Russia-US thaw to be mediated by India, Turkey - Analysis

 

It is no secret that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump want a thaw in relations between their countries. Should Donald Trump be reelected, Cold War with China would ensue and a trade deal with Russia would be reached.

The Covid-19 pandemic provides President Trump with the perfect opportunity for economic restructuring on a global scale.

Before Donald Trump was elected President, the global economy was built on the principles of Richard Nixon. In 1979, the US observed that relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China were at an all-time low. Then US President Richard Nixon to seized upon the rift as an opportunity: economically ally with China to "triangulate" against the Soviet Union. Within ten years of implementing this strategy, the Soviet Union went bankrupt.

Ever since, Communist China has fed off the western economic system like a vampire. Although the vast majority of Chinese companies are privately owned, the Chinese Communist Party still has overall strategic control. Its economic rise, too, is largely due to the economic trading surpluses it has enjoyed over its US-allied trading partners.

But after Donald Trump became President, the United States started calling out China on its unfair trading practices and encouraged US allies to do the same. As the US economy became stronger, the Chinese economy became weaker, forcing it into its worst recession since 1979. This might have been the cause for the Chinese Communist Party turning a blind eye to the Coronavirus pandemic, allowing it to spread worldwide.

But should Donald Trump be reelected November this year, China's economic woes would get much worse. Not only would President Trump decouple the US economy from China's - he would "triangulate" US economics with Russia. Then the Second Cold War would really heat up.

Today, Russia's major partners China, Iran and Syria are all under US sanctions, and if President Trump is reelected, Chinese dominance over Iran at Russia's expense would be secured. In a new strategic partnership, China and Iran would have have a vested interest in seeing the US return to Afghanistan after temporary withdrawal and would also a vested interest in propelling Hezbollah into power in Lebanon.

But in neighbouring Syria and in Afghanistan, Russia and the US have strategic partners in common: respectively Turkey and India. Although neither country is particularly democratic, they each serve as an unofficial link between Russia and the US and might see deals between the two larger powers mediated in exchange for a loosening of US sanctions on Russia.

If President Trump reaches a second term, he would want to withdraw from Syria - but only if Iran and Hezbollah also withdraw. Since China would dominate Iran at Russia's expense, it makes sense that Russia would be allowed by China and the US to dominate Syria at Iran's expense. The trade-off for Russian consolidation in Syria would be China and Iran consolidating control over Lebanon, something the US would disapprove of but Russia could hardly influence.

For Afghanistan, if China and Iran foment instability there and fund the Taliban to march on Kabul, the collective interests of India, Russia and the United States would be threatened. This might see not only a reentry of the US but also of the US-led Indo-Pacific partners into Afghanistan, to send a clear warning to China and to Iran. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific partners might seek a further partnership with Russia, much as Turkey has a partnership with Russia in Syria and Libya. This would challenge Chinese and Iranian influence in Afghanistan as never before.

However, larger agreement between Russia and the US would not be limited to a trade deal, to Afghanistan and Syria: additionally, the two larger powers would have to reach a compromise on Ukraine. The US might agree to recognize Russian control of the Crimea and agree to have no opinion on the governance of Ukraine, effectively isolating Ukraine as Taiwan was isolated through the One China Policy. In this scenario, a Ukrainian alternative to the Taiwan relations act could be flouted by US Congress, to keep Russia away from meddling further in Ukraine but to establish precedent for an easing of relations and trade.

In the past, President Trump was open to doing a trade deal with China - but the Covid-19 pandemic changed his mind. In the near future, a trade deal between the United States and Russia might see triangulation in reverse: instead of the high tensions between Russia and the US and compromise on China, a second term of the Trump Administration would see high tensions with China, yet peace at last between Russia and America.

Strategic Withdrawal: Trump's Historic Opportunity

Given the Chinese malevolence during the Coronavirus pandemic and the Hong Kong protests, it is most urgent that President Donald Trump strikes a deal with Vladimir Putin, strategically withdraws from Europe and redeploys forces to Taiwan and the Pacific.

As with Britain during the Second World War, the United States is no longer able to defeat her enemies everywhere.

During the Second World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was forced into prioritizing the Battles for the Mediterranean and the Atlantic over the growing Japanese threat in the Pacific. While it is possible that Nazi Germany could have been defeated by the Soviet Union alone, what is undeniable is that Churchill's decision to engage Nazi Germany at the expense of Japan meant that Hitler - and, by extension, the Holocaust - was stopped in 1945 rather than years later. Without Winston Churchill, the Nazis might have exterminated all of European Jewry.

Today, US President Donald Trump finds himself in a position rather similar to that of Churchill. The United States no longer has the ability to wage war on all fronts as it had during the Cold War, and is finding itself increasingly isolated from its European partners. Recently, European allies deserted the United States by abstaining from extending the weapons ban on Iran, which meant China and Russia were able to veto the extension unopposed.

Today, Europe is no longer the centre of global geostrategy. The iron curtain is gone; the Soviet Union is no more and Vladimir Putin's Russia, although dangerous, is by far the lesser threat compared with Xi Jinping's Communist China. It is imperative that the United States withdraw at least some of her forces from Europe, to better prioritize the crucial battles for influence which will undoubtedly be fought in the Pacific and in the Middle-East.

The Middle-East is on fire. US withdrawal from Middle-Eastern countries is risky and problematic, as was demonstrated when Barrack Obama withdrew from Iraq only to return three years later in 2014. While the United States will probably withdraw from Afghanistan over the next year, in all likelihood forces will be redeployed to Afghanistan before the end of President Trump's second term.

Meanwhile China is looking to increase its influence in the Middle-East. A draft of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked recently to the international press. This draft gives the world an idea of what is likely to happen should - as is likely - Donald Trump be reelected President. If Donald Trump is reelected, China will put pressure on the United States' interests in the Middle-East in addition to the Pacific.

Should the US be forced into remaining in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would put strain on its overall position in the Middle-East. Should Saudi Arabia erupt in instability (as looks increasingly likely), the United States would be able to do little in the way of military support. If Iran and the US go to war, the war would have to be limited to operations against Iran-backed forces in the Arabian Gulf, in Iraq and/or in Afghanistan. If China and Iran plot a coup in Lebanon which lands Hezbollah in power, as also appears likely, the United States would be unlikely to send troops there.

Of all the possible conflicts the United States might engage in, Taiwan is the most critical of them all. The Chinese Communist Party has long desired to invade Taiwan and unite it to mainland China. Should China succeed in this (as, unless the United States makes alternative security arrangements, looks likely) the balance of the Asia Pacific would be irrevocably tipped in China's favour. The future of Asia and the United States depends on the defense of Taiwan.

Because the loss of Taiwan would be the tipping point for the power struggle in Asia, it is imperative that the United States looks again at its geostrategic position. It is unlikely to be able to disengage from Iraq or Afghanistan in the long-term - but approximately 320,000 American troops are based in Europe. If half of these were withdrawn from Europe and instead sent to Taiwan, Japan and the South China Sea, Asia's future would be secured until the conclusion of the Second Cold War.

