Trump's Foreign Policy PART TWO

In my earlier post, "Trump's Foreign Policy," I suggested that Trump might install a dictator in Afghanistan and play the waiting game in Libya.

I wish to take it back and say the opposite: that Trump might install a dictator in Libya and play the waiting game in Afghanistan.

The Afghan War is the longest and one of the most unpopular wars in American memory. To spend much longer in Afghanistan would make Trump more unpopular. Since his foreign policy motto is to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability," he is likely to stabilize other countries first before trying to stabilize Afghanistan.

In any case, an exploding Afghanistan (caused by American troop removal) represents a much smaller regional threat to American assets than does an exploding Iraq, Syria or Libya.

Rather than stabilizing Afghanistan, it seems more likely that Trump, Russia and Iran would stabilize Syria by letting the legitimate Assad government remain to destroy ISIS. Though Assad victory in Syria strengthens Iran, Iran would be faced with an unstable Afghanistan on its eastern border. Such instability would only increase once America left, and would be a valuable bargaining chip for Trump against Iran.

As well as this, Trump would, in his words, "bomb the hell out of ISIS" in Iraq and Syria and "take their [Iraqi] oil." In Trump language this means destroy ISIS and increase oil relations with Iraq instead of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In Libya Trump has a valuable opportunity to cast himself as having a blueprint for American foreign policy. Comparatively, there has not been as much time in Libya since intervention (2011), compared to Afghanistan (2001) which again makes it easier to stabilize Libya over Afghanistan.

Unlike Afghanistan, in Libya there is already a potential dictator fighting on the ground: Haftar Al-Khalifa. All Trump would have to do is scrap the "Unity Government of National Salvation" (which has no power anyway) and give power back to the previously legitimate Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa. Trump supporting the Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa would likely stabilize Libya drastically.

Libya represents a large threat to the stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Trump stabilizing Libya would increase relations substantially between America and those countries.

An unstable Afghanistan represents a threat to stability for Pakistan and Iran in particular, which is also better for America. Iran is anti-American, so a threat to their stability is in America's interest. A threat to Pakistan forces Pakistan to rely more heavily on America. This is good considering Pakistan is one country that does - but should not have - nuclear weapons.


The negative behind America leaving Afghanistan would be a more radical Taliban emerging in 3 - 5 years. This, together with increased Al-Qaeda strength in Yemen, would put Al-Qaeda back on the map. Yet, like Iraq, it's what the American people are willing to accept for the price of getting out of the war.

A post-war unstable Afghanistan would only strengthen how Trump would look to the American people. The American people would be able to compare Trump's results in a stable Iraq, Syria and Libya with those of Obama and Bush, seen visibly in a continually deteriorating Afghanistan.


Such might increase Trump's popularity, causing him to come back for a second Presidential term and finish the war in Afghanistan for good, by installing a dictator on top. Then America would truly be out of the "nation-building business" and stability would return to those regions of the Middle-East.

Yemen: the next Islamic State

Taken from the 21st of August, 2015

For the past 5 months, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in the attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemeni Civil War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both Hadi’s forces and the Shi’ite Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of the Yemeni civil war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War, AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi airstrikes on the Houthi rebels. And like ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Though not directly supported by the United States, ISIS did help achieve America’s objectives in Syria by weakening the Assad government and, until the group invaded Iraq, was mostly left alone by the United States. The terror group, which has since taken over half of Syria and over a quarter of Iraq, claims to be a Caliphate, owing the allegiance of all Muslims, and asks all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Likewise, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been directly supported through Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Yet the result of Saudi’s airstrikes has been the emergence of AQAP as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP will attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes AQAP are working with have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an allegiance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aims in establishing a caliphate.

In Yemen, the largest non-governmental force pitted against the Houthis is the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement seeks to break unity with Northern Yemen and return Yemen to two states. As of now, Hadi’s forces and the Southern Movement are working together to defeat the Houthis. However, once the Houthis are no longer a threat to Southern Yemen, the Southern Movement is likely to fight the Hadi government for independence. Alone, it is unlikely the Southern Movement would succeed. However, were AQAP to join the Southern Movement on their endeavour, independence would become more likely. AQAP would, subsequently, establish a vice grip over the region, and cause the Southern Movement to be indebted to the group.

