solution for Afghanistan is clear: an 'Iraq-War in reverse' must be waged. Rather than engaging in dialogue with the Taliban, the Taliban need to be ruthlessly driven out of Afghanistan into Pakistan - either that or mass Taliban imprisonment.

A strong man must take charge of Afghanistan; whether he be an Afghan general or someone else, a coup must be supported by the United States to enable strong government to exist in Afghanistan, to the detriment of terrorism and benefit of the Afghani people.