Compromising on Turkey for stability and balance: Trump's grand strategy

In the previous two articles in our series, we examined the respective grand strategies of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. In this third installment, we will examine the American grand strategy for the Middle-East.


US President Donald Trump is fixated on surpassing his predecessor, Barrack Obama. In the Middle-East, this means regional stability and balance - and balance means a larger role for Turkey.

President Trump inherited seven conflicts from his predecessor. Of these, stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq are the highest priority, since they have cost the most for America financially and militarily. Almost every other US move in the region has stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq in mind.

For its part, Afghanistan is extremely difficult to stabilize. One of the ways the US has worked towards stability is through the Lapiz Lazuli transit route. Turkey is the main partner in the transit route, which connects Afghanistan to Europe via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. This deal ensures that in the event of a US withdrawal, Afghanistan might just be able to become economically independent of other, larger nations like Iran, Pakistan and Russia. Economic independence gives Afghanistan more ability to confront terrorist groups and prevent a Taliban takeover.

The Lapiz Lazuli transit route is a crucial reason the US has given Turkey lots of regional autonomy. Turkey has been toeing the line with Afghanistan and, as a result, its own strategy for cracking down on Iran by proxy in Syria has been endorsed by the US. Even though defeat of the Syrian opposition is inevitable, Turkey delaying this defeat ensures that Iran spends more and more of its precious resources there.

The main reason the Trump Administration has put maximum pressure on Iran and Syria - apart from nuclear concerns - is because of Iraq. Since the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been the major beneficiary and this, in turn, has completely destabilized Iraq. But substantial economic pressure on Iran and Syria gives Iraq maximum opportunity to pivot away from Iran and towards US allies in the region, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

But the tide has been turning against autocratic nations like the UAE and Saudi Arabia in favour of Turkey for some time now. The autocrats have failed to end the wars in Libya and Yemen, and this is causing President Trump to explore other options. In December 2019 Turkey signed an agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord and intervened against autocrat-backed Haftar Al-Khalifa. Meanwhile, Turkey is also increasing humanitarian assistance and funding for Yemenis linked to Al-Islah, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While Jared Kushner may have pushed for UAE-backed hegemony in the Middle-East as the best way to help Israel, President Trump seems to be making compromises with Turkey to restore political balance in the region. Should Turkey politically control all of Libya and Yemen, Russia would have its influence contained to Syria, Iran would lose Yemen, and Turkey would be more amicable to political stability in Afghanistan and Iraq in the US' favour.

With Libya and Yemen lost, the autocrats would have little choice but to compromise further to US interest in Afghanistan and Iraq. This compromise would only increase the likelihood of Iran being forced out of Iraq and of a stable Afghanistan. Such a result would end five of the seven wars inherited from the Obama Administration, and allow for a geostrategic balance not seen in the Middle-East since before the Iraq War.

However, relations between the autocratic wing of the Middle-East and Turkey are hostile. Even should Afghanistan and Iraq be stabilized and out of Iran's reach, a Turkey-controlled Libya and Yemen increases the likelihood of instability erupting out of Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, would challenge the Trump doctrine as never before, and give Turkey the ability to tip the balance of the Middle-East in its own favour.

Compromising on Syria for vengeance: Erdogan's Grand Startegy

Since the attempted coup of July 2016, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has been fixated on vengeance against the autocratic wing of the Middle-East.

Turkey has been growing weary of the United States and her allies since the beginning of the Arab Spring. From 2011, Turkey was shouldering most of the burden behind training and equipping the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian government, while the United States refused to act militarily. In 2013, a military coup changed Egypt from Turkish ally to nemesis and, in 2014, the United States decided to use the Kurds in their fight against ISIS in Syria.

But for President Erdogan, it was the parallels between Egypt in 2013 and Turkey in 2016 which were the most alarming. US ally the United Arab Emirates backed both the Egyptian military coup and the attempted military coup in Turkey, and Saudi Arabia strongly backed the UAE in these efforts. With signs that the autocratic wing of the Middle-East increasingly had the ear of the United States, it was President Erdogan's decision to compromise with Russia, instead of the US, to yield better results.

