Friday 24 July 2020

ISIS coup in Saudi Arabia: how Turkey would reclaim Mecca and Medina



It is no secret that President Erdogan covets a rebirth of the Ottoman Empire. To add Arabia to his empire, President Erdogan would detonate the Middle-East Time Bomb - and then clean up the mess afterwards.


Alistair Crooke was correct when he pointed out that the real aim of ISIS is to replace the Sauds as Emirs of Arabia, and that this is a Middle-East Time Bomb waiting to explode. This blog has long contended that ISIS is likely to rebirth in the Arabian Peninsula - specifically, in the territories of Saudi Arabia - and, in the words of Alistair Crooke, "there is really almost nothing the West can now do about it but sit and watch."

But what should be additionally noted is that Turkey has the most to gain of any power from a Middle-East Time Bomb explosion. The only way to make sure the Al-Saud royal family loses their control of Mecca and Medina is to complete the "Salafization" process - namely, allowing Saudi Arabia to be (temporarily) ruled by ISIS, the most rigid practicers of Salafi Islam, instead of by the Al-Saud family, which has compromised its Salafi interpretation. Only after this would Hanafi Muslim Turkey be able to step in and take back their "legitimate right" as emirs of Arabia and ouster the ISIS imposters.

Russian interference in Syria has guaranteed Turkey to lose all influence there. However, cooperation with Russia's Syrian project has almost certainly assured Turkey political control of Libya. As Turkish-backed rebels have lost more and more territory in Syria, many of these fighters have been shipped to Libya by Turkey to fight against Haftar and Egypt. These, unfortunately, include fighters that have in the past fought under the banner of ISIS.

With Syrian rebels, ISIS fighters, Somali and Yemeni rebels now working as mercenaries for Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord, it is not hard to see how these could later be deployed to Yemen to fight against the Houthis, to give Turkey a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula. For one thing, it is unlikely that the GNA would want hard line jihadist fighters to stay in Libya - for another, Yemen's Houthis are extremely tough fighters and could only be dislodged by fighters of equal tenacity.

Turkey must gain control of all of Libya before it could intervene decisively in Yemen. Libya shares a land border with Sudan, another Turkish ally, so the fighters could be moved from Libya to Sudan by land and then from Sudan to Yemen by sea. With foreign mercenaries safely away from Libya and Turkey, there would be little risk to these nations for further instability caused by foreign fighters. With the fighters out of Libya, Turkish military, navy and air force could set up a substantial amount of bases on Libya's coast.

Should President Erdogan successfully outmaneuver his opponents in Libya and Yemen, there is nothing to stop him from pushing his luck even further in Saudi Arabia. Most of the mercenaries fighting for Turkey would not hesitate to don ISIS' black garments once more and declare jihad on Saudi Arabia. But rather than ISIS fighting Saudi Arabia directly and risk the wrath of the United States, it would be more prudent (and more typical) for Turkey to facilitate and finance an ISIS coup on Saudi Arabia from within the kingdom.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is deeply unpopular at home. Although he is strongly supported by the US, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Mohammed Bin Salman has weakened the Saudi economy, engaged in a Yemeni war he cannot win and has been a key figure in the blockade against Qatar. Many of his actions have had a destabilizing impact on the region and, unlike President Sisi's Egypt, Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia has not yet had any sort of revolution against its rulers.

As long as King Salman is alive, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will end up in chaos. But should he die and his son Mohammed be named king, there are many from the tribes, religious teachers and leadership in Saudi Arabia who would not hesitate to help Turkey instigate a coup to land ISIS in power. They would want to do this to humiliate Mohammed Bin Salman, force him out of office and, in the long term, return Saudi Arabia to its status quo.

However, after an ISIS takeover, President Erdogan would have no intention of returning Mecca and Medina to the Al-Saud family. Should ISIS take control of Riyadh, the United States would likely occupy the oilfields in eastern Arabia and put pressure on regional actors to take the fight to ISIS directly. Turkey would only concede to help fight against ISIS if it was guaranteed a larger share of influence in its stead.