But such a sizable US withdrawal from Europe is impossible without dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Granting Russia concessions on Syria, Crimea and sanctions in exchange for a US troop withdrawal would see tensions on the European front ease significantly. The last 40 years have seen the United States compromise with China to defeat the Soviet Union and Russia. It is now time for the United States to compromise with Russia in order to defeat the Chinese Communist Party, to prevent China from remaining the enormous threat to the United States' homeland that it is today.

ISIS coup in Saudi Arabia: how Turkey would reclaim Mecca and Medina

It is no secret that President Erdogan covets a rebirth of the Ottoman Empire. To add Arabia to his empire, President Erdogan would detonate the Middle-East Time Bomb - and then clean up the mess afterwards.

Alistair Crooke was correct when he pointed out that the real aim of ISIS is to replace the Sauds as Emirs of Arabia, and that this is a Middle-East Time Bomb waiting to explode. This blog has long contended that ISIS is likely to rebirth in the Arabian Peninsula - specifically, in the territories of Saudi Arabia - and, in the words of Alistair Crooke, "there is really almost nothing the West can now do about it but sit and watch."

But what should be additionally noted is that Turkey has the most to gain of any power from a Middle-East Time Bomb explosion. The only way to make sure the Al-Saud royal family loses their control of Mecca and Medina is to complete the "Salafization" process - namely, allowing Saudi Arabia to be (temporarily) ruled by ISIS, the most rigid practicers of Salafi Islam, instead of by the Al-Saud family, which has compromised its Salafi interpretation. Only after this would Hanafi Muslim Turkey be able to step in and take back their "legitimate right" as emirs of Arabia and ouster the ISIS imposters.

Russian interference in Syria has guaranteed Turkey to lose all influence there. However, cooperation with Russia's Syrian project has almost certainly assured Turkey political control of Libya. As Turkish-backed rebels have lost more and more territory in Syria, many of these fighters have been shipped to Libya by Turkey to fight against Haftar and Egypt. These, unfortunately, include fighters that have in the past fought under the banner of ISIS.

With Syrian rebels, ISIS fighters, Somali and Yemeni rebels now working as mercenaries for Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord, it is not hard to see how these could later be deployed to Yemen to fight against the Houthis, to give Turkey a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula. For one thing, it is unlikely that the GNA would want hard line jihadist fighters to stay in Libya - for another, Yemen's Houthis are extremely tough fighters and could only be dislodged by fighters of equal tenacity.

Turkey must gain control of all of Libya before it could intervene decisively in Yemen. Libya shares a land border with Sudan, another Turkish ally, so the fighters could be moved from Libya to Sudan by land and then from Sudan to Yemen by sea. With foreign mercenaries safely away from Libya and Turkey, there would be little risk to these nations for further instability caused by foreign fighters. With the fighters out of Libya, Turkish military, navy and air force could set up a substantial amount of bases on Libya's coast.

Should President Erdogan successfully outmaneuver his opponents in Libya and Yemen, there is nothing to stop him from pushing his luck even further in Saudi Arabia. Most of the mercenaries fighting for Turkey would not hesitate to don ISIS' black garments once more and declare jihad on Saudi Arabia. But rather than ISIS fighting Saudi Arabia directly and risk the wrath of the United States, it would be more prudent (and more typical) for Turkey to facilitate and finance an ISIS coup on Saudi Arabia from within the kingdom.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is deeply unpopular at home. Although he is strongly supported by the US, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Mohammed Bin Salman has weakened the Saudi economy, engaged in a Yemeni war he cannot win and has been a key figure in the blockade against Qatar. Many of his actions have had a destabilizing impact on the region and, unlike President Sisi's Egypt, Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia has not yet had any sort of revolution against its rulers.

As long as King Salman is alive, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will end up in chaos. But should he die and his son Mohammed be named king, there are many from the tribes, religious teachers and leadership in Saudi Arabia who would not hesitate to help Turkey instigate a coup to land ISIS in power. They would want to do this to humiliate Mohammed Bin Salman, force him out of office and, in the long term, return Saudi Arabia to its status quo.

However, after an ISIS takeover, President Erdogan would have no intention of returning Mecca and Medina to the Al-Saud family. Should ISIS take control of Riyadh, the United States would likely occupy the oilfields in eastern Arabia and put pressure on regional actors to take the fight to ISIS directly. Turkey would only concede to help fight against ISIS if it was guaranteed a larger share of influence in its stead.

Turkey may decide that the best way to help bring Arabia under its sway would be to call for a non-Salafi democracy there, to prevent an ISIS resurgence. Though certainly not interested in democracy, such a project would be cover for Turkey to exert a Muslim-Brotherhood-controlled government in the heart of Arabia. Turkey has engaged in similar policy in Egypt, Syria and Libya during the Arab Spring.

Until such a time as Turkey were appeased, it would be near impossible to drive ISIS out of Arabia. ISIS has deep ideological roots there, and of all the regional actors, only Turkey has the military, political and economic capacity to destroy them. But should the United States learn that Turkey was responsible for backing the ISIS coup in the first place, the war between them in Arabia could drag on for many, many years.

Compromising on Turkey for stability and balance: Trump's grand strategy

In the previous two articles in our series, we examined the respective grand strategies of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. In this third installment, we will examine the American grand strategy for the Middle-East.


US President Donald Trump is fixated on surpassing his predecessor, Barrack Obama. In the Middle-East, this means regional stability and balance - and balance means a larger role for Turkey.

President Trump inherited seven conflicts from his predecessor. Of these, stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq are the highest priority, since they have cost the most for America financially and militarily. Almost every other US move in the region has stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq in mind.

For its part, Afghanistan is extremely difficult to stabilize. One of the ways the US has worked towards stability is through the Lapiz Lazuli transit route. Turkey is the main partner in the transit route, which connects Afghanistan to Europe via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. This deal ensures that in the event of a US withdrawal, Afghanistan might just be able to become economically independent of other, larger nations like Iran, Pakistan and Russia. Economic independence gives Afghanistan more ability to confront terrorist groups and prevent a Taliban takeover.

The Lapiz Lazuli transit route is a crucial reason the US has given Turkey lots of regional autonomy. Turkey has been toeing the line with Afghanistan and, as a result, its own strategy for cracking down on Iran by proxy in Syria has been endorsed by the US. Even though defeat of the Syrian opposition is inevitable, Turkey delaying this defeat ensures that Iran spends more and more of its precious resources there.

The main reason the Trump Administration has put maximum pressure on Iran and Syria - apart from nuclear concerns - is because of Iraq. Since the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been the major beneficiary and this, in turn, has completely destabilized Iraq. But substantial economic pressure on Iran and Syria gives Iraq maximum opportunity to pivot away from Iran and towards US allies in the region, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

But the tide has been turning against autocratic nations like the UAE and Saudi Arabia in favour of Turkey for some time now. The autocrats have failed to end the wars in Libya and Yemen, and this is causing President Trump to explore other options. In December 2019 Turkey signed an agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord and intervened against autocrat-backed Haftar Al-Khalifa. Meanwhile, Turkey is also increasing humanitarian assistance and funding for Yemenis linked to Al-Islah, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While Jared Kushner may have pushed for UAE-backed hegemony in the Middle-East as the best way to help Israel, President Trump seems to be making compromises with Turkey to restore political balance in the region. Should Turkey politically control all of Libya and Yemen, Russia would have its influence contained to Syria, Iran would lose Yemen, and Turkey would be more amicable to political stability in Afghanistan and Iraq in the US' favour.

