Islamic State after ISIS

Trump's policies are set to destroy ISIS for good in Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic State is set to remain in the Middle-East.

ISIS and the Islamic State are one and the same organisation - the difference is in the wording. ISIS is the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria', which Trump has vowed to completely destroy. Because Assad will remain; because Trump will push up Iraq's oil exports to stabilize the country, the only place in which the Islamic State will be able to expand in the immediate future is Saudi Arabia.

The northern tribes of Saudi Arabia are, unfortunately, the same as those in eastern Syria and western Iraq, the base of support for the Islamic State. This is where the Islamic State is likely to begin its expansion.

But it will not end there. As well as northern Saudi Arabia, the Islamic State will be able to expand into the east, Al-Ahsa, where the Saudi Shi'ites are. The Islamic State would likely unleash an anger - a collective anger of the Sunni Muslims at the Shi'ites who defeated them in Syria and Iraq - unleash an anger directed at the Saudi Shi'ites and resulting in a tearing of the fabric in the eastern province.

Such violence would, eventually, spill into Kuwait and Bahrain as well. The results are likely genocide and mass emigration by the Shi'ites from the Gulf.

As well as the northern and eastern provinces, the Islamic State is likely to make its way into the region of Najd, the central region of the Islamic State's ideology. Here the battle will be most bitterly fought between two sides who believe they better reflect the doctrines of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. Qaseem would likely fall to the Islamic State; Riyadh might fall, but that is harder to know for sure.

Should Mohammed Bin Salman remain the dominant figure of Saudi Arabia, Islamic State will be able to win over many of the tribes in Saudi Arabia and cause the Saud royal family to be living in existential crisis.

Should Mohammed Bin Nayef become more dominant than his cousin, there is a chance the Saudi kingdom would survive. While there are those who hate the Saudi government, Islamic State controlling Mecca and Medina is a very bad idea for the world.

The only feasible way someone like Mohammed Bin Nayef could save the kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be to ally with the lesser of two evils - namely, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. One almost wonders if that was the reason for King Salman waging the Yemen War in the first place: to train up the Saudi military and to stretch out a hand in alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of the Islamic State.

While Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula gaining dominance in Saudi Arabia is a threat to the kingdom, it is nowhere near as potent a threat as that of the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda, while condemning the Saud royal family, has on more than one occasion opened its hand in alliance with the kingdom, most notably during the Iraq-Kuwait War on 1990, in which Saudi Arabia rejected an alliance with Al-Qaeda in favour of the Americans.

Such alliance is Saudi Arabia's hope. After victory over the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would return Saudi Arabia to a sort of Islamic legitimacy, forcing the kingdom to cleanse itself of several policies which undermine it as bearer of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina. Those policies include breaking their previous alliance with America and Israel, as well as a focus on defeating America and Israel over and above the current focus on defeating Iran, something the Islamic State and Saudi Arabia currently share in common.

In the mean time, before a Saudi-Al-Qaeda victory over Islamic State could be achieved, it is to be expected that many of the smaller Gulf kingdoms would be destroyed by the Islamic State. These include Kuwait and Bahrain, previously mentioned; these also include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, where Dubai is located.

The Islamic State re-declaring itself as a Caliphate from its capital in Dubai is a frightening and distinct possibility.

The best thing President-elect Donald Trump could do in the face of such a conflict is minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East. Making Iraq one of America's top Arab allies is a step in the right direction - should the Trump Administration stabilize and wholeheartedly ally with Iraq, the Islamic State would be unable to expand back into its previous support network.

The other way Trump could minimize its impact on the rest of the Middle-East would be to minimize ties with Saudi Arabia, as he seems keen to do. The other way would be to withdraw support for Saudi's war on Yemen and even withdraw from bombing Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is going to need Al-Qaeda's help to defeat the Islamic State.

Staying neutral in the Saudi war is essential for Trump's withdrawal policies from the Middle-East to succeed. Should he get sucked into that conflict, it would only be exacerbated and increase the likelihood of the Saudi government falling.

Obama bombing more countries than Bush?!

Obama and Bush were both Establishment Presidents.

Of course Obama did some things that many Establishment Presidents would not do - namely, withdraw from Iraq (2011); the Iran Nuclear Deal (2015); not overthrow the Syrian Government (2011 - 2016) - in spite of this, Obama has, like Bush, agreed with the ideology of regime change.