Turkish compromise with Russia benefited both parties enormously. Since the Russian-Turkish partnership began, ISIS has been dislodged from all of Syria; Syrian rebels have been moved from various enclaves into Idlib; the US' hold on the Syrian Kurds has been weakened substantially and, recently, the southern half of Idlib was taken back by the Syrian government.

But Russia achieved these only at a price palatable to Turkey. For example, until recently the southern half of Idlib, though devoid of rebels, still had Turkish observation posts throughout - until Turkey intervened in Libya. After Turkey propped up the Government of National Accord in western Libya, Turkey removed its observation posts and ceded control of southern Idlib to the Syrian government.

What seems to be happening is that Turkey is compliant with Russia in Syria only if it receives adequate compensation for doing so. This explains why there is Russian interference across the Middle-East: Russia is using its influence over other Middle-Eastern countries as leverage for Syria. Russian support for Haftar in Libya and the Houthis in Yemen, therefore, is conditional on support for Bashar Al-Assad by regional players.

Crucially, this means that Turkey is likely to, eventually, allow Bashar Al-Assad to regain control over all of Syria - but in return, Russia will likely have to cede to Turkey control of two other nations mired in conflict: Libya and Yemen. Since Russia, Iran and Syria are all under US sanctions and since the autocratic wing of the Middle-East is largely subservient to the United States, Turkey is the only other power that Russia can rely on to attain its vision for Syria.

The reason President Erdogan is eyeing both Libya and Yemen in exchange for Syria goes deeper than influence, though: both Libya and Yemen have a UAE-backed autocratic force vying for control of the country. For Turkey, military intervention in both Libya and Yemen is personal. It is intervention against proxies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, nations that supported the attempted military coup of July 2016.

Should Turkey succeed in exchanging all of Syria for political control of Libya and Yemen, the autocratic wing of the Middle-East would feel the very pressure that they had once applied to Turkey upon their own heads. After Libya and Yemen, Turkey would do all it could to erode autocratic influence elsewhere - and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular would have much to fear from a vengeful Tayyip Erdogan.

Compromising on Libya for Idlib: Putin's grand strategy

Recently, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan sent arms, Syrian militias and his military in support of Libya's Government of National Accord. By doing so, President Erdogan saved the Libyan government from General Haftar's forces, which were marching on the capital Tripoli. Such a move was long ago predicted in our Forgotten Middle-East blog.

By contrast, in February this year Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces clashed with those in Syria's Idlib. Dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed. In retaliation, Turkey unleashed a barrage on approaching Iranian and Syrian targets, only to be stopped by a cease-fire deal reached between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian strategy has always been to get Turkey on side in Syria. That Turkey still refuses to compromise suggests that President Putin has not yet offered sufficient compensation to justify Turkish loss of Idlib. To accomplish this, Russia is likely to compromise on Libya.

Turkey is trying to gain drilling rights for gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the presence of the Government of National Accord is consolidated over all of Libya, Turkey would no longer be isolated diplomatically in their dispute. Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece all oppose Turkey sharing in the gas reserves of the Mediterranean, and all support Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya's east.

Russia, meanwhile, has largely supported Haftar Al-Khalifa in concordance with Egypt. But Russia has also encouraged dialogue between Haftar and the Government of National Accord, and its priority remains fixed on Syria. President Putin would not hesitate to seal the fate of Haftar Al-Khalifa if the result was a net gain for Syria.

The Government of National Accord consolidating all of Libya would pose a serious threat to Egyptian President Abdul Feteh As-Sisi. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would be revived and supported from Libya which, in turn, would force President Sisi to turn to Russia for help. This provides President Putin with his perfect opportunity.

The only place where Egypt could strike back at Turkey successfully would be in Syria, where the war is nearing its end. Although overt military support is unlikely, diplomatic pressure from Egypt on regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US could see support for Idlib dropped in favour of a settlement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

For the autocratic wing of the Sunni Middle-East - Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular - losing Haftar in Libya would force a strategic rethink. With Iran under sanctions and Iraq in anti-Iran protests, the autocrats would perceive Turkey as the greater threat to regional stability. This, in turn, only increases the likelihood of a settlement in Syria in favour of Bashar Al-Assad - himself an autocrat - and would once again demonstrate the genius of Russian President Vladimir Putin in his approach to foreign policy.

