Trump's Foreign Policy PART TWO

In my earlier post, "Trump's Foreign Policy," I suggested that Trump might install a dictator in Afghanistan and play the waiting game in Libya.

I wish to take it back and say the opposite: that Trump might install a dictator in Libya and play the waiting game in Afghanistan.

The Afghan War is the longest and one of the most unpopular wars in American memory. To spend much longer in Afghanistan would make Trump more unpopular. Since his foreign policy motto is to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability," he is likely to stabilize other countries first before trying to stabilize Afghanistan.

In any case, an exploding Afghanistan (caused by American troop removal) represents a much smaller regional threat to American assets than does an exploding Iraq, Syria or Libya.

Rather than stabilizing Afghanistan, it seems more likely that Trump, Russia and Iran would stabilize Syria by letting the legitimate Assad government remain to destroy ISIS. Though Assad victory in Syria strengthens Iran, Iran would be faced with an unstable Afghanistan on its eastern border. Such instability would only increase once America left, and would be a valuable bargaining chip for Trump against Iran.

As well as this, Trump would, in his words, "bomb the hell out of ISIS" in Iraq and Syria and "take their [Iraqi] oil." In Trump language this means destroy ISIS and increase oil relations with Iraq instead of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In Libya Trump has a valuable opportunity to cast himself as having a blueprint for American foreign policy. Comparatively, there has not been as much time in Libya since intervention (2011), compared to Afghanistan (2001) which again makes it easier to stabilize Libya over Afghanistan.

Unlike Afghanistan, in Libya there is already a potential dictator fighting on the ground: Haftar Al-Khalifa. All Trump would have to do is scrap the "Unity Government of National Salvation" (which has no power anyway) and give power back to the previously legitimate Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa. Trump supporting the Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa would likely stabilize Libya drastically.

Libya represents a large threat to the stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Trump stabilizing Libya would increase relations substantially between America and those countries.

An unstable Afghanistan represents a threat to stability for Pakistan and Iran in particular, which is also better for America. Iran is anti-American, so a threat to their stability is in America's interest. A threat to Pakistan forces Pakistan to rely more heavily on America. This is good considering Pakistan is one country that does - but should not have - nuclear weapons.


The negative behind America leaving Afghanistan would be a more radical Taliban emerging in 3 - 5 years. This, together with increased Al-Qaeda strength in Yemen, would put Al-Qaeda back on the map. Yet, like Iraq, it's what the American people are willing to accept for the price of getting out of the war.

A post-war unstable Afghanistan would only strengthen how Trump would look to the American people. The American people would be able to compare Trump's results in a stable Iraq, Syria and Libya with those of Obama and Bush, seen visibly in a continually deteriorating Afghanistan.


Such might increase Trump's popularity, causing him to come back for a second Presidential term and finish the war in Afghanistan for good, by installing a dictator on top. Then America would truly be out of the "nation-building business" and stability would return to those regions of the Middle-East.

Yemen: the next Islamic State

Taken from the 21st of August, 2015

For the past 5 months, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in the attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemeni Civil War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both Hadi’s forces and the Shi’ite Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of the Yemeni civil war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War, AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi airstrikes on the Houthi rebels. And like ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Though not directly supported by the United States, ISIS did help achieve America’s objectives in Syria by weakening the Assad government and, until the group invaded Iraq, was mostly left alone by the United States. The terror group, which has since taken over half of Syria and over a quarter of Iraq, claims to be a Caliphate, owing the allegiance of all Muslims, and asks all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Likewise, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been directly supported through Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Yet the result of Saudi’s airstrikes has been the emergence of AQAP as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP will attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes AQAP are working with have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an allegiance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aims in establishing a caliphate.

In Yemen, the largest non-governmental force pitted against the Houthis is the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement seeks to break unity with Northern Yemen and return Yemen to two states. As of now, Hadi’s forces and the Southern Movement are working together to defeat the Houthis. However, once the Houthis are no longer a threat to Southern Yemen, the Southern Movement is likely to fight the Hadi government for independence. Alone, it is unlikely the Southern Movement would succeed. However, were AQAP to join the Southern Movement on their endeavour, independence would become more likely. AQAP would, subsequently, establish a vice grip over the region, and cause the Southern Movement to be indebted to the group.

ISIS, on the other hand, is unlikely to develop much presence in Yemen. They will likely continue their bombings of Zaidi mosques in Yemen, and possibly establish a temporary foothold in Sunni Northern Yemen.

But AQAP is likely to desire to expand its influence, and there is a clever way in which AQAP could do this while still supporting the Southern Movement:

AQAP could claim parts of Sunni Northern Yemen as belonging to Southern Yemen.

Along the west coast of Northern Yemen there are a number of Sunni regions which could be coaxed to the side of both the Southern Movement and AQAP. This could mean the end not only of Yemen as a whole, but of any chance of Houthi or Hadi dominance in the foreseeable future, which is exactly what AQAP wants.

In this case, AQAP would not even need to invade Sana’a to control Yemen; all they would need would be to take the Sunni regions from Northern Yemen to weaken Hadi and Houthi influence. Then, for the first time in many years, Southern Yemen would prevail as stronger than Northern Yemen.

The unfortunate thing is that, like ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and like the Taliban in Afghanistan, America is unlikely to realise the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group may be heading for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. As ISIS grows stronger in Syria and Iraq, it is likely to turn more of its attention to Saudi Arabia. If ISIS invades Saudi Arabia from the north, AQAP might take advantage of the instability and launch an invasion from the south. If that happens, there will be little America can do to save the region.