ISIS, on the other hand, is unlikely to develop much presence in Yemen. They will likely continue their bombings of Zaidi mosques in Yemen, and possibly establish a temporary foothold in Sunni Northern Yemen.

But AQAP is likely to desire to expand its influence, and there is a clever way in which AQAP could do this while still supporting the Southern Movement:

AQAP could claim parts of Sunni Northern Yemen as belonging to Southern Yemen.

Along the west coast of Northern Yemen there are a number of Sunni regions which could be coaxed to the side of both the Southern Movement and AQAP. This could mean the end not only of Yemen as a whole, but of any chance of Houthi or Hadi dominance in the foreseeable future, which is exactly what AQAP wants.

In this case, AQAP would not even need to invade Sana’a to control Yemen; all they would need would be to take the Sunni regions from Northern Yemen to weaken Hadi and Houthi influence. Then, for the first time in many years, Southern Yemen would prevail as stronger than Northern Yemen.

The unfortunate thing is that, like ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and like the Taliban in Afghanistan, America is unlikely to realise the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group may be heading for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. As ISIS grows stronger in Syria and Iraq, it is likely to turn more of its attention to Saudi Arabia. If ISIS invades Saudi Arabia from the north, AQAP might take advantage of the instability and launch an invasion from the south. If that happens, there will be little America can do to save the region.

Trump Is President. What's Next?

Well, Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States of America. What stands as next for the Middle-East?


It would be naive to think that a Trump Presidency would not be at least slightly hawkish. The Obama Administration is currently involved in 3 major conflicts: the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS, the Afghan War and the Libyan War on ISIS. I wish to provide the likely direction for each of them.

1) the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS

It will be swift and quick. In Syria, Trump will either cooperate with Russia or withdraw from Syria and let Russia defeat ISIS. The first seems more likely, as Trump would likely want himself seen as making "great deals," and one of those great deals would be to destroy ISIS in Syria and restore better relations with Russia. Both of these objectives would be achieved with Trump's plan: Assad's army is the largest capable fighting force against ISIS, and Russia, Syria and Trump would all benefit from an ISIS defeat at the hands of Assad.

In Iraq, the fight may be equally swift, but how Trump acts after defeating ISIS in Iraq will be telling. Trump's idea for "safe zones" in Syria funded by Turkey and the Gulf States is a long shot - a very long shot. However, safe zones in Iraq would be something that Turkey and the Gulf States would be - perhaps - more comfortable with.


Unless incredibly hawkish, Trump is likely to use some "soft-power" policies to increase Iraq's stability. One such would be the increased trade of oil between Iraq and America - such increased trade could benefit both Iraq's economy and America's. Trump has talked about "taking Iraqi oil," but in Trump language that means increasing oil trade with Iraq. He has also said he would not take Saudi oil if they refused to comply with his ISIS' strategy. Trump's "soft power" Iraqi oil policy would also benefit America should Saudi Arabia destabilize. (More about the destabilization of Saudi Arabia later).

If not "soft-power" policies, Trump might arrange for a Turkish guardianship of Iraq should the country destabilize again. This would mean that the Trump Administration would not have to return to Iraq, and Turkey would be sucked into the conflict instead.

2) the Afghan War

Like Obama in Iraq, Trump seems likely to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. This might be preceded by a solid smashing of the Taliban before they go, but other than that, there is no immediate desire to recreate the political fabric of Afghanistan for the third time in 40 years.

And, like Iraq, this would cause a massive problem of instability for Afghanistan within 3 - 5 years of American withdrawal. Perhaps a resurgent Taliban would emerge - perhaps ISIS - or perhaps, as I believe most likely, something even worse.

This would give Trump a chance to return to Afghanistan and smash out whatever terrorist organisation had taken root in the country, but to do so from only the skies, as Obama did in Iraq. With more American public support for the war, he would likely then try and work out how to install a dictator in Afghanistan, as dictatorship is the only likely alternative to more terrorism growing in the region.