With Libya and Yemen lost, the autocrats would have little choice but to compromise further to US interest in Afghanistan and Iraq. This compromise would only increase the likelihood of Iran being forced out of Iraq and of a stable Afghanistan. Such a result would end five of the seven wars inherited from the Obama Administration, and allow for a geostrategic balance not seen in the Middle-East since before the Iraq War.

However, relations between the autocratic wing of the Middle-East and Turkey are hostile. Even should Afghanistan and Iraq be stabilized and out of Iran's reach, a Turkey-controlled Libya and Yemen increases the likelihood of instability erupting out of Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, would challenge the Trump doctrine as never before, and give Turkey the ability to tip the balance of the Middle-East in its own favour.

Compromising on Syria for vengeance: Erdogan's Grand Startegy

Since the attempted coup of July 2016, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has been fixated on vengeance against the autocratic wing of the Middle-East.

Turkey has been growing weary of the United States and her allies since the beginning of the Arab Spring. From 2011, Turkey was shouldering most of the burden behind training and equipping the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian government, while the United States refused to act militarily. In 2013, a military coup changed Egypt from Turkish ally to nemesis and, in 2014, the United States decided to use the Kurds in their fight against ISIS in Syria.

But for President Erdogan, it was the parallels between Egypt in 2013 and Turkey in 2016 which were the most alarming. US ally the United Arab Emirates backed both the Egyptian military coup and the attempted military coup in Turkey, and Saudi Arabia strongly backed the UAE in these efforts. With signs that the autocratic wing of the Middle-East increasingly had the ear of the United States, it was President Erdogan's decision to compromise with Russia, instead of the US, to yield better results.

Turkish compromise with Russia benefited both parties enormously. Since the Russian-Turkish partnership began, ISIS has been dislodged from all of Syria; Syrian rebels have been moved from various enclaves into Idlib; the US' hold on the Syrian Kurds has been weakened substantially and, recently, the southern half of Idlib was taken back by the Syrian government.

But Russia achieved these only at a price palatable to Turkey. For example, until recently the southern half of Idlib, though devoid of rebels, still had Turkish observation posts throughout - until Turkey intervened in Libya. After Turkey propped up the Government of National Accord in western Libya, Turkey removed its observation posts and ceded control of southern Idlib to the Syrian government.

What seems to be happening is that Turkey is compliant with Russia in Syria only if it receives adequate compensation for doing so. This explains why there is Russian interference across the Middle-East: Russia is using its influence over other Middle-Eastern countries as leverage for Syria. Russian support for Haftar in Libya and the Houthis in Yemen, therefore, is conditional on support for Bashar Al-Assad by regional players.

Crucially, this means that Turkey is likely to, eventually, allow Bashar Al-Assad to regain control over all of Syria - but in return, Russia will likely have to cede to Turkey control of two other nations mired in conflict: Libya and Yemen. Since Russia, Iran and Syria are all under US sanctions and since the autocratic wing of the Middle-East is largely subservient to the United States, Turkey is the only other power that Russia can rely on to attain its vision for Syria.

The reason President Erdogan is eyeing both Libya and Yemen in exchange for Syria goes deeper than influence, though: both Libya and Yemen have a UAE-backed autocratic force vying for control of the country. For Turkey, military intervention in both Libya and Yemen is personal. It is intervention against proxies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, nations that supported the attempted military coup of July 2016.

Should Turkey succeed in exchanging all of Syria for political control of Libya and Yemen, the autocratic wing of the Middle-East would feel the very pressure that they had once applied to Turkey upon their own heads. After Libya and Yemen, Turkey would do all it could to erode autocratic influence elsewhere - and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular would have much to fear from a vengeful Tayyip Erdogan.

Compromising on Libya for Idlib: Putin's grand strategy

Recently, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan sent arms, Syrian militias and his military in support of Libya's Government of National Accord. By doing so, President Erdogan saved the Libyan government from General Haftar's forces, which were marching on the capital Tripoli. Such a move was long ago predicted in our Forgotten Middle-East blog.

By contrast, in February this year Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces clashed with those in Syria's Idlib. Dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed. In retaliation, Turkey unleashed a barrage on approaching Iranian and Syrian targets, only to be stopped by a cease-fire deal reached between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian strategy has always been to get Turkey on side in Syria. That Turkey still refuses to compromise suggests that President Putin has not yet offered sufficient compensation to justify Turkish loss of Idlib. To accomplish this, Russia is likely to compromise on Libya.

Turkey is trying to gain drilling rights for gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the presence of the Government of National Accord is consolidated over all of Libya, Turkey would no longer be isolated diplomatically in their dispute. Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece all oppose Turkey sharing in the gas reserves of the Mediterranean, and all support Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya's east.

Russia, meanwhile, has largely supported Haftar Al-Khalifa in concordance with Egypt. But Russia has also encouraged dialogue between Haftar and the Government of National Accord, and its priority remains fixed on Syria. President Putin would not hesitate to seal the fate of Haftar Al-Khalifa if the result was a net gain for Syria.

The Government of National Accord consolidating all of Libya would pose a serious threat to Egyptian President Abdul Feteh As-Sisi. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would be revived and supported from Libya which, in turn, would force President Sisi to turn to Russia for help. This provides President Putin with his perfect opportunity.

The only place where Egypt could strike back at Turkey successfully would be in Syria, where the war is nearing its end. Although overt military support is unlikely, diplomatic pressure from Egypt on regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US could see support for Idlib dropped in favour of a settlement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

For the autocratic wing of the Sunni Middle-East - Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular - losing Haftar in Libya would force a strategic rethink. With Iran under sanctions and Iraq in anti-Iran protests, the autocrats would perceive Turkey as the greater threat to regional stability. This, in turn, only increases the likelihood of a settlement in Syria in favour of Bashar Al-Assad - himself an autocrat - and would once again demonstrate the genius of Russian President Vladimir Putin in his approach to foreign policy.

The Dangers of Modi's India for the West

Coronavirus is the greatest gift China could have given to Narenda Modi's India.

Since 2016, India has been the main beneficiary of the Brexit/Trump era. Since Donald Trump became President of the United States, he has been working hard to strengthen alliances in Asia - not only with South Korea and Japan, but also with India. Additionally, as Britain is leaving Europe, Boris Johnson is turning his attention to improve ties and trade with the once Crown Jewel of the British Empire.

But although India has been called the world's largest democracy, there are legitimate reasons to be suspect of the Modi government. Its track record of human rights abuses towards its minorities are substantial and, until there was international outcry, this policy continued unabated. Today, Narenda Modi continues to harass and displace India's Muslim minority, but there is no reason to suspect that he will not once again return his attention to other minorities once India has grown more powerful.

The Coronavirus outbreak has only accelerated trends that were already well under way from the beginning of the Brexit/Trump era. The world is rejecting globalism and, with it, China's role as a key cornerstone in the global system. What is now accelerating is the speed at which the west is disassociating from China. This will bring more manufacturing jobs from China back to western countries' shores, but it is also very likely to bring more manufacturing power to India.

