Positioning NATO towards radical Islam

Trump has gotten many things right about the war on terror - one of these is his vision to have NATO direct its policies away from antagonising Russia and towards dealing with radical Islam.

Russia represents no threat to the USA - actually she represents a great asset for America. This is especially true in Syria. In Syria, Trump now has the option of withdrawing from the conflict altogether to let Russia and the Syrian government deal with ISIS and radical Islam there.

But radical Islam represents a sizeable and paramount threat to the USA. Since 9-11, the United States has not achieved even one notable victory in the war on terror. Even the capture of Osama Bin Laden was not a notable victory, because in Bin Laden's place is now Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, who is more extreme than Osama Bin Laden.

Capturing Bin Laden has only resulted in a further radicalisation caused by - you guessed it - Obama's policies in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Instead of Bin Laden's execution resulting in a breaking up of Al-Qaeda to decrease radicalisation, the capture of Bin Laden gave Obama the excuse to overthrow Libyan president Gidaffi, greatly increasing Al-Qaeda and ISIS networks there. Obama also funded Iraq's worst enemy in Syria while withdrawing from Iraq, which is tantamount to betrayal by the Obama Administration.

Trump's policies are likely to materialize into some of the greatest victories in the war on terror that we have yet seen - this is especially true if he repositions NATO in that direction.

To reposition NATO towards fighting radical Islam is likely to start in Libya, where NATO was last used. Under Obama and Hillary Clinton, NATO was used wrongly in support of radical Islamic terrorists seeking to overthrow Libyan President Gidaffi. Rather than land in Libya and have America bear all the costs, Trump is likely to use NATO to install Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya as the dictator there. This will result in a victory on the war on terror.

A greater victory on the war on terror than a Libya War is currently being accomplished in Syria under Russia. When Russia succeeds in stabilizing Syria - when, not if - Trump will need larger victories to compete. One such victory could be accomplished in Iraq.

In Iraq, whether America will attack ISIS on its own or whether Trump will use NATO is difficult to know for sure. Yet the only way to create a lasting victory in Iraq would be to up oil exports there over and above oil exports in Iran and Saudi Arabia, two known funders of radical Islamic terrorism.

In this second Iraq War (2014 - present), it would make sense for Trump to utilize NATO to protect oil fields in Iraq from lone wolf attacks. Increasing exports between NATO countries and Iraq would only be accomplished should the Iraqi oil fields remain protected. Trump has vowed complete energy independence from the world - an increase in oil exports between NATO countries and Iraq would be hugely beneficial to both parties without compromising Trump's promise for American energy independence.

In Afghanistan, it is harder to know for sure what Trump will do. Should he sit tight? Or should he withdraw? The only way to create a sizable victory in the Afghan War would be for temporary withdrawal from Afghanistan, a focus on Libya and Iraq, then a return to Afghanistan - from the air - once the situation has more seriously deteriorated. This would give the Afghanis an opportunity to form for themselves a government devoid of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban - but only after they see the Taliban firsthand without an American presence on the ground.

In short, Trump's victories on the war on terror are likely to be substantial. At the very least, I anticipate Trump policy to stabilize Syria, Iraq and Libya, which will decrease radical Islam's vice grip over the region.

Islamic State after ISIS

Trump's policies are set to destroy ISIS for good in Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic State is set to remain in the Middle-East.

ISIS and the Islamic State are one and the same organisation - the difference is in the wording. ISIS is the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria', which Trump has vowed to completely destroy. Because Assad will remain; because Trump will push up Iraq's oil exports to stabilize the country, the only place in which the Islamic State will be able to expand in the immediate future is Saudi Arabia.

The northern tribes of Saudi Arabia are, unfortunately, the same as those in eastern Syria and western Iraq, the base of support for the Islamic State. This is where the Islamic State is likely to begin its expansion.

But it will not end there. As well as northern Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State will be able to expand into the east, Al-Ahsa, where the Saudi Shi'ites are. The Islamic State would likely unleash an anger - a collective anger of the Sunni Muslims at the Shi'ites who defeated them in Syria and Iraq - unleash an anger directed at the Saudi Shi'ites and resulting in a tearing of the fabric in the eastern province.

Such violence would, eventually, spill into Kuwait and Bahrain as well. The results are likely genocide and mass emigration by the Shi'ites from the Gulf.

As well as the northern and eastern provinces, the Islamic State is likely to make its way into the region of Najd, the central region of the Islamic State's ideology. Here the battle will be most bitterly fought between two sides who believe they better reflect the doctrines of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Qaseem would likely fall to the Islamic State; Riyadh might fall, but that is harder to know for sure.