The Dangers of Modi's India for the West

Coronavirus is the greatest gift China could have given to Narenda Modi's India.

Since 2016, India has been the main beneficiary of the Brexit/Trump era. Since Donald Trump became President of the United States, he has been working hard to strengthen alliances in Asia - not only with South Korea and Japan, but also with India. Additionally, as Britain is leaving Europe, Boris Johnson is turning his attention to improve ties and trade with the once Crown Jewel of the British Empire.

But although India has been called the world's largest democracy, there are legitimate reasons to be suspect of the Modi government. Its track record of human rights abuses towards its minorities are substantial and, until there was international outcry, this policy continued unabated. Today, Narenda Modi continues to harass and displace India's Muslim minority, but there is no reason to suspect that he will not once again return his attention to other minorities once India has grown more powerful.

The Coronavirus outbreak has only accelerated trends that were already well under way from the beginning of the Brexit/Trump era. The world is rejecting globalism and, with it, China's role as a key cornerstone in the global system. What is now accelerating is the speed at which the west is disassociating from China. This will bring more manufacturing jobs from China back to western countries' shores, but it is also very likely to bring more manufacturing power to India.

India is likely to take China's place as the manufacturing hub of the western world. But, like China, India's government is suspect. Some reports link the way Modi's party Bharatiya Janata rose to power with that of Nazism. Though calling right-wing movements like Brexit and the Trump Presidency Nazi is exaggerated rhetoric, Bharatiya Janata's policies of discrimination based on religion and ideology herald back to the German regime much more strongly than either movement in Britain or the US. Bharatiya Janata is a political ideology that sees Hinduism as truly Indian and, therefore, has no qualms with discriminating against other minorities that are not Hindu.

What seems likely to happen is this: as the US and wider western world continues to decline and a Cold War with China heats up, India will take over more of the western world apparatus in the political, economic and military spheres. This is reminiscent of Britain handing over military bases to the United States throughout the Second World War, leaving the United States as the primary superpower of the western world. Unfortunately for the west, Narenda Modi's India would be a very different sort of superpower to the United States.

It is entirely possible - and even likely - that once sufficiently strong enough, India will eventually turn on her allies to take more resources and force the western world to break apart. This has been a pattern throughout history. Some have speculated on a Chinese invasion of Australia. Unfortunately for Australia, in the current circumstances an Indian takeover is much more likely.

The only real hope is that the Indian populace will vote out Modi's government and a more moderate government will take control of India. But it will only be at that time the western world will know for sure just how much the link between Bharatiya Janata and Nazism is justified.

Missiles and Protests - how US policy to weaken Iran is working

On September 14th 2019, missiles hit the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, which damaged oil production and dampened prospects for international investment so crucial for Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision. Iran-allied Houthis in Yemen claimed responsibility, but Saudi Arabia, the US and others blamed Iran.

Little over two weeks later protests erupted in Iraq, demanding an end to corruption and incompetence which has classed the political elite since the Iraq War. On the 17th of October, little over a month after the Abqaiq/Khurais attack, protests also erupted in Lebanon against their own leadership class.

Contrasting previous administrations, the Trump Administration has kept remarkably silent about the Lebanese and Iraqi protests. To the majority of pundits, this suggests indifference to the suffering in Lebanon and Iraq. Far more likely, however, is that everything is going exactly as planned for the Trump Administration, and any show of US support could spoil the movements in either country, which are currently leveling their frustrations against corrupt political elites backed by Iran.

While Iran - whether by proxy in Iraq or Yemen or directly from its own country - had to resort to missiles and drones to strike at US interests in Saudi Arabia, the Trump Administration is showing it does not need boots on the ground nor does it need resort to conventional warfare to further its aims in weakening Iran. The Trump Administration is using finance and economic warfare to siege Iran, which is weakening its hold on Iraq and Lebanon and eliciting protests in both countries.