3) the Libyan War on ISIS

In the beginning, Trump would not do a lot - he would want to see how his plan to defeat ISIS plays out in Syria and Iraq first. Yet Trump would work out, rather quickly, that Haftar Al-Khalifa is his best shot at a stable Libya. He would then use Al-Khalifa to flatten ISIS in the region, as well as the pockets of Islamist militias who are of the same mind as ISIS.

Like Iraq, Trump would likely increase oil production from Libya, to get America further and further away from Saudi oil. That, coupled together with a dictatorship under Haftar Al-Khalifa, gives Trump one of the best shots at an "American first" military victory.


I would also like to take the time to mention Yemen and Saudi Arabia, briefly.

4) Yemen.

It seems unlikely Trump would get involved in the Yemeni-Saudi conflict at all, save do what the Obama Administration is doing already: supply arms to Saudi Arabia in bombing Yemenis.

Of course this would only increase Al-Qaeda's power in Yemen. Trump may turn a blind eye to the Yemeni conflict for a time as he deals with ISIS, getting America out of Afghanistan and instability in Libya, but eventually Al-Qaeda will become too strong in Yemen to ignore.

This, so it seems to me, would lead Trump not to directly fight in Yemen, but to get another world power involved in fighting this sensitive war. Perhaps Russia, perhaps Britain - but it would be a war fought against Al-Qaeda, benefitting the Houthis and outraging Saudi Arabia.

5) Saudi Arabia

Trump's policies are nothing short of disastrous for Saudi Arabia. If Trump does as he has said he would, Syria would remain an ally of Iran, Iraqi-American relations would increase (benefitting the Shi'ite government in Iraq - remember Saudi is Sunni and Sunnis don't like Shi'ites) and with both Libya and Iraq supplying America with oil - together with America's own fracking, oil industries going up under a Trump Administration - Saudi economy would look less and less certain, as America would have far less need for cheap Saudi oil.

(Trump's Afghanistan has a silver lining for Saudi Arabia, as does Trump's non-intervention in Yemen, but these are lesser conflicts compared to Syria and Iraq in particular, both which Saudi would gain nothing from.)

This would make it perfect for internal explosion and chaos. With terrorism decreased in Iraq, Syria and Libya as a result of Trump policy, the increase would happen elsewhere: namely Yemen, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

It is hard to know what a Trump Administration would do were civil war to break out between terrorists and Saudis. On the one hand, a terrorist takeover of Saudi Arabia would legitimize Trump's war on terror in one way, increase relations between many Arab countries and Israel (as these countries would look for security against a terrorist-controlled Saudi Arabia), and on the other hand, having Mecca and Medina in the hand of terrorists explodes legitimacy for them, which is a huge blow to the war on terror in another way.

The likely idea is that Trump would keep the war going as long as possible between Saudi Arabia and the terrorists, as Obama did in Syria.



Anyway, only one way to know for certain: watch as the drama unfolds in 3 months' time.

If Assad wins the Syrian Civil War

As the Syrian Government’s forces, backed by the Russian air force, enter into Aleppo, it looks as if the bloody conflict of the Syrian Civil War may finally reach its end.

This article is to take a glimpse at what would happen in the Middle-East – and abroad – should Assad win the Syrian Civil War.

Christianity would survive in the Middle-East. Linked with the Syrian Government are the sizeable Christian minorities that support it – if the current Government survives the war, Christians would not have to find a home in the West, but would be able to stay in the heart of the Middle-East. Compared to Iraq, where Christians are being genocided by ISIS in Nineveh, this would be one of the major positives for an Assad victory.

Iran would be a power-house in the Middle-East. For Iran, consolidating control over Syria through the Assad Government would ensure that Iranian dominance in Palestine and Lebanon would continue unabated. Such dominance would worry both Israel and Saudi Arabia and likely strengthen their ties to each other, benefitting Israel.

The Kurds would have a chance at forming their own government. With Iraq and Syria both ransacked by war, the Kurds in each respective country would have a chance at creating an autonomous region ruled by neither government. An Iraqi-Syrian Kurdistan would greatly benefit Israel.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS would suffer horrific defeats. Were the Assad Government to regain control of all their Arab regions, ISIS and Al-Qaeda would end up completely driven from the country. This would be a major win against Sunni terrorism and an international benefit for an Assad victory.