India is likely to take China's place as the manufacturing hub of the western world. But, like China, India's government is suspect. Some reports link the way Modi's party Bharatiya Janata rose to power with that of Nazism. Though calling right-wing movements like Brexit and the Trump Presidency Nazi is exaggerated rhetoric, Bharatiya Janata's policies of discrimination based on religion and ideology herald back to the German regime much more strongly than either movement in Britain or the US. Bharatiya Janata is a political ideology that sees Hinduism as truly Indian and, therefore, has no qualms with discriminating against other minorities that are not Hindu.

What seems likely to happen is this: as the US and wider western world continues to decline and a Cold War with China heats up, India will take over more of the western world apparatus in the political, economic and military spheres. This is reminiscent of Britain handing over military bases to the United States throughout the Second World War, leaving the United States as the primary superpower of the western world. Unfortunately for the west, Narenda Modi's India would be a very different sort of superpower to the United States.

It is entirely possible - and even likely - that once sufficiently strong enough, India will eventually turn on her allies to take more resources and force the western world to break apart. This has been a pattern throughout history. Some have speculated on a Chinese invasion of Australia. Unfortunately for Australia, in the current circumstances an Indian takeover is much more likely.

The only real hope is that the Indian populace will vote out Modi's government and a more moderate government will take control of India. But it will only be at that time the western world will know for sure just how much the link between Bharatiya Janata and Nazism is justified.

Missiles and Protests - how US policy to weaken Iran is working

On September 14th 2019, missiles hit the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, which damaged oil production and dampened prospects for international investment so crucial for Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision. Iran-allied Houthis in Yemen claimed responsibility, but Saudi Arabia, the US and others blamed Iran.

Little over two weeks later protests erupted in Iraq, demanding an end to corruption and incompetence which has classed the political elite since the Iraq War. On the 17th of October, little over a month after the Abqaiq/Khurais attack, protests also erupted in Lebanon against their own leadership class.

Contrasting previous administrations, the Trump Administration has kept remarkably silent about the Lebanese and Iraqi protests. To the majority of pundits, this suggests indifference to the suffering in Lebanon and Iraq. Far more likely, however, is that everything is going exactly as planned for the Trump Administration, and any show of US support could spoil the movements in either country, which are currently leveling their frustrations against corrupt political elites backed by Iran.

While Iran - whether by proxy in Iraq or Yemen or directly from its own country - had to resort to missiles and drones to strike at US interests in Saudi Arabia, the Trump Administration is showing it does not need boots on the ground nor does it need resort to conventional warfare to further its aims in weakening Iran. The Trump Administration is using finance and economic warfare to siege Iran, which is weakening its hold on Iraq and Lebanon and eliciting protests in both countries.

To add to the quagmire, on the 16th of November Iranians also began to protest, this time because of their own rising fuel prices. The leadership in Tehran are stuck: on one hand, they could turn their scarce finances to better the lives of ordinary Iranians, but doing so would mean losing their foothold in countries like Iraq and Lebanon. To so obviously focus on domestic policy over foreign policy would mean publicly conceding that the Trump Administration's economic warfare on Iran - to change its behaviour - is working.

In this case, having proxies has worked against Iran: in the past, proxies in these countries - Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi in Iraq - have prevented war from arriving on Iranian borders; currently, with such crippling economic sanctions and an unwillingness to change its foreign policy, these proxies have become a financial drain for the Iranian regime and a source of frustration for the Iranian people.

While the protests in Iran are unlikely to materialize into any substantial gains this time around, in Iraq and Lebanon the situation looks very uncertain. Of the three countries, Iraq is the most likely to experience regime change away from Iran - in Lebanon, the country could be plunged back into civil war. The difference between Iraq and Lebanon is that Iraqis have been suffering under the more appalling conditions since 2003, and so Iraqis are more likely to have the grit to emerge victorious against the Iranian proxies in their country. In Lebanon, the people are less likely to want to fight hard against Iranian proxies like Hezbollah should civil war ensue. In fact, such a war might propel Hezbollah into a position of even more centralized leadership.

In Iraq, the government has little real power to stop the momentum of these protests. Cosmetic changes to Iraqi leadership will no longer suffice. Far more likely is a regime overhaul, with an anti-Iran leader rising to power, realigning with its Arab neighbours and forcing Iranian proxy Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi to choose between Iraq and Iran.

All of this keeps Iran very much occupied with affairs closer to home and less concerned with provoking the US by attacking oil facilities like those in Abqaiq and Khurais. Iran holds much hope in outlasting the Trump Administration. But should Donald Trump get reelected in 2020, protests in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran will be just the beginning of an avalanche that will redefine the Middle-East as we know it.

Why Mohammed Bin Salman and Congress are destined for a collision course

Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, has lost the support of the US Congress.

The straw which broke the camel's back was the murdering of Khasoggi, a pro-Muslim Brotherhood journalist in Istanbul - who also happened to be an American citizen. It is the Congress' response to the murder of an American citizen that Bin Salman failed to factor in to his plan of assassination: now Bin Salman's whole vision for Saudi Arabia is under threat.

For some who watch the Middle-East, the removal of the current Crown Prince would come as a welcome a relief. However, the damage has already been done. With his political rivals locked up at home and his father very elderly, Mohammed Bin Salman's ouster at this time is more likely to exacerbate instability in the Middle-East than calm it.

It is this that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a champion support for Mohammed Bin Salman, fears, though - as with previous Israeli support for conflicts in Iraq and Syria - it must be pointed out that Israel sanctioned these policies with short-sighted thinking that has only served to strengthen regional adversary Iran rather than weaken her.

Should economic pressure be measured against Saudi Arabia to cause the resignation of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, Mohammed Bin Nayyef, the previous Crown Prince, is the most likely candidate to replace him. However, what is concerning is that King Salman himself might resign should his son be forced to do so. Mohammed Bin Salman has often been seen as the "go to" to make deals with King Salman.

More worryingly still: Mohammed Bin Salman may not leave Saudi Arabia without a fight. Should that occur, Saudi Arabia will explode same as Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan before her, but instead extremist groups will be within sight of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

At this stage, Congress' condemnation of Crown Prince Salman will destine them for a collision course between American and Saudi foreign policy - but this collision may result in the mother of all conflicts for the heart of the Middle-East.

Iran and Saudi politics realigned in Iraq

Following on from the previous article, (http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2017/07/iran-ikhwan-and-salafi-politics.html) this article will explore Saudi Arabia and the UAE's role in Iraq at the behest of the Trump Administration.

From the beginning, the Trump Administration has been pushing for Iran to be rolled back in the Middle-East. And this has been tied to its strong, firm support to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Due to Russian intervention in Syria, Iran's position has been solidified there. Though Israel and the US are exerting pressure on Russia to force an Iranian withdrawal, it is far more likely the US will be forced into its own withdrawal from the Kurdish enclave in the north-east. Syria, Iran, Russia and Turkey are all united in their opposition to the US/Kurdish presence in north-eastern Syria.