To add to the quagmire, on the 16th of November Iranians also began to protest, this time because of their own rising fuel prices. The leadership in Tehran are stuck: on one hand, they could turn their scarce finances to better the lives of ordinary Iranians, but doing so would mean losing their foothold in countries like Iraq and Lebanon. To so obviously focus on domestic policy over foreign policy would mean publicly conceding that the Trump Administration's economic warfare on Iran - to change its behaviour - is working.

In this case, having proxies has worked against Iran: in the past, proxies in these countries - Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi in Iraq - have prevented war from arriving on Iranian borders; currently, with such crippling economic sanctions and an unwillingness to change its foreign policy, these proxies have become a financial drain for the Iranian regime and a source of frustration for the Iranian people.

While the protests in Iran are unlikely to materialize into any substantial gains this time around, in Iraq and Lebanon the situation looks very uncertain. Of the three countries, Iraq is the most likely to experience regime change away from Iran - in Lebanon, the country could be plunged back into civil war. The difference between Iraq and Lebanon is that Iraqis have been suffering under the more appalling conditions since 2003, and so Iraqis are more likely to have the grit to emerge victorious against the Iranian proxies in their country. In Lebanon, the people are less likely to want to fight hard against Iranian proxies like Hezbollah should civil war ensue. In fact, such a war might propel Hezbollah into a position of even more centralized leadership.

In Iraq, the government has little real power to stop the momentum of these protests. Cosmetic changes to Iraqi leadership will no longer suffice. Far more likely is a regime overhaul, with an anti-Iran leader rising to power, realigning with its Arab neighbours and forcing Iranian proxy Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi to choose between Iraq and Iran.

All of this keeps Iran very much occupied with affairs closer to home and less concerned with provoking the US by attacking oil facilities like those in Abqaiq and Khurais. Iran holds much hope in outlasting the Trump Administration. But should Donald Trump get reelected in 2020, protests in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran will be just the beginning of an avalanche that will redefine the Middle-East as we know it.

Why Mohammed Bin Salman and Congress are destined for a collision course

Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, has lost the support of the US Congress.

The straw which broke the camel's back was the murdering of Khasoggi, a pro-Muslim Brotherhood journalist in Istanbul - who also happened to be an American citizen. It is the Congress' response to the murder of an American citizen that Bin Salman failed to factor in to his plan of assassination: now Bin Salman's whole vision for Saudi Arabia is under threat.

For some who watch the Middle-East, the removal of the current Crown Prince would come as a welcome a relief. However, the damage has already been done. With his political rivals locked up at home and his father very elderly, Mohammed Bin Salman's ouster at this time is more likely to exacerbate instability in the Middle-East than calm it.

It is this that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a champion support for Mohammed Bin Salman, fears, though - as with previous Israeli support for conflicts in Iraq and Syria - it must be pointed out that Israel sanctioned these policies with short-sighted thinking that has only served to strengthen regional adversary Iran rather than weaken her.

Should economic pressure be measured against Saudi Arabia to cause the resignation of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, Mohammed Bin Nayyef, the previous Crown Prince, is the most likely candidate to replace him. However, what is concerning is that King Salman himself might resign should his son be forced to do so. Mohammed Bin Salman has often been seen as the "go to" to make deals with King Salman.

More worryingly still: Mohammed Bin Salman may not leave Saudi Arabia without a fight. Should that occur, Saudi Arabia will explode same as Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan before her, but instead extremist groups will be within sight of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

At this stage, Congress' condemnation of Crown Prince Salman will destine them for a collision course between American and Saudi foreign policy - but this collision may result in the mother of all conflicts for the heart of the Middle-East.

Iran and Saudi politics realigned in Iraq

Following on from the previous article, (http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2017/07/iran-ikhwan-and-salafi-politics.html) this article will explore Saudi Arabia and the UAE's role in Iraq at the behest of the Trump Administration.

