If Assad wins the Syrian Civil War

As the Syrian Government’s forces, backed by the Russian air force, enter into Aleppo, it looks as if the bloody conflict of the Syrian Civil War may finally reach its end.

This article is to take a glimpse at what would happen in the Middle-East – and abroad – should Assad win the Syrian Civil War.

Christianity would survive in the Middle-East. Linked with the Syrian Government are the sizeable Christian minorities that support it – if the current Government survives the war, Christians would not have to find a home in the West, but would be able to stay in the heart of the Middle-East. Compared to Iraq, where Christians are being genocided by ISIS in Nineveh, this would be one of the major positives for an Assad victory.

Iran would be a power-house in the Middle-East. For Iran, consolidating control over Syria through the Assad Government would ensure that Iranian dominance in Palestine and Lebanon would continue unabated. Such dominance would worry both Israel and Saudi Arabia and likely strengthen their ties to each other, benefitting Israel.

The Kurds would have a chance at forming their own government. With Iraq and Syria both ransacked by war, the Kurds in each respective country would have a chance at creating an autonomous region ruled by neither government. An Iraqi-Syrian Kurdistan would greatly benefit Israel.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS would suffer horrific defeats. Were the Assad Government to regain control of all their Arab regions, ISIS and Al-Qaeda would end up completely driven from the country. This would be a major win against Sunni terrorism and an international benefit for an Assad victory.

The Wars in Libya and Yemen would intensify. For America, both the Libyan and Yemeni conflicts have been largely off the radar, compared with the Iraqi-Syrian conflict (2014 – current) in which ISIS has been able to flourish. Libya and Yemen would see a spike in violence caused by funders of Al-Qaeda and ISIS no longer able to fund terrorism in Syria.

In Libya it is difficult to tell whether ISIS or Al-Qaeda would benefit more, yet in Yemen the benefactor is clear. Over the course of the Yemeni Civil War (2015 – current), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has seen an exponential increase in support comparable to the rise of ISIS over the course of the Iraq War (2003 – 2011). With the defeat of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would see an even larger growth in funding and support, to the detriment of anti-terrorism in the region.

In Libya, to have success over Al-Qaeda, ISIS would have to become localized as they have been in Iraq and Syria, and they would also need a large enemy for Libyans to focus on. If ISIS could rebrand themselves as the protectors of Islam and the Libyan people, they may have more success than they have had in Derna and more recently in Sirte.

Instability would grow in the Gulf. With ISIS driven out of Syria, it would likely go underground in Iraq after the liberation of Mosul by the Iraqi Army. This would mean that while ISIS would still exist in Iraq, it would be too unpopular to mobilize support against the Iraqi Government – at least for the next couple of years.

With ISIS unable to expand in Syria and playing the waiting game in Iraq, it would largely focus on other countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia the opportunities for ISIS are frightening to contemplate. Much of the kingdom is familiar with ISIS’ radical ideology, as both Saudi Arabia and ISIS share much doctrine in Salafiya and share a deep and abiding hatred for Iran and Shi’a Islam.

With Assad secure, many Saudis would feel that their influence would be diminished by Iran’s, as Iran would control Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and would largely manage Iraq and contest for Yemen. This would breed frustration within the Kingdom and likely result in a war between the large Sunni majority and the smaller Shi’ite minority in the east of the Kingdom.

If the Saudi government does not tread carefully, they could be painted by ISIS as collaborators with the Saudi Shi’ites, driving more Saudis into their arms. While an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia is unlikely, the country could suffer from a crippling civil war akin to the one Syria would have just come out of.

And then there is Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. While seen as less relevant than ISIS by both Saudi and America, instability in Saudi Arabia could give Al-Qaeda the space to infiltrate into the south of the kingdom, meaning that it could end up at war with Shi’ites, Al-Qaeda and ISIS all at once – a war as complex as the one fought in Syria.

Iraq would grind on. While the Assad Government would likely stabilize Syria, Iraq would remain a centre of instability for the Middle-East – at least until a revolution takes place.

Were the Kurds to become completely autonomous, Iraq would end up a weaker country. It would cause the dysfunctional Iraqi government to continue persecuting and scape-goating the Sunni Arabs for all its own problems, meaning that ISIS would, after a couple of years, re-emerge in Iraq stronger than ever.

Yet the Kurds’ self-autonomy would cause many Shi’ites to blame the government – not the Sunnis – for their problems. This would give an opportunity for a revolutionary like Muqtada Al-Sadr to take control of the Sunni and Shi’ite areas of Iraq – such a change of government would only solidify the Kurdish separation from Iraq, though it might cause the remains of Iraq to stay together; neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor Shi’ites wish to divide their country in three.

Assad would stabilize Syria. Contrary to popular belief, Assad does have a majority support in Syria – especially given the alternatives the Syrians see right outside their front doorstep in ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Assad’s real test will be the winning of Bedouins in the Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor regions – fortunately he has controlled the city of Deir Ez-Zor for the entirety of the war, which suggests that Bedouin support for Assad is not fictional.

If the Kurds do end up separating, it is only the Ba’ath Party ideology that could keep the remainder of Syria together. Assad would be able to frame the Kurdish autonomy as an Israeli conspiracy, uniting the more extreme elements of his country to him, and returning Syria to the safe place it was five years ago.

It would be better than the alternative. If Assad did not win the war in Syria – say, if Hillary Clinton became President and made good on her threat to invade and overthrow the government there – Al-Qaeda and ISIS would have a safe-haven in Syria for the next two decades at least. Genocides of Alawites, Druze and Christians would occur, and Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would all be destabilized. Israel would be threatened on its border by Al-Qaeda in Syria, and a weak Muslim Brotherhood Government would nominally control Syria – as the Shi’ite Government nominally controls Iraq.

While Assad remaining as President of Syria would produce some unstable outcomes, the alternative is far, far worse.