Herein lies Obama's problem in foreign policy. Regime change is the biggest cause for increase in terrorism - we saw this after Bush invaded Iraq in 2003. The lessons from Bush's Iraq War have not been learnt by Obama in Yemen, Libya and Syria. And this is unacceptable.

For Yemen, Libya and Syria are the 3 additional conflicts Obama is bombing, added to Bush's bombing of 4 countries - namely, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. These 3 additional conflicts are, in essence, being bombed because the dominant powers in those countries run counter or ran counter to United States' interest.

In Yemen, the Houthis threaten to rip Yemen from Saudi Arabia's vice grip. The Houthis threaten the Al-Qaeda stronghold in Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, this is unacceptable, and America is assisting Saudi's war on Yemen, while also continuing drone strikes in the country against Al-Qaeda - which, I might add, help more than hinder Al-Qaeda's recruitment there.

In Libya, Moammar Al-Gidaffi had been on America's list of regime change for decades. The Arab Spring provided the Obama Administration with an opportunity for regime change there, overthrowing Gidaffi and replacing him with squabbling militias.

From these squabbling militias ISIS made its footprint in Derna and more recently in Sirte. The Obama Administration decided that bombing ISIS in Libya was a great idea, though had Gidaffi never been removed in the first place, ISIS would not exist in Libya. Again, Obama's campaign against ISIS in Libya helps more than hinders the spread of terrorism in Libya.

Syria is worst of the 3. To Obama's credit, he did not remove Bashar Al-Assad, but he still funded rebels, the majority of whom have more in common with ISIS than America. Now he is involved in an ISIS campaign that would not have existed in Syria had he but stayed out of Syria and not supported the rebels there.

Thankfully, Obama's ISIS campaign in Syria has not been helping recruitment there - it has been genuinely helpful in eradicating terrorism from Syria.


In the Trump Administration, expect a lot more productive intervention in the majority of the 7 countries the United States is currently bombing. Expect Trump to end the conflict in Syria by ending Obama's policy of 'Assad must go' and of funding Syrian rebels. Expect Trump to end much of the conflict in Iraq by 'taking their oil' (namely, increasing oil relations with Iraq over and above Saudi Arabia and Iran, to economically benefit Iraq). Expect Trump to install dictator Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, ending militias squabbling and restoring stability there.

Expect also Trump to withdraw from Afghanistan. It is true that America would likely return to Afghanistan 3 - 5 years after withdrawal, but Trump understands that spending much longer in Afghanistan is wasted effort. There are more immediate battles in the war on terror that require US' attention than Afghanistan.

Sadly, it is unlikely Trump would stop American bombings in Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen. Yet the ending of 3 - 4 conflicts in the Middle-East would greatly improve America's standing in the region.

Are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about to ally with China?

Trump's plans for the Middle-East represent significant problems for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.


For Saudi Arabia, the shrinking of Sunni-dominance in Iraq and Syria by the Trump Administration represents an existential threat to the Saudi kingdom.

Trump willing to work with Bashar Al-Assad against ISIS in Syria is one thing, but Trump's plan to increase relations with Iraq is another, a policy which threatens to unhinge Saudi Arabia from the American sphere of influence.

There are two options for Saudi Arabia. One is increased relations with China - the other is increased relations with the European Union. And Saudi Arabia is likely to make the most of both opportunities.

The European Union is from a political sphere of influence that runs counter to the 'New Nationalism' of Putin, Trump and Brexit. To ally more closely with the European Union makes logical sense for Saudi Arabia, as the European Union's views of immigration, Assad and Iran are not dissimilar with the conservative kingdom's own views.

China, though not a fan of Islamism, would share benefit from allying more closely with Saudi Arabia regarding oil. With Trump set to 'take their [Iraqi] oil,' (namely increase American oil relations with Iraq) previous oil deals between China and Iraq would be decreased substantially. Previous oil deals between America and Saudi Arabia would also be decreased substantially.

While Iran would provide some oil, it would not be enough for the gigantic Asian power. China would perhaps be able to move into America's shoes in Saudi Arabia, dominating much of the Arabian Gulf and being the largest importer of Saudi oil.

China, like Russia and Trump's America, benefits from a stable Middle-East. With Russia set to stabilize Syria and Trump to stabilize Iraq, China would perhaps be able to show its force in stabilizing what is likely to be an unstable Saudi Arabia.

This likelihood is increased by a further strengthening of Pakistani-Chinese relations under a Trump Administration.