Should Mohammed Bin Salman remain the dominant figure of Saudi Arabia, Islamic State will be able to win over many of the tribes in Saudi Arabia and cause the Saud royal family to be living in existential crisis.

Should Mohammed Bin Nayef become more dominant than his cousin, there is a chance the Saudi kingdom would survive. While there are those who hate the Saudi government, Islamic State controlling Mecca and Medina is a very bad idea for the world.

The only feasible way someone like Mohammed Bin Nayef could save the kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be to ally with the lesser of two evils - namely, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. One almost wonders if that was the reason for King Salman waging the Yemen War in the first place: to train up the Saudi military and to stretch out a hand in alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of the Islamic State.

While Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula gaining dominance in Saudi Arabia is a threat to the kingdom, it is nowhere near as potent a threat as that of the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda, while condemning the Saud royal family, has on more than one occasion opened its hand in alliance with the kingdom, most notably during the Iraq-Kuwait War on 1990, in which Saudi Arabia rejected an alliance with Al-Qaeda in favour of the Americans.

Such alliance is Saudi Arabia's hope. After victory over the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would return Saudi Arabia to a sort of Islamic legitimacy, forcing the kingdom to cleanse itself of several policies which undermine it as bearer of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina. Those policies include breaking their previous alliance with America and Israel, as well as a focus on defeating America and Israel over and above the current focus on defeating Iran, something the Islamic State and Saudi Arabia currently share in common.

In the mean time, before a Saudi-Al-Qaeda victory over Islamic State could be achieved, it is to be expected that many of the smaller Gulf kingdoms would be destroyed by the Islamic State. These include Kuwait and Bahrain, previously mentioned; these also include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, where Dubai is located.

The Islamic State re-declaring itself as a Caliphate from its capital in Dubai is a frightening and distinct possibility.

The best thing President-elect Donald Trump could do in the face of such a conflict is minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East. Making Iraq one of America's top Arab allies is a step in the right direction - should the Trump Administration stabilize and wholeheartedly ally with Iraq, the Islamic State would be unable to expand back into its previous support network.

The other way Trump could minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East would be to minimize ties with Saudi Arabia, as he seems keen to do. The other way would be to withdraw support for Saudi's war on Yemen and even withdraw from bombing Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is going to need Al-Qaeda's help to defeat the Islamic State.

Staying neutral in the Saudi war is essential for Trump's withdrawal policies from the Middle-East to succeed. Should he get sucked into that conflict, it would only be exacerbated and increase the likelihood of the Saudi government falling.

Obama bombing more countries than Bush?!

Obama and Bush were both Establishment Presidents.

Of course Obama did some things that many Establishment Presidents would not do - namely, withdraw from Iraq (2011); the Iran Nuclear Deal (2015); not overthrow the Syrian Government (2011 - 2016) - in spite of this, Obama has, like Bush, agreed with the ideology of regime change.

Herein lies Obama's problem in foreign policy. Regime change is the biggest cause for increase in terrorism - we saw this after Bush invaded Iraq in 2003. The lessons from Bush's Iraq War have not been learnt by Obama in Yemen, Libya and Syria. And this is unacceptable.

For Yemen, Libya and Syria are the 3 additional conflicts Obama is bombing, added to Bush's bombing of 4 countries - namely, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. These 3 additional conflicts are, in essence, being bombed because the dominant powers in those countries run counter or ran counter to United States' interest.

In Yemen, the Houthis threaten to rip Yemen from Saudi Arabia's vice grip. The Houthis threaten the Al-Qaeda stronghold in Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, this is unacceptable, and America is assisting Saudi's war on Yemen, while also continuing drone strikes in the country against Al-Qaeda - which, I might add, help more than hinder Al-Qaeda's recruitment there.

In Libya, Moammar Al-Gidaffi had been on America's list of regime change for decades. The Arab Spring provided the Obama Administration with an opportunity for regime change there, overthrowing Gidaffi and replacing him with squabbling militias.

From these squabbling militias ISIS made its footprint in Derna and more recently in Sirte. The Obama Administration decided that bombing ISIS in Libya was a great idea, though had Gidaffi never been removed in the first place, ISIS would not exist in Libya. Again, Obama's campaign against ISIS in Libya helps more than hinders the spread of terrorism in Libya.

Syria is worst of the 3. To Obama's credit, he did not remove Bashar Al-Assad, but he still funded rebels, the majority of whom have more in common with ISIS than America. Now he is involved in an ISIS campaign that would not have existed in Syria had he but stayed out of Syria and not supported the rebels there.