The Wars in Libya and Yemen would intensify. For America, both the Libyan and Yemeni conflicts have been largely off the radar, compared with the Iraqi-Syrian conflict (2014 – current) in which ISIS has been able to flourish. Libya and Yemen would see a spike in violence caused by funders of Al-Qaeda and ISIS no longer able to fund terrorism in Syria.

In Libya it is difficult to tell whether ISIS or Al-Qaeda would benefit more, yet in Yemen the benefactor is clear. Over the course of the Yemeni Civil War (2015 – current), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has seen an exponential increase in support comparable to the rise of ISIS over the course of the Iraq War (2003 – 2011). With the defeat of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would see an even larger growth in funding and support, to the detriment of anti-terrorism in the region.

In Libya, to have success over Al-Qaeda, ISIS would have to become localized as they have been in Iraq and Syria, and they would also need a large enemy for Libyans to focus on. If ISIS could rebrand themselves as the protectors of Islam and the Libyan people, they may have more success than they have had in Derna and more recently in Sirte.

Instability would grow in the Gulf. With ISIS driven out of Syria, it would likely go underground in Iraq after the liberation of Mosul by the Iraqi Army. This would mean that while ISIS would still exist in Iraq, it would be too unpopular to mobilize support against the Iraqi Government – at least for the next couple of years.

With ISIS unable to expand in Syria and playing the waiting game in Iraq, it would largely focus on other countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia the opportunities for ISIS are frightening to contemplate. Much of the kingdom is familiar with ISIS’ radical ideology, as both Saudi Arabia and ISIS share much doctrine in Salafiya and share a deep and abiding hatred for Iran and Shi’a Islam.

With Assad secure, many Saudis would feel that their influence would be diminished by Iran’s, as Iran would control Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and would largely manage Iraq and contest for Yemen. This would breed frustration within the Kingdom and likely result in a war between the large Sunni majority and the smaller Shi’ite minority in the east of the Kingdom.

If the Saudi government does not tread carefully, they could be painted by ISIS as collaborators with the Saudi Shi’ites, driving more Saudis into their arms. While an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia is unlikely, the country could suffer from a crippling civil war akin to the one Syria would have just come out of.

And then there is Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. While seen as less relevant than ISIS by both Saudi and America, instability in Saudi Arabia could give Al-Qaeda the space to infiltrate into the south of the kingdom, meaning that it could end up at war with Shi’ites, Al-Qaeda and ISIS all at once – a war as complex as the one fought in Syria.

Iraq would grind on. While the Assad Government would likely stabilize Syria, Iraq would remain a centre of instability for the Middle-East – at least until a revolution takes place.

Were the Kurds to become completely autonomous, Iraq would end up a weaker country. It would cause the dysfunctional Iraqi government to continue persecuting and scape-goating the Sunni Arabs for all its own problems, meaning that ISIS would, after a couple of years, re-emerge in Iraq stronger than ever.

Yet the Kurds’ self-autonomy would cause many Shi’ites to blame the government – not the Sunnis – for their problems. This would give an opportunity for a revolutionary like Muqtada Al-Sadr to take control of the Sunni and Shi’ite areas of Iraq – such a change of government would only solidify the Kurdish separation from Iraq, though it might cause the remains of Iraq to stay together; neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor Shi’ites wish to divide their country in three.

Assad would stabilize Syria. Contrary to popular belief, Assad does have a majority support in Syria – especially given the alternatives the Syrians see right outside their front doorstep in ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Assad’s real test will be the winning of Bedouins in the Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor regions – fortunately he has controlled the city of Deir Ez-Zor for the entirety of the war, which suggests that Bedouin support for Assad is not fictional.

If the Kurds do end up separating, it is only the Ba’ath Party ideology that could keep the remainder of Syria together. Assad would be able to frame the Kurdish autonomy as an Israeli conspiracy, uniting the more extreme elements of his country to him, and returning Syria to the safe place it was five years ago.