Trump Is President. What's Next?

Well, Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States of America. What stands as next for the Middle-East?


It would be naive to think that a Trump Presidency would not be at least slightly hawkish. The Obama Administration is currently involved in 3 major conflicts: the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS, the Afghan War and the Libyan War on ISIS. I wish to provide the likely direction for each of them.

1) the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS

It will be swift and quick. In Syria, Trump will either cooperate with Russia or withdraw from Syria and let Russia defeat ISIS. The first seems more likely, as Trump would likely want himself seen as making "great deals," and one of those great deals would be to destroy ISIS in Syria and restore better relations with Russia. Both of these objectives would be achieved with Trump's plan: Assad's army is the largest capable fighting force against ISIS, and Russia, Syria and Trump would all benefit from an ISIS defeat at the hands of Assad.

In Iraq, the fight may be equally swift, but how Trump acts after defeating ISIS in Iraq will be telling. Trump's idea for "safe zones" in Syria funded by Turkey and the Gulf States is a long shot - a very long shot. However, safe zones in Iraq would be something that Turkey and the Gulf States would be - perhaps - more comfortable with.


Unless incredibly hawkish, Trump is likely to use some "soft-power" policies to increase Iraq's stability. One such would be the increased trade of oil between Iraq and America - such increased trade could benefit both Iraq's economy and America's. Trump has talked about "taking Iraqi oil," but in Trump language that means increasing oil trade with Iraq. He has also said he would not take Saudi oil if they refused to comply with his ISIS' strategy. Trump's "soft power" Iraqi oil policy would also benefit America should Saudi Arabia destabilize. (More about the destabilization of Saudi Arabia later).

If not "soft-power" policies, Trump might arrange for a Turkish guardianship of Iraq should the country destabilize again. This would mean that the Trump Administration would not have to return to Iraq, and Turkey would be sucked into the conflict instead.

2) the Afghan War

Like Obama in Iraq, Trump seems likely to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. This might be preceded by a solid smashing of the Taliban before they go, but other than that, there is no immediate desire to recreate the political fabric of Afghanistan for the third time in 40 years.

And, like Iraq, this would cause a massive problem of instability for Afghanistan within 3 - 5 years of American withdrawal. Perhaps a resurgent Taliban would emerge - perhaps ISIS - or perhaps, as I believe most likely, something even worse.

This would give Trump a chance to return to Afghanistan and smash out whatever terrorist organisation had taken root in the country, but to do so from only the skies, as Obama did in Iraq. With more American public support for the war, he would likely then try and work out how to install a dictator in Afghanistan, as dictatorship is the only likely alternative to more terrorism growing in the region.

3) the Libyan War on ISIS

In the beginning, Trump would not do a lot - he would want to see how his plan to defeat ISIS plays out in Syria and Iraq first. Yet Trump would work out, rather quickly, that Haftar Al-Khalifa is his best shot at a stable Libya. He would then use Al-Khalifa to flatten ISIS in the region, as well as the pockets of Islamist militias who are of the same mind as ISIS.

Like Iraq, Trump would likely increase oil production from Libya, to get America further and further away from Saudi oil. That, coupled together with a dictatorship under Haftar Al-Khalifa, gives Trump one of the best shots at an "American first" military victory.


I would also like to take the time to mention Yemen and Saudi Arabia, briefly.

4) Yemen.

It seems unlikely Trump would get involved in the Yemeni-Saudi conflict at all, save do what the Obama Administration is doing already: supply arms to Saudi Arabia in bombing Yemenis.

Of course this would only increase Al-Qaeda's power in Yemen. Trump may turn a blind eye to the Yemeni conflict for a time as he deals with ISIS, getting America out of Afghanistan and instability in Libya, but eventually Al-Qaeda will become too strong in Yemen to ignore.

This, so it seems to me, would lead Trump not to directly fight in Yemen, but to get another world power involved in fighting this sensitive war. Perhaps Russia, perhaps Britain - but it would be a war fought against Al-Qaeda, benefitting the Houthis and outraging Saudi Arabia.

5) Saudi Arabia

Trump's policies are nothing short of disastrous for Saudi Arabia. If Trump does as he has said he would, Syria would remain an ally of Iran, Iraqi-American relations would increase (benefitting the Shi'ite government in Iraq - remember Saudi is Sunni and Sunnis don't like Shi'ites) and with both Libya and Iraq supplying America with oil - together with America's own fracking, oil industries going up under a Trump Administration - Saudi economy would look less and less certain, as America would have far less need for cheap Saudi oil.

(Trump's Afghanistan has a silver lining for Saudi Arabia, as does Trump's non-intervention in Yemen, but these are lesser conflicts compared to Syria and Iraq in particular, both which Saudi would gain nothing from.)

This would make it perfect for internal explosion and chaos. With terrorism decreased in Iraq, Syria and Libya as a result of Trump policy, the increase would happen elsewhere: namely Yemen, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

It is hard to know what a Trump Administration would do were civil war to break out between terrorists and Saudis. On the one hand, a terrorist takeover of Saudi Arabia would legitimize Trump's war on terror in one way, increase relations between many Arab countries and Israel (as these countries would look for security against a terrorist-controlled Saudi Arabia), and on the other hand, having Mecca and Medina in the hand of terrorists explodes legitimacy for them, which is a huge blow to the war on terror in another way.

The likely idea is that Trump would keep the war going as long as possible between Saudi Arabia and the terrorists, as Obama did in Syria.



Anyway, only one way to know for certain: watch as the drama unfolds in 3 months' time.