Yet with Russia and Iran invested so heavily in Syria, in Iraq US' plans for pushing back Iran are more likely to succeed, especially since Saudi Arabia and the UAE are becoming increasingly invested in Iraqi politics. Firebrand cleric Muqtada As-Sadr, whose coalition secured the most seats in the election earlier this year, visited Saudi Arabia before the elections' results and met with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

Such a visit, coupled with other cooperation initiatives between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has been widely hailed by Iraqis, as Iraq being closer to Saudi Arabia would see it reintegrated into the Arab world. Iraq has been an outsider since the Gulf War in 1991; with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, Syria has become the new outsider in the Arab world, and this in turn has given Iraq and Saudi Arabia more incentive to repair ties.

The Crown Prince's bold initiatives in Iraq benefit his own country's struggle against Iran. Mohammed Bin Salman is showing Shi'ite Arabs across the region that he is not against them or Shi'ism inasmuch as he is against the Shi'ite religious establishment in Qom, Iran. For Saudi Arabia, allying more closely with Iraq turns the Saudi-Iran conflict from Shi'ite-Sunni (a conflict Saudi Arabia has largely lost) into a conflict between Persians and Arabs, a conflict more likely to invigorate Iraqis and place them by Saudi Arabia's side.

This helps decrease the risk for Saudi Arabia from its own Shi'ite minorities. It gives Saudi Arabia flexibility to maintain an even harsher stance against Iran - for example, it could ban all Saudis from visiting Iran while increasing the ease of travelling to Shi'ite sites in Iraq. It may also, in the long-term, give Saudi Arabia Shi'ite allies in its war against the Houthis in Yemen.

Iraq's internal struggle, therefore, is becoming increasingly bitter and contested. After the Iraqi election, Saudi Arabia, the United States and the UAE put their support behind Abadi's Nasr coalition, Muqtada As-Sadr's Sa'eroon coalition and the various Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties. This has led to increased threats from the pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi political structure.

The result has been, as of the parliamentary meetings in the 3rd of September, that the largest block has been formed from the Shi'ite coalitions Nasr, Sa'eroon, Wataniya and Hikmah, together with various smaller Sunni Arab coalitions. Both the Kurdish parties and the pro-Iran coalitions Fateh and State of Law, headed by Ameri and the notorious Nouri Al-Maliki, have refused to join the largest political block. So far, it looks as if the Saudi/Emirati/US plan is working.

However, recent Iraqi protests against poor services in Shi'ite city Basra have caused lead coalitions Fateh and Sa'eroon to call for the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. Whether this will break up the Nasr coalition from the largest political block is unclear. What is clear is that if the political block survives, Haider Al-Abadi will not remain the Prime Minister.

This would not be such a bad scenario for the US. If Haider Al-Abadi does not remain the Prime Minister, then it is likely that one of the members of the Sa'eroon coalition will become the next Prime Minister. This would be even worse for Iran than if Abadi secured a second term.

The other reason support for an Iraq independent of Iran is likely produce dividends is the Middle-East's water crisis. Syria, Turkey and Iran have all made dams which have drastically reduced water supply to Iraq. This has been one of the reasons for the protests in Basra: the water there is undrinkable. The Basrawis rightly point out that Iran is a large part of the problem, because Iranian and Turkish dams have cut off most of their water supply.

With Turkey, Iran and Syria all emerging as adversaries to the US and Saudi Arabia, geopolitically Iraq fits in better with the Saudi/Emirati/US camp. To be deprived of water will force Iraq into a position of animosity towards those neighbours depriving it of water.

But Iraq's path to be rid of Iranian interference will not be easy. In all likelihood Iraq will experience yet another civil war, one which will stamp out Iran's proxies one by one in long, bloody battles.

Autocracy forces Jordan away from Saudi Arabia

As the Gulf crisis enters its second year, the Middle-East's increasingly autocratic landscape is turning countries like the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan towards Qatar and the Ikhwan.

The UAE's autocratic vision for the Middle-East has never looked stronger. In Egypt, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown and replaced by Abdul-Feteh As-Sisi in 2013. In 2014 Libyan strongman Haftar Al-Khalifa took control of the Libyan Army and set up a rival autocratic government in Tobruk. Since the start of the Yemen war, the UAE has been strengthening the Southern Movement under Aidarious Az-Zubaidi, to facilitate the fragmentation of Yemen into two states, with the southern state being autocratic and pro-UAE. Anti-autocratic Qatar has been boycotted by a significant number of its neighbours.

Yet the crown jewel to UAE's autocratic vision has been the support it has lended to Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, which has set Saudi Arabia on the path to autocracy and away from political Islamism. Mohammed Bin Salman's reforms have allowed the UAE and Saudi Arabia to increasingly see eye-to-eye on a whole range of issues, including Iran, Qatar, Turkey - and even Israel.

Currently, there is a peace agreement being considered by Saudi Arabia and Israel. This peace agreement does not take into account the Palestinian diaspora that desperately desires to return home. There is no larger diaspora of Palestinians than in Jordan. For King Abdullah Hashemi to survive the political fallout of such a deal, seeking aid from Qatar, Saudi Arabia's most bitter Sunni enemy, is the only option.

Jordan has a significant portion of its population that is pro-Ikhwan, the staunch enemy of the Middle-East's autocrat block and politically closer to countries Qatar and Turkey. When other countries denounced the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorism, Jordan refrained. This has incentivised Jordan to take 1 billion dollars' aid from Qatar over and above the 1.5 billion dollars' aid offered by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The two autocratic nations did not provide enough of a financial alternative for Jordan to feel inclined to upsetting its pro-Ikhwan population.

Should a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia come to fruition, it will have to face serious opposition from Qatar in the east as well as Jordan in the north, with both countries supported by Islamist giant Turkey. This, together with the unstable large countries Iraq and Yemen, does not pose well for the future of autocracy in Saudi Arabia.

In this case, it will be the Ikhwan countries which are better shielded from instability than the autocratic ones. By reaching across the aisle to Qatar, Jordan is saving itself from the likely fate of autocratic Saudi Arabia: instability, terrorism and perhaps even regime change.

Iran: Israel's 'Baptism of Fire'

Many pundits often said that it was either an Iran Nuclear Deal or an Iran War. They may be right - but if so, it is unlikely to be US troops on the ground fighting it.

The American public are exhausted of war. President Donald Trump won his historic presidential campaign on an anti-war platform, including lambasting the "big fat mistake" of the Iraq War. If the Iraq War was a big fat mistake for the US, an Iran war would be one of the biggest, "fattest" US conflicts since the Second World War.

In 2013, when President Barrack Obama pushed for a vote in Congress over whether or not to strike the Syrian government, the American public were overwhelmingly against it. Since then, the anti-war sentiment in the United States has not grown weaker, but stronger.

So with a war-weary America, why has President Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal and made war with Iran a possibility in the short-term? Because though he cannot fight this war with current public support, he also knows he is not expected to by his closest ally, Israel - except as a last resort.

Israel, on the other hand, is ready for war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has just been granted overwhelming war powers, granting him the ability to wage war without a cabinet vote. Israel is also being welcomed into the Arab fold by countries Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE in particular, with an Israeli-Palestinian deal pending before full relations are initiated.