Thankfully, Obama's ISIS campaign in Syria has not been helping recruitment there - it has been genuinely helpful in eradicating terrorism from Syria.


In the Trump Administration, expect a lot more productive intervention in the majority of the 7 countries the United States is currently bombing. Expect Trump to end the conflict in Syria by ending Obama's policy of 'Assad must go' and of funding Syrian rebels. Expect Trump to end much of the conflict in Iraq by 'taking their oil' (namely, increasing oil relations with Iraq over and above Saudi Arabia and Iran, to economically benefit Iraq). Expect Trump to install dictator Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, ending militias squabbling and restoring stability there.

Expect also Trump to withdraw from Afghanistan. It is true that America would likely return to Afghanistan 3 - 5 years after withdrawal, but Trump understands that spending much longer in Afghanistan is wasted effort. There are more immediate battles in the war on terror that require US' attention than Afghanistan.

Sadly, it is unlikely Trump would stop American bombings in Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen. Yet the ending of 3 - 4 conflicts in the Middle-East would greatly improve America's standing in the region.

Are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about to ally with China?

Trump's plans for the Middle-East represent significant problems for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.


For Saudi Arabia, the shrinking of Sunni-dominance in Iraq and Syria by the Trump Administration represents an existential threat to the Saudi kingdom.

Trump willing to work with Bashar Al-Assad against ISIS in Syria is one thing, but Trump's plan to increase relations with Iraq is another, a policy which threatens to unhinge Saudi Arabia from the American sphere of influence.

There are two options for Saudi Arabia. One is increased relations with China - the other is increased relations with the European Union. And Saudi Arabia is likely to make the most of both opportunities.

The European Union is from a political sphere of influence that runs counter to the 'New Nationalism' of Putin, Trump and Brexit. To ally more closely with the European Union makes logical sense for Saudi Arabia, as the European Union's views of immigration, Assad and Iran are not dissimilar with the conservative kingdom's own views.

China, though not a fan of Islamism, would share benefit from allying more closely with Saudi Arabia regarding oil. With Trump set to 'take their [Iraqi] oil,' (namely increase American oil relations with Iraq) previous oil deals between China and Iraq would be decreased substantially. Previous oil deals between America and Saudi Arabia would also be decreased substantially.

While Iran would provide some oil, it would not be enough for the gigantic Asian power. China would perhaps be able to move into America's shoes in Saudi Arabia, dominating much of the Arabian Gulf and being the largest importer of Saudi oil.

China, like Russia and Trump's America, benefits from a stable Middle-East. With Russia set to stabilize Syria and Trump to stabilize Iraq, China would perhaps be able to show its force in stabilizing what is likely to be an unstable Saudi Arabia.

This likelihood is increased by a further strengthening of Pakistani-Chinese relations under a Trump Administration.


Pakistan has similar threats from Trump as Saudi Arabia, though not as immediate. Trump, likely to withdraw from Afghanistan after solidly smashing the Taliban in 2017, would after 3 - 5 years return to fix an even more unstable Afghanistan. The reason for Trump's likely withdrawal is two-fold: first, the war on terror has other priority battlegrounds which need dealing with first, namely in Syria, Iraq and Libya; second, American public opinion no longer supports the Afghan war as it once did.

If Trump can show he wishes to rebuild American infrastructure and deal successfully with the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya, American public is unlikely to hold him as accountable for a worse Afghanistan. Namely, if Afghanistan explodes before the 2020 elections, it would unlikely affect Trump's popularity should America, Syria, Iraq and Libya recover.

Trump has said that his problem with the Afghan War is mainly Pakistan over Afghanistan. Trumps sees that Pakistan deliberately destabilizes Afghanistan through an increase in terrorism there. Trump would likely have an unfavourable policy towards Pakistan in order to stabilize Afghanistan. This would likely drive Pakistan more fully into China's embrace.

Pakistani-Chinese relations are currently good, and are only set to improve under a Trump Administration. With Trump able to stabilize Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan as an ally, it couldn't be a better deal for the American people, and couldn't be a better example of Trump foreign policy.

the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda

I predict that Trump will do more to end the war on terror than Bush and Obama put together.

In light of this, what is the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda?

Those who have read my previous posts would note that ISIS and Al-Qaeda are both about to suffer the worst defeats in their histories in Syria at the hands of Russia. Russia has fought an historic 'Iraq War in reverse,' which has greatly reversed the tide of radical Islamism in Syria.