Pakistan has similar threats from Trump as Saudi Arabia, though not as immediate. Trump, likely to withdraw from Afghanistan after solidly smashing the Taliban in 2017, would after 3 - 5 years return to fix an even more unstable Afghanistan. The reason for Trump's likely withdrawal is two-fold: first, the war on terror has other priority battlegrounds which need dealing with first, namely in Syria, Iraq and Libya; second, American public opinion no longer supports the Afghan war as it once did.

If Trump can show he wishes to rebuild American infrastructure and deal successfully with the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya, American public is unlikely to hold him as accountable for a worse Afghanistan. Namely, if Afghanistan explodes before the 2020 elections, it would unlikely affect Trump's popularity should America, Syria, Iraq and Libya recover.

Trump has said that his problem with the Afghan War is mainly Pakistan over Afghanistan. Trumps sees that Pakistan deliberately destabilizes Afghanistan through an increase in terrorism there. Trump would likely have an unfavourable policy towards Pakistan in order to stabilize Afghanistan. This would likely drive Pakistan more fully into China's embrace.

Pakistani-Chinese relations are currently good, and are only set to improve under a Trump Administration. With Trump able to stabilize Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan as an ally, it couldn't be a better deal for the American people, and couldn't be a better example of Trump foreign policy.

the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda

I predict that Trump will do more to end the war on terror than Bush and Obama put together.

In light of this, what is the future of ISIS and Al-Qaeda?

Those who have read my previous posts would note that ISIS and Al-Qaeda are both about to suffer the worst defeats in their histories in Syria at the hands of Russia. Russia has fought an historic 'Iraq War in reverse,' which has greatly reversed the tide of radical Islamism in Syria.

With Trump agreeing - rightly so, might I add - to the direction and implication of Russian intervention in Syria, Al-Qaeda and ISIS are unlikely to have a substantial presence in Syria. Assad is the ultimate antidote to radical Islam in Syria.

Previously I have stated that ISIS, getting routed in Sirte, would not disappear forever in Libya. But Trump's likely plan of installing Haftar Al-Khalifa as the Libyan dictator would cause ISIS and Al-Qaeda to both be substantially weakened in North Africa as well.

But what of Iraq? Iraq depends very much on what Trump means to do there. If Trump 'takes their oil,' as he said he would in his campaign, Iraq would stabilize. (It should be noted here that in Trump language, 'take their oil' means increasing oil relations with Iraq. This would definitely stabilize Iraq substantially.)

If Trump wages war on the Iranian elements of the Iraqi government, Trump is doomed to failure. The best thing Trump can do - and his likely policy, might I add - is increase the use of American soft-power in Iraq to stabilize it, not change the regime there.

In the interim, as Iraq recovers, ISIS would still have a foothold in the country. They would try and destabilize Iraq - depending on how Trump reacts to it would depend on whether or not Iraq stabilizes.

With ISIS virtually non-existent in Syria and weakened in Iraq, it would have a different goal: provoking civil war in Saudi Arabia.

Scarily, ISIS has perhaps the perfect platform from which to destabilize Saudi Arabia. ISIS borders Saudi Arabia in Iraq; ISIS sleeper cells are already established in the northern provinces of Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia is preoccupied by a fruitless war in Yemen; the Saudi economy is currently weaker than in decades; and to top it all off, Mohammed Bin Salman is the perfect candidate for America's dupe, the personification of American influence in Saudi Arabia.

ISIS' future is sealed, forcing the world into a no-win situation. If ISIS is left unchecked in Iraq and Syria, it would destroy 2 beautiful countries and their minorities, and threaten the stability of neighbouring countries. But if ISIS is destroyed in Syria and Iraq, Iran looks the winner to the Arabs, causing Saudis and other Gulf countries to rally to ISIS' call and bitterly fight their governments.

But the second option is preferable. It's the option Russia and America have chosen in Putin and Trump. ISIS' new target after Iraq and Syria is, of course, Saudi Arabia, which it may even succeed in obtaining.

But what of Al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda is likely to have a resurgence. With its complete destruction in Syria and Libya, Al-Qaeda would invest more heavily in Yemen, giving Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) priority in funding. AQAP needs only for Yemen to go into famine in order to drastically increase appeal in Yemen. It already has much appeal in that it is not as barbaric or cruel as ISIS - if it continues its powerful soft-power policies, AQAP would exponentially grow in power in Yemen as Al-Qaeda crumbles in Libya and Syria.

Trump is unlikely to wage war against Saudi interests in Yemen. Like Obama, Trump would quietly support Saudi's war in Yemen, even should it cause Al-Qaeda to grow substantially in Yemen.

