Wednesday 12 September 2018

Iran and Saudi politics realigned in Iraq



Following on from the previous article, (http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2017/07/iran-ikhwan-and-salafi-politics.html) this article will explore Saudi Arabia and the UAE's role in Iraq at the behest of the Trump Administration.

From the beginning, the Trump Administration has been pushing for Iran to be rolled back in the Middle-East. And this has been tied to its strong, firm support to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Due to Russian intervention in Syria, Iran's position has been solidified there. Though Israel and the US are exerting pressure on Russia to force an Iranian withdrawal, it is far more likely the US will be forced into its own withdrawal from the Kurdish enclave in the north-east. Syria, Iran, Russia and Turkey are all united in their opposition to the US/Kurdish presence in north-eastern Syria.

Yet with Russia and Iran invested so heavily in Syria, in Iraq US' plans for pushing back Iran are more likely to succeed, especially since Saudi Arabia and the UAE are becoming increasingly invested in Iraqi politics. Firebrand cleric Muqtada As-Sadr, whose coalition secured the most seats in the election earlier this year, visited Saudi Arabia before the elections' results and met with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

Such a visit, coupled with other cooperation initiatives between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has been widely hailed by Iraqis, as Iraq being closer to Saudi Arabia would see it reintegrated into the Arab world. Iraq has been an outsider since the Gulf War in 1991; with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, Syria has become the new outsider in the Arab world, and this in turn has given Iraq and Saudi Arabia more incentive to repair ties.

The Crown Prince's bold initiatives in Iraq benefit his own country's struggle against Iran. Mohammed Bin Salman is showing Shi'ite Arabs across the region that he is not against them or Shi'ism inasmuch as he is against the Shi'ite religious establishment in Qom, Iran. For Saudi Arabia, allying more closely with Iraq turns the Saudi-Iran conflict from Shi'ite-Sunni (a conflict Saudi Arabia has largely lost) into a conflict between Persians and Arabs, a conflict more likely to invigorate Iraqis and place them by Saudi Arabia's side.

This helps decrease the risk for Saudi Arabia from its own Shi'ite minorities. It gives Saudi Arabia flexibility to maintain an even harsher stance against Iran - for example, it could ban all Saudis from visiting Iran while increasing the ease of travelling to Shi'ite sites in Iraq. It may also, in the long-term, give Saudi Arabia Shi'ite allies in its war against the Houthis in Yemen.

Iraq's internal struggle, therefore, is becoming increasingly bitter and contested. After the Iraqi election, Saudi Arabia, the United States and the UAE put their support behind Abadi's Nasr coalition, Muqtada As-Sadr's Sa'eroon coalition and the various Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties. This has led to increased threats from the pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi political structure.

The result has been, as of the parliamentary meetings in the 3rd of September, that the largest block has been formed from the Shi'ite coalitions Nasr, Sa'eroon, Wataniya and Hikmah, together with various smaller Sunni Arab coalitions. Both the Kurdish parties and the pro-Iran coalitions Fateh and State of Law, headed by Ameri and the notorious Nouri Al-Maliki, have refused to join the largest political block. So far, it looks as if the Saudi/Emirati/US plan is working.

However, recent Iraqi protests against poor services in Shi'ite city Basra have caused lead coalitions Fateh and Sa'eroon to call for the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. Whether this will break up the Nasr coalition from the largest political block is unclear. What is clear is that if the political block survives, Haider Al-Abadi will not remain the Prime Minister.

This would not be such a bad scenario for the US. If Haider Al-Abadi does not remain the Prime Minister, then it is likely that one of the members of the Sa'eroon coalition will become the next Prime Minister. This would be even worse for Iran than if Abadi secured a second term.

The other reason support for an Iraq independent of Iran is likely produce dividends is the Middle-East's water crisis. Syria, Turkey and Iran have all made dams which have drastically reduced water supply to Iraq. This has been one of the reasons for the protests in Basra: the water there is undrinkable. The Basrawis rightly point out that Iran is a large part of the problem, because Iranian and Turkish dams have cut off most of their water supply.

With Turkey, Iran and Syria all emerging as adversaries to the US and Saudi Arabia, geopolitically Iraq fits in better with the Saudi/Emirati/US camp. To be deprived of water will force Iraq into a position of animosity towards those neighbours depriving it of water.

But Iraq's path to be rid of Iranian interference will not be easy. In all likelihood Iraq will experience yet another civil war, one which will stamp out Iran's proxies one by one in long, bloody battles.