Prime Minister Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran and its nuclear deal has culminated into Israel and Iran engaging in a series of military strikes in Syria. Yet with the risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran looming, Prime Minister Netanyahu is unlikely to focus Israel's efforts on merely striking Iran's proxies. The Israeli Prime Minister has often been known for having a "go at it alone" approach to Middle-East affairs, such as when he flew to Washington to condemn the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 at Congress, against President Barrack Obama's wishes.

In an Israeli-Iranian conflict, Israel would not only have the political support of the United States (which Israel did not have under President Obama), but Israel would also be supported by many of its Arab neighbours. In fact, an Israeli war with Iran may just be the 'baptism of fire' required by the Arab states to prove that Israel can vouch for their security. With the rise of Turkey as an adversary to Arab determinism in the Middle-East and beyond, Israel is more likely to garner Arab support should it prove itself in militarily intervening against the enemies of the Arabs, such as Iran.

In such a case, perhaps it is understood by both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu that, in the advent of an Iran War, an Iran-Israeli conflict is the best case scenario for the US, Israel and the wider Middle-East: President Trump would not have to embroil the US in another costly Middle-East conflict, Israel would prove itself capable to protect its Arab partners, and Israeli-Arab relations would soar.

Since its initial fight for survival, the nation of Israel has come a long way with its Arab neighbours. Because of this, the fury of the Israeli military may soon, with Arab support, be directed against Iran, a stark and historic contrast to previous Israeli conflicts.

Mohammed Bin Salman - the Shah of Saudi Arabia

The flourishing relationship between Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al-Saud and the Trump Administration is a foreign policy strategy that has been tried before, to counterbalance growing anti-Israeli resentment and keep US adversaries at bay. And it did not work.

Under the Nixon Administration (1969-1974), ties between the United States and the Shah-led Iran, which were already strong, reached new heights as the pro-American regime continued to bolster its military might through the "blank check" initiative, in which the US would provide enormous amounts of weaponry to the Shah in exchange for large sums of money.

President Nixon chose this path was because British forces withdrew from the Arabian Gulf, which left a vacuous space that the US was unable to fill itself. The vacuum was unable to be filled by the US due to its commitments with the Vietnam War and the Cold War.

Such a geopolitical situation parallels the Trump Administration's dilemma. After President Barrack Obama's disastrous Middle-East foreign policy and with victories still aloof in Afghanistan and Iraq, President Trump has doubled down on achieving victory in the two nations, with much less capacity for dealing with the wider region.

With US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continuing, an extra US ally is needed to support the US ambitions and act as a counterbalance to Iran. The Trump Administration has singled out Saudi Arabia - and, more specifically Mohammed Bin Salman - to protect US interests and keep Iran at bay.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is the favoured future ruler of Saudi Arabia for both the US and Israel. Mohammed Bin Salman's hawkish views on Iran largely match the Israeli and US views. One of the largest arms deals was signed between President Trump and Saudi Arabia and paved the way for stronger relations. It is very likely that the favouritism of the US and Israel for Mohammed Bin Salman was the reason Mohammed Bin Nayyef, the previous Crown Prince, was forced to abdicate.

Under the tacit approval of Mohammed Bin Salman, it is no secret that an Israeli-Palestinian peace process is under way. But this peace process leaves Israel with full control of Palestine and with Israel's capital as Jerusalem, a deal completely unacceptable for the majority of adherents to the Muslim faith. Being anti-Iranian may not be enough for Mohammed Bin Salman to stem outrage at home over a peace deal with Israel supported by his government.

Islamic extremists are already painting Mohammed Bin Salman as the figurehead of everything wrong with Saudi Arabia - indeed, as a figurehead of everything wrong with the Middle-East. Worryingly, the economy under Mohammed Bin Salman's 2030 vision is worsening, with some of the worst recession to hit the conservative kingdom in years occurring in 2017.

Much optimism from pundits about the direction of Saudi Arabia under Mohammed Bin Salman is misguided unless it is rooted in recent history. Under President Nixon, much more emphasis was put on ties between the Shah of Iran and the US, but economically Iran went from bad to worse. Anti-Israeli sentiment was fueled by bad economy and the Shah became the figurehead of everything wrong with Iran. The Nixon policy fueled one of the most anti-American revolutions in history - and armed it, too.

It was some years between President Nixon's terms and the Iranian revolution, and it may be that the Trump Administration is just buying time for Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize before Saudi Arabia implodes.

But history should leave the world in no doubt: explicitly pro-Israeli governments in the Middle-East can only work with a functioning economy or popular leadership. Mohammed Bin Salman, like the Shah before him, will be unable to provide a functioning economy for his country. And the time will come, soon, when Saudi Arabia will be plagued by a revolution, but instead of Ayatollah Khomeini, it will be ISIS, hiding in Iraq, that will lead the revolution.


http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821
https://972mag.com/zionism-and-the-shah-on-the-iranian-elites-evolving-perceptions-of-israel/71699/
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821?page=2
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/07/jared-kushner-mohammed-bin-salman-and-benjamin-netanyahu-are-up-to-something/

The New Middle-East UPDATED

Since the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, the Arab world has undergone its largest geopolitical shifts since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the state of Israel.

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a Shi'ite government in Iraq swung the balance decisively away from the Arab Sunni world and gave Iran a new ally. For the first time in almost 25 years, the United States was once again allied to a Shi'ite Muslim government. The forces unleashed during the Iraq War still haunt the region to this day.

The Obama-endorsed Arab Spring did much to inflame terrorism across the region, particularly in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While withdrawal from Iraq was endorsed at the time, Obama's Syria policy fueled Iraq's worst enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq, turning it into ISIS, a group so brutal that Al-Qaeda disavowed it. Had Obama supported a ceasefire in Syria, it is unlikely ISIS would have grown as large as it did.

Obama's Syrian policy inflamed the instability which spilled over from Iraq. Thankfully, Russia has had a pragmatic approach to Syria. Their Syrian campaign (2015 to present) has seen an historic reduction in violence and terrorism across the entire region. Russia is currently playing the lead role in ending the conflict in Libya, while also strengthening already strong ties with the autocratic government of Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

All 3 Arab countries which suffered from the Obama-era interventions - Egypt, Libya and Syria - are now closer to Russia than ever. President Trump has been unable or unwilling to stop this, given his focus on Afghanistan and Iraq with a war-weary America.

For Libya, President Trump is quoted as saying he would only commit to destroying ISIS there, not to a political settlement. For Syria, the State Department has released a statement that the US will be leaving Syria after they are certain ISIS has been defeated there. Though President Trump has extended his hand in alliance to Egypt, the damage of the last 3 years of the Obama Administration has meant that Egypt has looked on the US with the question: will this alliance outlast President Trump?

President Trump's largest challenges remain the same as those of Presidents Bush and Obama: Iraq and Afghanistan. While the US is engaged militarily in those two countries and initiating its pivot towards Asia, this leaves other regional forces - such as Russia, Iran and Turkey - more space to intervene in other areas of the Middle-East.

These developments have left Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia increasingly vulnerable to instability and chaos. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, the son of the current king, is increasingly being used by Al-Qaeda and ISIS as the figure head of everything wrong with the kingdom. Even the less radical side of Saudi Arabia is appalled at Bin Salman's handling of the Yemeni crisis. Should he descend to the throne, civil war will likely follow him.