Not only would Al-Qaeda resurge in Yemen, but in Afghanistan as well. With Trump planning on withdrawing from Afghanistan - which, I might add, should have been done by Obama after the death of Osama Bin Laden - America would be set to return there in 3 - 5 years.

Trump would not make the mistake Obama did. Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Obama did almost exactly that in Iraq and Syria: he withdrew from Iraq while funding 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' in Syria, giving us ISIS.

Trump would not fund the Taliban in Pakistan while withdrawing from Afghanistan. Instead, Trump would withdraw from Afghanistan as Obama should have withdrawn from Iraq: Trump would not fund extremism next door.

But the Taliban would still resurge in Afghanistan after 3 - 5 years of troop withdrawal - not only so, but with a lack of places for Islamists to wage jihad under a Trump Administration (no longer able to in Iraq, Syria or Libya), foreign fighters would fight in Afghanistan instead. A resurgent Al-Qaeda is likely to fight on the Taliban's side in Afghanistan after America leaves.

But at the moment, radical Islam is widespread across Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan. A reduction in terror safe havens would of course benefit the Middle-East and decrease terrorism in the region.

But in place of unstable Syria, Iraq and Libya would be a more unstable Yemen and Afghanistan, benefitting Al-Qaeda's vision immensely in the region.

Even worse is when Saudi Arabia implodes. When Saudi Arabia implodes, all other previously known conflicts in recent memory will pale in comparison. We will see sights of blood we have not seen since the days of World War 2. You think the current Iraqi-Syrian conflict is bad? The Saudi conflict will be much, much worse, and ISIS in Saudi Arabia will reach new pits of depravity yet unseen in our generation.

Trump's Foreign Policy PART TWO

In my earlier post, "Trump's Foreign Policy," I suggested that Trump might install a dictator in Afghanistan and play the waiting game in Libya.

I wish to take it back and say the opposite: that Trump might install a dictator in Libya and play the waiting game in Afghanistan.

The Afghan War is the longest and one of the most unpopular wars in American memory. To spend much longer in Afghanistan would make Trump more unpopular. Since his foreign policy motto is to "get out of the nation-building business" and "focus on stability," he is likely to stabilize other countries first before trying to stabilize Afghanistan.

In any case, an exploding Afghanistan (caused by American troop removal) represents a much smaller regional threat to American assets than does an exploding Iraq, Syria or Libya.

Rather than stabilizing Afghanistan, it seems more likely that Trump, Russia and Iran would stabilize Syria by letting the legitimate Assad government remain to destroy ISIS. Though Assad victory in Syria strengthens Iran, Iran would be faced with an unstable Afghanistan on its eastern border. Such instability would only increase once America left, and would be a valuable bargaining chip for Trump against Iran.

As well as this, Trump would, in his words, "bomb the hell out of ISIS" in Iraq and Syria and "take their [Iraqi] oil." In Trump language this means destroy ISIS and increase oil relations with Iraq instead of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In Libya Trump has a valuable opportunity to cast himself as having a blueprint for American foreign policy. Comparatively, there has not been as much time in Libya since intervention (2011), compared to Afghanistan (2001) which again makes it easier to stabilize Libya over Afghanistan.

Unlike Afghanistan, in Libya there is already a potential dictator fighting on the ground: Haftar Al-Khalifa. All Trump would have to do is scrap the "Unity Government of National Salvation" (which has no power anyway) and give power back to the previously legitimate Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa. Trump supporting the Tobruk-based government and Haftar Al-Khalifa would likely stabilize Libya drastically.

Libya represents a large threat to the stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Trump stabilizing Libya would increase relations substantially between America and those countries.

An unstable Afghanistan represents a threat to stability for Pakistan and Iran in particular, which is also better for America. Iran is anti-American, so a threat to their stability is in America's interest. A threat to Pakistan forces Pakistan to rely more heavily on America. This is good considering Pakistan is one country that does - but should not have - nuclear weapons.


The negative behind America leaving Afghanistan would be a more radical Taliban emerging in 3 - 5 years. This, together with increased Al-Qaeda strength in Yemen, would put Al-Qaeda back on the map. Yet, like Iraq, it's what the American people are willing to accept for the price of getting out of the war.

A post-war unstable Afghanistan would only strengthen how Trump would look to the American people. The American people would be able to compare Trump's results in a stable Iraq, Syria and Libya with those of Obama and Bush, seen visibly in a continually deteriorating Afghanistan.