From the beginning, the Trump Administration has been pushing for Iran to be rolled back in the Middle-East. And this has been tied to its strong, firm support to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Due to Russian intervention in Syria, Iran's position has been solidified there. Though Israel and the US are exerting pressure on Russia to force an Iranian withdrawal, it is far more likely the US will be forced into its own withdrawal from the Kurdish enclave in the north-east. Syria, Iran, Russia and Turkey are all united in their opposition to the US/Kurdish presence in north-eastern Syria.

Yet with Russia and Iran invested so heavily in Syria, in Iraq US' plans for pushing back Iran are more likely to succeed, especially since Saudi Arabia and the UAE are becoming increasingly invested in Iraqi politics. Firebrand cleric Muqtada As-Sadr, whose coalition secured the most seats in the election earlier this year, visited Saudi Arabia before the elections' results and met with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

Such a visit, coupled with other cooperation initiatives between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has been widely hailed by Iraqis, as Iraq being closer to Saudi Arabia would see it reintegrated into the Arab world. Iraq has been an outsider since the Gulf War in 1991; with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, Syria has become the new outsider in the Arab world, and this in turn has given Iraq and Saudi Arabia more incentive to repair ties.

The Crown Prince's bold initiatives in Iraq benefit his own country's struggle against Iran. Mohammed Bin Salman is showing Shi'ite Arabs across the region that he is not against them or Shi'ism inasmuch as he is against the Shi'ite religious establishment in Qom, Iran. For Saudi Arabia, allying more closely with Iraq turns the Saudi-Iran conflict from Shi'ite-Sunni (a conflict Saudi Arabia has largely lost) into a conflict between Persians and Arabs, a conflict more likely to invigorate Iraqis and place them by Saudi Arabia's side.

This helps decrease the risk for Saudi Arabia from its own Shi'ite minorities. It gives Saudi Arabia flexibility to maintain an even harsher stance against Iran - for example, it could ban all Saudis from visiting Iran while increasing the ease of travelling to Shi'ite sites in Iraq. It may also, in the long-term, give Saudi Arabia Shi'ite allies in its war against the Houthis in Yemen.

Iraq's internal struggle, therefore, is becoming increasingly bitter and contested. After the Iraqi election, Saudi Arabia, the United States and the UAE put their support behind Abadi's Nasr coalition, Muqtada As-Sadr's Sa'eroon coalition and the various Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties. This has led to increased threats from the pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi political structure.

The result has been, as of the parliamentary meetings in the 3rd of September, that the largest block has been formed from the Shi'ite coalitions Nasr, Sa'eroon, Wataniya and Hikmah, together with various smaller Sunni Arab coalitions. Both the Kurdish parties and the pro-Iran coalitions Fateh and State of Law, headed by Ameri and the notorious Nouri Al-Maliki, have refused to join the largest political block. So far, it looks as if the Saudi/Emirati/US plan is working.

However, recent Iraqi protests against poor services in Shi'ite city Basra have caused lead coalitions Fateh and Sa'eroon to call for the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. Whether this will break up the Nasr coalition from the largest political block is unclear. What is clear is that if the political block survives, Haider Al-Abadi will not remain the Prime Minister.

This would not be such a bad scenario for the US. If Haider Al-Abadi does not remain the Prime Minister, then it is likely that one of the members of the Sa'eroon coalition will become the next Prime Minister. This would be even worse for Iran than if Abadi secured a second term.

The other reason support for an Iraq independent of Iran is likely produce dividends is the Middle-East's water crisis. Syria, Turkey and Iran have all made dams which have drastically reduced water supply to Iraq. This has been one of the reasons for the protests in Basra: the water there is undrinkable. The Basrawis rightly point out that Iran is a large part of the problem, because Iranian and Turkish dams have cut off most of their water supply.

With Turkey, Iran and Syria all emerging as adversaries to the US and Saudi Arabia, geopolitically Iraq fits in better with the Saudi/Emirati/US camp. To be deprived of water will force Iraq into a position of animosity towards those neighbours depriving it of water.

But Iraq's path to be rid of Iranian interference will not be easy. In all likelihood Iraq will experience yet another civil war, one which will stamp out Iran's proxies one by one in long, bloody battles.