With Russia strongly backing autocratic regimes in Egypt, Syria and Libya and strengthening ties with Islamist countries Iran and Turkey, the US is left on the back foot. Their own hold on Turkey is slipping; Iraq and Afghanistan are still unstable after years of intervention and, worst of all, the Arabian Peninsula is creeping towards chaos as terrorism is uprooted from other regions.

This will leave Russia dominating much of the Middle-East, while America will be forced to continue their strategic withdrawal and focus on stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is the new Middle-East: a Middle-East divided between US and Russian influence; divided between Russian-supported autocratic regimes, US-supported democratic institutions and sponsors of terrorism threatened by terrorists returning home disillusioned and beaten.

This New Middle-East heralds the dawn of a new, even more uncertain era.

4 Predictions for Saudi Arabia

In this article I will be outlying a series of predictions for Saudi Arabia over the next 5 years:

1) Mohammed Bin Salman will be forced to abdicate from ruling Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is next in line for the throne after his father, King Salman. However, unlike his father, Mohammed Bin Salman is reforming the country at too fast a rate for the kingdom to cope with.

Not to mention: Bin Salman's foreign policy blunders have been exceptional: from Yemen, to Qatar, to Lebanon - he has shown himself to be too reckless and not measured enough to rule a kingdom as dynamic and conservative as Saudi Arabia.

2) Mohammed Bin Nayef will be made king of Saudi Arabia.

Unlike Mohammed Bin Salman, Mohammed Bin Nayef is the Al Saud family favourite for the throne. Though he has been currently forced to abdicate by his cousin and uncle, the Saudi establishment will look to him to lead the country after the folly of bin Salman's policies has been fully revealed.

3) ISIS will come to Saudi Arabia.

Scarily, Mohammed Bin Salman's push for modernization makes ISIS coming to Saudi Arabia all the more likely. What is even worse is his desire to push for public ties with Israel.

This has happened before: in the 1970's the Shah of Iran pushed for public ties with Israel. That, along with economic instability, led to his downfall in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini took over the country in the Iranian revolution.

A Saudi revolution benefits ISIS, and ISIS only. ISIS is a neo-Ikhwani expansionist project in the tradition of Ibn Abdul Wahhab and, according to Alistair Crooke, after invading Iraq, ISIS inserted a time bomb into the heart of the Middle-East, into Saudi Arabia. Alistair Crooke maintains that the kingdom is more vulnerable to ISIS under a modernizing ruler like Mohammed Bin Salman than under a more conservative ruler like Mohammed Bin Nayef.

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-aim-saudi-arabia_b_5748744.html

4) With ISIS will come war to Saudi Arabia

Whether the Al-Saud royal family will be eventually forced out by ISIS is difficult to assess, but what is likely is that, like Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen in recent years, different Arab tribes will pick different sides. Some will remain loyal to the Saud royal family - some will join with ISIS.

Unlike the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Saudi revolution will quickly turn into a civil war, one in which millions of Muslims will fight, either for or against ISIS. What the Trump Administration does in such a scenario is difficult to assess - American airstrikes on Islamic holy land will further exacerbate such a conflict.

the new Middle-East

Since the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, the Arab world has undergone the largest geopolitical shifts since the Ottoman Empire.

Though responsible for the death of Osama Bin Laden, President Obama's Middle-East strategy has been misguided. The Obama-endorsed Arab Spring did much to inflame terrorism across the Middle-East, particularly in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. While withdrawal from Iraq was endorsed at the time, Obama's Syria policy fueled Iraq's worst enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq, turning it into ISIS, a group so brutal that Al-Qaeda disavowed it. Had Obama supported a ceasefire in Syria, it is unlikely ISIS would have grown as large as they did.

Unlike President Obama, Russia has had a pragmatic approach regarding the Middle-East. Their Syrian campaign (2015 to present) has seen an historic reduction in violence and terrorism across the entire region. Russia is currently playing the lead role in ending the conflict in Libya, while also strengthening already strong ties with the autocratic government of Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Obama's push for democracy across the Middle-East backfired badly. Not only has Russia been consolidating alliances in many Middle-East countries not wanting Obama-doctrine democracy, but President Trump has been, implicitly, welcoming Russian intervention in such countries. The reason for this is that President Trump does not wish to have as large a US footprint internationally as under the Obama or Bush Administrations and wants to focus more on domestic issues.

Not only so, but President Trump has made sure that President Obama's Arab Spring interventions - such as those Libya and Syria - are not engaged militarily by the US in the future and left instead to the Russian sphere of influence. For Libya, President Trump is quoted as saying he would only commit to destroying ISIS there, not to a political settlement. For Syria, the State Department has released a statement that the US will be leaving Syria after ISIS is defeated there.

In spite of this, there is growing tension between Russia and the US in the Middle-East. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has been asking for the removal of Bashar Al-Assad, something Russia is highly unlikely to do, while Russia has also been linked to supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and attempting to gain influence over Iraq. While the war on terror is being won by both President Putin and President Trump, both are doing so in competition - not in harmony - with each other.

President Trump's largest challenges are the same as those of Presidents Bush and Obama: Iraq and Afghanistan. Because Iraq is allied with Iran, it is easier for Russia to try and wrest control of it from the US. However it is more likely that the US will prioritize relations with Iraq and Afghanistan over any other Middle-East nation (with Israel as an exception), to keep them out of Russian hands.

Enter Saudi Arabia. Under the Obama Administration, relations deteriorated badly between the US and the conservative kingdom, due in no small part to the Iran Nuclear Deal and Obama's endorsement of the Arab Spring. Though relations between the Trump Administration and Saudi Arabia are strong currently, there is every reason to suspect that, as Salafi terrorism continues to be funded worldwide by the Saudis, relations between President Trump and Saudi Arabia will sour, and sour quickly.

This will leave Russia dominating much of the Middle-East - Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen - while America will continue make their strategic withdrawal and focus on solidifying relations with Iraq and Afghanistan. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan will likely suffer the most from the American withdrawal, and may end up plagued by instability.

This is the new Middle-East: a Middle-East divided between US and Russian influence; divided between Russian-supported autocratic regimes, US-supported democratic institutions and sponsors of Salafi terrorism under sanctions.

In a Middle-East like this, terrorism may actually be defeated.

Trump's Saudi comment may signal end of long alliance

Earlier today, Donald Trump called on Saudi Arabia to end the Yemeni blockade immediately. Saudi Arabia is currently blocking many food stuffs from entering Yemen, driving the country to famine on an industrial scale.

Added to this strain has been Saudi Arabia slamming Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. That aside, Trump's comments about Yemen have come at a particularly hard time for Saudi Arabia, having just lost Ali Abdullah Saleh as leverage over the Houthis.

It is entirely possible that this is the beginning of the end of the Saudi-US alliance, an alliance which began with the intention of frustrating Soviet ambitions in the Middle-East and curbing their influence. The reason why this may come to an end is two-fold: either Saudi Arabia will cut their losses and become more anti-American, or they will remain pro-American and suffer from plaguing instability.