Such might increase Trump's popularity, causing him to come back for a second Presidential term and finish the war in Afghanistan for good, by installing a dictator on top. Then America would truly be out of the "nation-building business" and stability would return to those regions of the Middle-East.

Yemen: the next Islamic State

Taken from the 21st of August, 2015

For the past 5 months, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in the attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power.  In the subsequent chaos of the Yemeni Civil War, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both Hadi’s forces and the Shi’ite Houthi rebels.

And it isn’t ISIS.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining most out of the chaos of the Yemeni civil war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War, AQAP is building its momentum as a direct result of Saudi airstrikes on the Houthi rebels. And like ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is underestimated by the group utilizing them.

Though not directly supported by the United States, ISIS did help achieve America’s objectives in Syria by weakening the Assad government and, until the group invaded Iraq, was mostly left alone by the United States. The terror group, which has since taken over half of Syria and over a quarter of Iraq, claims to be a Caliphate, owing the allegiance of all Muslims, and asks all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Likewise, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been directly supported through Saudi intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Yet the result of Saudi’s airstrikes has been the emergence of AQAP as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.

It is unlikely that AQAP will attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes AQAP are working with have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an allegiance with Iraqi Ba’ath Party militants disenfranchised with America’s vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS’ aims in establishing a caliphate.

In Yemen, the largest non-governmental force pitted against the Houthis is the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement seeks to break unity with Northern Yemen and return Yemen to two states. As of now, Hadi’s forces and the Southern Movement are working together to defeat the Houthis. However, once the Houthis are no longer a threat to Southern Yemen, the Southern Movement is likely to fight the Hadi government for independence. Alone, it is unlikely the Southern Movement would succeed. However, were AQAP to join the Southern Movement on their endeavour, independence would become more likely. AQAP would, subsequently, establish a vice grip over the region, and cause the Southern Movement to be indebted to the group.

ISIS, on the other hand, is unlikely to develop much presence in Yemen. They will likely continue their bombings of Zaidi mosques in Yemen, and possibly establish a temporary foothold in Sunni Northern Yemen.

But AQAP is likely to desire to expand its influence, and there is a clever way in which AQAP could do this while still supporting the Southern Movement:

AQAP could claim parts of Sunni Northern Yemen as belonging to Southern Yemen.

Along the west coast of Northern Yemen there are a number of Sunni regions which could be coaxed to the side of both the Southern Movement and AQAP. This could mean the end not only of Yemen as a whole, but of any chance of Houthi or Hadi dominance in the foreseeable future, which is exactly what AQAP wants.

In this case, AQAP would not even need to invade Sana’a to control Yemen; all they would need would be to take the Sunni regions from Northern Yemen to weaken Hadi and Houthi influence. Then, for the first time in many years, Southern Yemen would prevail as stronger than Northern Yemen.

The unfortunate thing is that, like ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and like the Taliban in Afghanistan, America is unlikely to realise the extent of the threat AQAP poses until it is too late. Though marked as the most active of the Al-Qaeda franchises in its attacks on the West, the group may be heading for attacks in a completely different region.

Saudi Arabia is a country despised by both ISIS and Al-Qaeda for its alliance with America and its control of the holy cities Mecca and Medina. As ISIS grows stronger in Syria and Iraq, it is likely to turn more of its attention to Saudi Arabia. If ISIS invades Saudi Arabia from the north, AQAP might take advantage of the instability and launch an invasion from the south. If that happens, there will be little America can do to save the region.

Trump Is President. What's Next?

Well, Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States of America. What stands as next for the Middle-East?


It would be naive to think that a Trump Presidency would not be at least slightly hawkish. The Obama Administration is currently involved in 3 major conflicts: the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS, the Afghan War and the Libyan War on ISIS. I wish to provide the likely direction for each of them.

1) the Iraqi-Syrian War on ISIS

It will be swift and quick. In Syria, Trump will either cooperate with Russia or withdraw from Syria and let Russia defeat ISIS. The first seems more likely, as Trump would likely want himself seen as making "great deals," and one of those great deals would be to destroy ISIS in Syria and restore better relations with Russia. Both of these objectives would be achieved with Trump's plan: Assad's army is the largest capable fighting force against ISIS, and Russia, Syria and Trump would all benefit from an ISIS defeat at the hands of Assad.

In Iraq, the fight may be equally swift, but how Trump acts after defeating ISIS in Iraq will be telling. Trump's idea for "safe zones" in Syria funded by Turkey and the Gulf States is a long shot - a very long shot. However, safe zones in Iraq would be something that Turkey and the Gulf States would be - perhaps - more comfortable with.