Turkey may decide that the best way to help bring Arabia under its sway would be to call for a non-Salafi democracy there, to prevent an ISIS resurgence. Though certainly not interested in democracy, such a project would be cover for Turkey to exert a Muslim-Brotherhood-controlled government in the heart of Arabia. Turkey has engaged in similar policy in Egypt, Syria and Libya during the Arab Spring.

Until such a time as Turkey were appeased, it would be near impossible to drive ISIS out of Arabia. ISIS has deep ideological roots there, and of all the regional actors, only Turkey has the military, political and economic capacity to destroy them. But should the United States learn that Turkey was responsible for backing the ISIS coup in the first place, the war between them in Arabia could drag on for many, many years.

Sunday 19 July 2020

Compromising on Turkey for stability and balance: Trump's grand strategy



In the previous two articles in our series, we examined the respective grand strategies of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. In this third installment, we will examine the American grand strategy for the Middle-East.


US President Donald Trump is fixated on surpassing his predecessor, Barrack Obama. In the Middle-East, this means regional stability and balance - and balance means a larger role for Turkey.

President Trump inherited seven conflicts from his predecessor. Of these, stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq are the highest priority, since they have cost the most for America financially and militarily. Almost every other US move in the region has stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq in mind.

For its part, Afghanistan is extremely difficult to stabilize. One of the ways the US has worked towards stability is through the Lapiz Lazuli transit route. Turkey is the main partner in the transit route, which connects Afghanistan to Europe via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. This deal ensures that in the event of a US withdrawal, Afghanistan might just be able to become economically independent of other, larger nations like Iran, Pakistan and Russia. Economic independence gives Afghanistan more ability to confront terrorist groups and prevent a Taliban takeover.

The Lapiz Lazuli transit route is a crucial reason the US has given Turkey lots of regional autonomy. Turkey has been toeing the line with Afghanistan and, as a result, its own strategy for cracking down on Iran by proxy in Syria has been endorsed by the US. Even though defeat of the Syrian opposition is inevitable, Turkey delaying this defeat ensures that Iran spends more and more of its precious resources there.

The main reason the Trump Administration has put maximum pressure on Iran and Syria - apart from nuclear concerns - is because of Iraq. Since the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been the major beneficiary and this, in turn, has completely destabilized Iraq. But substantial economic pressure on Iran and Syria gives Iraq maximum opportunity to pivot away from Iran and towards US allies in the region, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

But the tide has been turning against autocratic nations like the UAE and Saudi Arabia in favour of Turkey for some time now. The autocrats have failed to end the wars in Libya and Yemen, and this is causing President Trump to explore other options. In December 2019 Turkey signed an agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord and intervened against autocrat-backed Haftar Al-Khalifa. Meanwhile, Turkey is also increasing humanitarian assistance and funding for Yemenis linked to Al-Islah, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While Jared Kushner may have pushed for UAE-backed hegemony in the Middle-East as the best way to help Israel, President Trump seems to be making compromises with Turkey to restore political balance in the region. Should Turkey politically control all of Libya and Yemen, Russia would have its influence contained to Syria, Iran would lose Yemen, and Turkey would be more amicable to political stability in Afghanistan and Iraq in the US' favour.

With Libya and Yemen lost, the autocrats would have little choice but to compromise further to US interest in Afghanistan and Iraq. This compromise would only increase the likelihood of Iran being forced out of Iraq and of a stable Afghanistan. Such a result would end five of the seven wars inherited from the Obama Administration, and allow for a geostrategic balance not seen in the Middle-East since before the Iraq War.

However, relations between the autocratic wing of the Middle-East and Turkey are hostile. Even should Afghanistan and Iraq be stabilized and out of Iran's reach, a Turkey-controlled Libya and Yemen increases the likelihood of instability erupting out of Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, would challenge the Trump doctrine as never before, and give Turkey the ability to tip the balance of the Middle-East in its own favour.