With Trump agreeing - rightly so, might I add - to the direction and implication of Russian intervention in Syria, Al-Qaeda and ISIS are unlikely to have a substantial presence in Syria. Assad is the ultimate antidote to radical Islam in Syria.

Previously I have stated that ISIS, getting routed in Sirte, would not disappear forever in Libya. But Trump's likely plan of installing Haftar Al-Khalifa as the Libyan dictator would cause ISIS and Al-Qaeda to both be substantially weakened in North Africa as well.

But what of Iraq? Iraq depends very much on what Trump means to do there. If Trump 'takes their oil,' as he said he would in his campaign, Iraq would stabilize. (It should be noted here that in Trump language, 'take their oil' means increasing oil relations with Iraq. This would definitely stabilize Iraq substantially.)

If Trump wages war on the Iranian elements of the Iraqi government, Trump is doomed to failure. The best thing Trump can do - and his likely policy, might I add - is increase the use of American soft-power in Iraq to stabilize it, not change the regime there.

In the interim, as Iraq recovers, ISIS would still have a foothold in the country. They would try and destabilize Iraq - depending on how Trump reacts to it would depend on whether or not Iraq stabilizes.

With ISIS virtually non-existent in Syria and weakened in Iraq, it would have a different goal: provoking civil war in Saudi Arabia.

Scarily, ISIS has perhaps the perfect platform from which to destabilize Saudi Arabia. ISIS borders Saudi Arabia in Iraq; ISIS sleeper cells are already established in the northern provinces of Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia is preoccupied by a fruitless war in Yemen; the Saudi economy is currently weaker than in decades; and to top it all off, Mohammed Bin Salman is the perfect candidate for America's dupe, the personification of American influence in Saudi Arabia.

ISIS' future is sealed, forcing the world into a no-win situation. If ISIS is left unchecked in Iraq and Syria, it would destroy 2 beautiful countries and their minorities, and threaten the stability of neighbouring countries. But if ISIS is destroyed in Syria and Iraq, Iran looks the winner to the Arabs, causing Saudis and other Gulf countries to rally to ISIS' call and bitterly fight their governments.

But the second option is preferable. It's the option Russia and America have chosen in Putin and Trump. ISIS' new target after Iraq and Syria is, of course, Saudi Arabia, which it may even succeed in obtaining.

But what of Al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda is likely to have a resurgence. With its complete destruction in Syria and Libya, Al-Qaeda would invest more heavily in Yemen, giving Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) priority in funding. AQAP needs only for Yemen to go into famine in order to drastically increase appeal in Yemen. It already has much appeal in that it is not as barbaric or cruel as ISIS - if it continues its powerful soft-power policies, AQAP would exponentially grow in power in Yemen as Al-Qaeda crumbles in Libya and Syria.

Trump is unlikely to wage war against Saudi interests in Yemen. Like Obama, Trump would quietly support Saudi's war in Yemen, even should it cause Al-Qaeda to grow substantially in Yemen.

Not only would Al-Qaeda resurge in Yemen, but in Afghanistan as well. With Trump planning on withdrawing from Afghanistan - which, I might add, should have been done by Obama after the death of Osama Bin Laden - America would be set to return there in 3 - 5 years.

Trump would not make the mistake Obama did. Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Obama did almost exactly that in Iraq and Syria: he withdrew from Iraq while funding 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' in Syria, giving us ISIS.

Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Instead, Trump would withdraw from Afghanistan as Obama should have withdrawn from Iraq: Trump would not fund extremism next door.

But the Taliban would still resurge in Afghanistan after 3 - 5 years of troop withdrawal - not only so, but with a lack of places for Islamists to wage jihad under a Trump Administration (no longer able to in Iraq, Syria or Libya), foreign fighters would fight in Afghanistan instead. A resurgent Al-Qaeda is likely to fight on the Taliban's side in Afghanistan after America leaves.

But at the moment, radical Islam is widespread across Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan. A reduction in terror safe havens would of course benefit the Middle-East and decrease terrorism in the region.

But in place of unstable Syria, Iraq and Libya would be a more unstable Yemen and Afghanistan, benefitting Al-Qaeda's vision immensely in the region.

Even worse is when Saudi Arabia implodes. When Saudi Arabia implodes, all other previously known conflicts in recent memory will pale in comparison. We will see sights of blood we have not seen since the days of World War 2. You think the current Iraqi-Syrian conflict is bad? The Saudi conflict will be much, much worse, and ISIS in Saudi Arabia will reach new pits of depravity yet unseen in our generation.