It would be better than the alternative. If Assad did not win the war in Syria – say, if Hillary Clinton became President and made good on her threat to invade and overthrow the government there – Al-Qaeda and ISIS would have a safe-haven in Syria for the next two decades at least. Genocides of Alawites, Druze and Christians would occur, and Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would all be destabilized. Israel would be threatened on its border by Al-Qaeda in Syria, and a weak Muslim Brotherhood Government would nominally control Syria – as the Shi’ite Government nominally controls Iraq.

While Assad remaining as President of Syria would produce some unstable outcomes, the alternative is far, far worse.

Hypocrisy Reigns in the West as Syrian Government takes back Aleppo

Bashar Al-Assad, the legitimate ruler of Syria, with widespread support from Syrian Christians, Alawites, Druze and upper-class Sunni Muslims, is closer than ever to retaking control of Aleppo for the first time since 2012.

The outcome of this bloody battle would be one of the best for the Middle-Eastern region: Terrorism would be driven out of its largest stronghold in Syria.

But if one reads the news, there is nothing but screaming bloody murder towards the Syrian Government. The legitimate President in Syria, with unbelievable support from the army, surrounding government and people, is continuing to be called by Western Media and politicans as illegitimate and in need of removal.

Of course, if Bashar Al-Assad is removed from Syria, it would lead to the worst conflict of the Middle-East in the last century. Yes: worse than ISIS' invasion of Iraq in June 2014. We would have a radicalised Hezbollah in western Syria, fighting for control with Al-Qaeda, ISIS and a dysfunctional Muslim Brotherhood Syrian Government.

But the West seems to just ignore that every decision they've made thus far against certain sides - whether in Afghanistan in the 80's, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 or Yemen in 2015 - all of these are increasing terrorism in the region and bankrupting the West, both morally and financially.

In the 80's, funding the Mujahideen gave rise to the Taliban in Afghanistan. While this destroyed Russian influence in the country, it was replaced with a government which Al-Qaeda leaders pledge allegiance to. Really, US support of terrorists in Afghanistan gave themselves 9-11.

Removing Saddam Hussien in Iraq 2003 was even worse. ISIS is worse than Al-Qaeda, more brutal and more explosive for the region. Whereas Al-Qaeda focused largely on western targets, ISIS have ignited a Sunni-Shi'ite war in the Middle-East that has been raging ever since ISIS first emerged in 2003. Back then, ISIS was known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but its founder, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi is more aligned with self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi than with Osama Bin Laden, the latter who he pledged allegiance to.

Iraq borders Saudi Arabia, and the hardcore ISIS ideology has great sympathy there. If ISIS are able to successfully detonate in Saudi Arabia, the whole region could undergo a sysmic shift as the Arabian Peninsula completely destabilizes.


The results of removing Gidaffi in Libya 2011 are not yet felt in the region, but if Gidaffi loyalists continue to be persecuted and kept out of power in Libya, they will try and find another way as Saddam loyalists did: through terrorism. This will mean that, even if powers in the region successfully deal with Al-Qaeda and ISIS - which seems to me unlikely, with the exception of Russia - terrorism would still have a stronghold in Libya.

Western support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is strengthening Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to an alarming extent. As if ISIS didn't threaten Saudi Arabia enough, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is becoming one of the most powerful contenders for Yemen, right on Saudi Arabia's doorstep.

When all of these foolish blunders of the West are weighed up against Western criticism of the Syrian Government, one cannot help but feel that the West are either completely oblivious to what they are doing, like a child with his father's gun, or that the West are just destabilizing the Middle-East because they like terrorism.

The best thing America and the West can do in Syria is shut their mouths about its government gaining back their city, and focus on undoing their erroneous work: replace terrorism with strong governments.

Yet only Russia seems to have the sense to do that.

Is Mohammed Bin Salman pushing Saudi Arabia to civil war?

Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is making some very quick decisions in Saudi Arabia.


Mohammed Bin Salman is the most influential figure in Saudi Arabia at this moment. His father, King Salman, has given him authority in a variety of roles, ministries, including Deputy Crown Prince after Mohammed Bin Nayef. Bin Salman has been modernizing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia very quickly, and this process has been sped up many times faster than efforts under the previous king, King Abdullah.