Unless incredibly hawkish, Trump is likely to use some "soft-power" policies to increase Iraq's stability. One such would be the increased trade of oil between Iraq and America - such increased trade could benefit both Iraq's economy and America's. Trump has talked about "taking Iraqi oil," but in Trump language that means increasing oil trade with Iraq. He has also said he would not take Saudi oil if they refused to comply with his ISIS' strategy. Trump's "soft power" Iraqi oil policy would also benefit America should Saudi Arabia destabilize. (More about the destabilization of Saudi Arabia later).

If not "soft-power" policies, Trump might arrange for a Turkish guardianship of Iraq should the country destabilize again. This would mean that the Trump Administration would not have to return to Iraq, and Turkey would be sucked into the conflict instead.

2) the Afghan War

Like Obama in Iraq, Trump seems likely to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. This might be preceded by a solid smashing of the Taliban before they go, but other than that, there is no immediate desire to recreate the political fabric of Afghanistan for the third time in 40 years.

And, like Iraq, this would cause a massive problem of instability for Afghanistan within 3 - 5 years of American withdrawal. Perhaps a resurgent Taliban would emerge - perhaps ISIS - or perhaps, as I believe most likely, something even worse.

This would give Trump a chance to return to Afghanistan and smash out whatever terrorist organisation had taken root in the country, but to do so from only the skies, as Obama did in Iraq. With more American public support for the war, he would likely then try and work out how to install a dictator in Afghanistan, as dictatorship is the only likely alternative to more terrorism growing in the region.

3) the Libyan War on ISIS

In the beginning, Trump would not do a lot - he would want to see how his plan to defeat ISIS plays out in Syria and Iraq first. Yet Trump would work out, rather quickly, that Haftar Al-Khalifa is his best shot at a stable Libya. He would then use Al-Khalifa to flatten ISIS in the region, as well as the pockets of Islamist militias who are of the same mind as ISIS.

Like Iraq, Trump would likely increase oil production from Libya, to get America further and further away from Saudi oil. That, coupled together with a dictatorship under Haftar Al-Khalifa, gives Trump one of the best shots at an "American first" military victory.


I would also like to take the time to mention Yemen and Saudi Arabia, briefly.

4) Yemen.

It seems unlikely Trump would get involved in the Yemeni-Saudi conflict at all, save do what the Obama Administration is doing already: supply arms to Saudi Arabia in bombing Yemenis.

Of course this would only increase Al-Qaeda's power in Yemen. Trump may turn a blind eye to the Yemeni conflict for a time as he deals with ISIS, getting America out of Afghanistan and instability in Libya, but eventually Al-Qaeda will become too strong in Yemen to ignore.

This, so it seems to me, would lead Trump not to directly fight in Yemen, but to get another world power involved in fighting this sensitive war. Perhaps Russia, perhaps Britain - but it would be a war fought against Al-Qaeda, benefitting the Houthis and outraging Saudi Arabia.

5) Saudi Arabia

Trump's policies are nothing short of disastrous for Saudi Arabia. If Trump does as he has said he would, Syria would remain an ally of Iran, Iraqi-American relations would increase (benefitting the Shi'ite government in Iraq - remember Saudi is Sunni and Sunnis don't like Shi'ites) and with both Libya and Iraq supplying America with oil - together with America's own fracking, oil industries going up under a Trump Administration - Saudi economy would look less and less certain, as America would have far less need for cheap Saudi oil.

(Trump's Afghanistan has a silver lining for Saudi Arabia, as does Trump's non-intervention in Yemen, but these are lesser conflicts compared to Syria and Iraq in particular, both which Saudi would gain nothing from.)

This would make it perfect for internal explosion and chaos. With terrorism decreased in Iraq, Syria and Libya as a result of Trump policy, the increase would happen elsewhere: namely Yemen, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

It is hard to know what a Trump Administration would do were civil war to break out between terrorists and Saudis. On the one hand, a terrorist takeover of Saudi Arabia would legitimize Trump's war on terror in one way, increase relations between many Arab countries and Israel (as these countries would look for security against a terrorist-controlled Saudi Arabia), and on the other hand, having Mecca and Medina in the hand of terrorists explodes legitimacy for them, which is a huge blow to the war on terror in another way.

The likely idea is that Trump would keep the war going as long as possible between Saudi Arabia and the terrorists, as Obama did in Syria.



Anyway, only one way to know for certain: watch as the drama unfolds in 3 months' time.