There are rumours suggesting that Mohammed Bin Salman has his eyes set on the kingship, wishing to jump over Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef and become the next King. This could ignite civil war.


The truth is that Mohammed Bin Salman only has the ability to eye the kingship because the late King Abdullah's previous command has been completely ignored. This command was that Salman be king, followed by then Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin, followed by whoever Salman would choose.


King Salman raised the hopes of the royal family when he chose Mohammed Bin Nayef as Deputy Crown Prince and kept Muqrin as Crown Prince. But when Crown Prince Muqrin “resigned” and Mohammed Bin Salman was made the new Deputy Crown Prince, this caused frustration in the Saudi royal family.


The Saudi royal family favours Mohammed Bin Nayef, the crown prince, over Mohammed Bin Salman. Bin Salman has skipped over many other more qualified candidates for Deputy Crown Prince because he is the son of the esteemed king. King Salman had the popularity of the Saudi royal family and earned his right to become king. His son, however, has not.


Mohammed Bin Salman is also the architect of Saudi’s war with Yemen, which has resulted in severe devastation in the impoverished country – the damage done to Yemen is comparable to damage done in the Iraq by American intervention. Northern Yemen is at risk of famine, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is stronger than ever – the Houthis remain undefeated and Hadi’s government remains one of the weakest forces in Yemen.


This is all exacerbated by Mohammed Bin Salman’s rapid push for modernization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, without considering that Saudi Arabia was funded on the principle of spreading Salafiya – the most conservative and arguably truest form of Sunni Islam – across the world, and that for decades, the Saudi royal family has been able to balance internal westernization of the Kingdom with an external “Salafization”.


In modernizing the kingdom, ascending to the kingship and stopping the external "Salafization", Mohammed Bin Salman could be painted as a servant of America, ignoring the commands of God and bowing down to America’s wishes unashamedly.


Those in Saudi Arabia who are most frustrated with Mohammed Bin Salman are those older than him. He is young – very, very young by Saudi standards – to be in a position of such power. Many would not hesitate to wage war on him should he ascend to the kingship based on his age.


ISIS and Al-Qaeda would feed into this frustration. Al-Qaeda’s base nearest to the Kingdom is, ironically, in Yemen – Mohammed Bin Salman has been the architect of a war which has fuelled Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is bent on destroying the modernization Mohammed Bin Salman stands for.


Worse still is ISIS. Though their territories across Iraq and Syria are shrinking, their replacement is Iranian-backed governments in Iraq and Syria, as well as Israeli-sympathetic Kurdish governments – this is only fuelling sectarian hatred on which ISIS thrives. Unfortunately for Mohammed Bin Salman, the population in the Eastern Province is mixed between Sunnis and Shi’ites, which makes it ideal territory for ISIS to infiltrate into - from Iraq - at the outbreak of a civil war.
 
With ISIS in Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Yemen competing for influence in Saudi Arabia at the outbreak of war, Mohammed Bin Salman would face external and internal threats from these groups and the Saudis that support them.

Trump's Foreign Policy

I used to think Trump was a clown, a buffoon, a corrupt businessman who didn't know anything about American politics, whether domestic or international.

Then I watched the following policy speech:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q_s6cXSv_8


And I discovered that the Media portrayal of Trump in regards to Foreign Policy - he would be the first to use a nuke, that world war 3 would start under him - was false.

Trump, for all his faults, has a better Foreign Policy than Hillary Clinton's.


Hillary Clinton has followed the neo-con handbook. Her vote in favour of the Iraq War was not followed by apology or sincere change of policy - rather, she only continued to please her donors in voting for the ousting of Egypt's Mubarak - who had signed a declaration of peace with Israel - and Clinton replaced him with Muslim Brotherhood Morsi.

Clinton did not stop there. She continued her failed policy by ousting Gidaffi in Libya and replacing him with - well, militias squabbling with each other. They are still squabbling.

And she is not stopping. She wants to remove President Assad from Syria - which would be her worst foreign policy decision to date.

Yes, worse than voting for the Iraq War. I said it.
(Refer to earlier post for more details.)

Trump says he wishes to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability." (By the way, in his foreign policy speech, he did not mention nukes once. Not once! Ergh, American Media...)

Trump has tapped into what the American people want: an end to endless wars. But he recognises that in order to create lasting peace in an area as volatile as the Middle-East, strong men are a better alternative to terrorists. Regarding Assad, Trump said, "Maybe Assad is a bad guy, but there might be worse guys after him... We don't even know who we're funding."

Meaning that step 1 in Trump's Foreign Policy is the handing over of terrorism in Syria to Russia and President Assad - who is the head of the internationally recognised government anyway. Such a move benefits the Middle-East, benefits the Syrian people, benefits relations between America and Russia and benefits Israel. I will unpack each of these below:

1) Benefits the Middle-East. The destabilization of Syria with the removal of Assad would destroy much heritage and culture of the Middle-East. Together with Egypt and Iraq, Syria is one of the countries which is most recognised for its culture and heritage in the Middle-East. An escalation in violence and killing caused by the removal of Assad would destroy a sizeable amount of heritage in Syria and the Middle-East.

2) Benefits the Syrian people. Most Syrians live in Assad's territory - they're not fleeing Assad - they're fleeing Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The Syrians that are disgruntled and not content with Assad are mainly from the villages and countryside of Syria - these are a minority fighting the majority (except they have American/Western backing.) Most people would benefit more from an Assad victory than from his removal: Alawites, Druze, Christians and upper-class Sunnis would all stand to benefit.

3) Benefits relations between America and Russia. American-Russian relations are at their worst post-Cold War. American pressure easing in Syria would undoubtedly give Putin the space he needs to show the world that he wishes to accomplish good in Syria and fight terrorism. Putin would also give America more concessions in other areas if his top Middle-East ally were left alone.

4) Benefits Israel. There are those in Israel that believe getting rid of Assad would benefit Israel - Hillary Clinton is one such as this. I disagree for a reason I have stated earlier: at the moment, Israel's main enemies are Shi'ite Muslims, not Sunni Muslims. The majority of Muslims in the Middle-East - and in the world - are Sunni. If the Assad Government is removed - a Shi'ite power that has maintained a peaceful border with Israel - then Sunnis would undoubtedly turn their attention to Israel themselves and make this peaceful border not so peaceful. This "sleeping giant" of Sunnis turning to fight Israel has been asleep since the beginning of the Iraq War - Israel would be wise to keep it asleep.


Trump may also install a dictator in Afghanistan. At the moment, the Taliban controls a sizeable amount of territory in Afghanistan - they are stronger than they have been in a number of years - and America cannot defeat them with their current strategy. With "getting out of the nation-building business" and "focusing on stability," the logical conclusion for Trump regarding Afghanistan would be to push for a Sunni dictator to take control. This would destroy the Taliban for sure; it would also stabilize a country which has seen nothing but war for the past 15 years. It would provide a balwark for Iranian influence, much as Saddam Hussein did in Iraq prior to the Iraq War.

Afghanistan may be the country Trump gets out of more successfully than Obama did from Iraq.


It may be possible as well that Trump would increase relations with Iraq and decrease relations with Saudi Arabia. He has said jokingly, "We gotta take their [Iraqi] oil" - but what he is referring to is keeping Iraq's oil out of the hands of American companies - companies selling the oil elsewhere - and increasing oil trade between Iraq and America.

Iraq would likely stabilize under a new level of relations with America and the economic boost associated with it. Whether Iraq breaks in 2 or not would be irrelevant - America has established trade with Gulf countries whether part of Saudi Arabia or not; there is no reason to suggest they would not do the same with both mainland and Kurdish Iraq.

America not boosting the oil industry in both Iran and Saudi Arabia would dampen terrorist efforts enormously, as both have been funding terrorism extensively.

This would likely have an impact on the Saudi-American war on Houthis in Yemen. While pro-Iranian, the Houthis may be able to be pushed into closer relations with Iraq over Iran, through which Trump may give them the green light to control all of Yemen and expel Al-Qaeda from Yemen for good.

With Libya, Trump would likely wait for the country to deteriorate extensively before intervening again there. This is a sad reality for Libyans: Americans are war-weary.

Trump is a better solution than Clinton. I can provide more links below if requested.