Saudi Arabia is losing every proxy war they have been engaged in. From Syria, to Iraq, to Yemen, to Afghanistan - their proxies are being defeated and replaced with either pro-American or pro-Iranian forces in the region. As it becomes clearer that Saudi Arabia will not detract itself from Salafi terrorism, the US look to other Middle-East allies as better alternatives, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

If Saudi Arabia end the blockade in Yemen and stop funding for radical Islamic terrorism, it is very likely the Houthis will win the war and Saudi Arabia will be faced with Iranian proxies everywhere. This will cause a geo-political shift unlike any we have seen since the Iranian Revolution in 1979: Saudi Arabia will likely suffer both revolution and civil war, with the clear benefactor being ISIS.

How America respond to such instability in yet another Middle-East country is unclear. What is clear is that the Al-Saud government's rule has never been shakier, and could easily be swept away by instability and chaos.

If John Waver had been Donald J. Trump (2016 - 2017)

This article will focus on where John Waver would have deviated from Donald Trump's own foreign policy of the last twelve months, particularly in how it relates to the Middle-East.

For the most part, Donald Trump has done well in the Middle-East. He has certainly done better than Barrack Obama, though it is contestable as to whether he has done a better job than George W. Bush. This is because like W. Bush, Donald Trump is fighting in a war that cannot be won. George W. Bush fought the Iraq War. Donald Trump is supporting the Saudis in their war on Yemen.

1) John Waver would have withdrawn from Syria as soon as possible.

The American people are war-weary. Like Donald Trump, John Waver would have wanted to minimize the Obama legacy as much as was possible, and one way to do this would be to withdraw from the conflict the US had the least to lose by leaving: Syria.

Syria is complicated. With Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war, regime change in Syria is all but impossible without an exacerbated conflict between Russia and the United States. Simultaneously, John Waver would have pulled all troops and aviation out of Syria, to stop the war on ISIS in Syria, while also withdrawing all funds for the Syrian rebels. That way Russia would have been under further economic and military strain to end the conflict in Syria, keeping them occupied in Syria so the United States could have more breathing space to fix up other problems it has in other areas of the Middle-East.

Temporarily this would have given ISIS a firmer safe haven in Syria, but it would have meant that relations between the US and Turkey would not have deteriorated as rapidly as they have this year. Relations between the two NATO allies have deteriorated largely because the Kurds in Syria have been funded by the US to fight ISIS. Withdrawing all support for the Syrian Kurds would have meant that Turkey would have felt more at ease on its large southern border, and would instead have been able to work out with Russia and Iran how to deal with the ISIS threat in Syria.

2) John Waver would have pushed Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fly sorties against ISIS exclusively in Iraq.

While ISIS in Syria could be dealt with by Russia, Turkey and Iran, ISIS in Iraq would have remained the responsibility of the US. But rather than the US fighting ISIS alone in the air, encouraging allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to fly sorties over Iraq would have been a positive step for the region. While Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been expanding their ties recently, these have largely been after the war against ISIS has been won, and not before then.

Iraq being welcomed earlier into the Arab world would have given Iraq more time to wrest itself free of Iranian control. Such ambition will undoubtedly take years, but Sunni Arab help in Iraq against ISIS would not have gone astray to ending the sectarian bloodletting there.

3) John Waver would have held the same course as Trump in Afghanistan - with one ISIS exception.

One of the things underestimated by the US is the ability to manipulate an intra-jihad war between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In the case of Afghanistan, while Trump's policy is sound, further pressure could be put on the Taliban if it were hammered by not only the US-backed government in Kabul, but also by ISIS militants.

ISIS is small in Afghanistan. Turning a blind eye to it growing in size at the expense of the Taliban would have made it easier for certain tribes within Afghanistan to reconcile themselves with Ashraf Ghani's government. Provided ISIS received no weapons, training, or finance from the US, it could still be used to weaken the Taliban and provide the Afghan Army with further relief.

The Taliban, not ISIS, is the major threat to stability in Afghanistan. Until the Taliban is destroyed, the world will not be safe from the powers that enabled 9-11.

4) John Waver would have divided Yemen into two parts - north and south

The bloodletting in Yemen is beyond a catastrophe. It has happened because Saudi Arabia has felt surrounded by Iranian proxies - across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and now Yemen. President Donald Trump's support of the Yemeni civil war is reprehensible.

Understanding such concerns, but also realizing the limitations of Saudi air power, John Waver would have dissolved the Hadi Government and replaced it with a government headed by the Southern Movement. The Southern Movement, under a UAE-friendly dictatorship, would then be able to drive Al-Qaeda militants out of Southern Yemen and into the north, forcing Al-Qaeda to fight the Houthis until the Houthis accepted Yemen would no longer be two states.

It would be crucially important that food, water and sanitation be allowed into northern Yemen, while the Houthis' own supplies of weapons and military bases would be targeted. This would have helped avoid famine and the current Cholera outbreak in Yemen while also avoiding the current Al-Qaeda safe haven in the south of the country.


Perhaps this would have been more effective than President Trump's foreign policy - perhaps it would have been less effective. It is open for discussion, and overall I am happier with Trump's progress in the Middle-East than with Presidents' Obama and Bush.

With Assad victory certain, Israel's anxieties are growing

For the world, peace in Syria is desirable. For Israel, Syrian peace is a nightmare turned reality.

Like much of the world, Israel was anticipating the fall of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad early in the Syrian civil war. As the conflict continued, Israel continued to condemn the Assad Government and called for rebels to take control of the country. At times Syrian rebels have been treated in Israeli hospitals. At other times, ISIS had been advocated by Israelis as a more desirable neighbour than the Syrian Government.

Like Saudi Arabia, Israel is threatened by the rise of Iran in the region. The war on ISIS has largely benefit the Iran-allied Iraqi government and the Syrian Government, though for both Israel and Saudi Arabia, the recovery of the Syrian Government is the worse predicament. The revival of Bashar Al-Assad means that Hezbollah will continue to be funded, Hamas will continue having dominant support from Iran and Syria and, unlike Iraq, Syria will remain staunchly anti-Israel and anti-American at any cost.

Yet as the Syrian rebels continue to be weakened, both Israel and Saudi Arabia are turning to the Kurds as new proxies. The Kurds remain largely autonomous in both Iraq and Syria, and thus could, theoretically, offer a counterbalance to Iran in the Middle-East. However, all of the Kurds' neighbours are anti-Kurdistan: Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. In Syria, extensive financial aid would be needed for the Kurds to defend themselves from Assad's Government. In Iraq, the chances are better for the Kurds to break off, as the Iraqi government is the weaker link.

Though Benyamin Netanyahu and other Israelis are anxious about the coming end of the Syrian civil war, perspective is needed here. While the Kurds might succeed in breaking off from Iraq and Syria to provide Israel with a new ally, there are other gains for Israel in recent years which should not go unnoticed. Jordan, an Israeli ally, remains stable in spite of neighbouring conflict; Sisi, the President of Egypt, is working with Israel to fight ISIS; Haftar Al-Khalifa, strongman of Libya, is also strengthening ties with Israel. And the Gulf states, set to be plagued by instability, are deepening their ties with Israel as a buffer to the threat of Iran.

But where Israel should look for expansion in ties with Middle-East countries is in Iraq. Iraq is a shadow of its former strength, but it can still act as a front line in the war against Iran. Many Iraqis are sick and tired of Iranian influence in their country, and the country is on the edge of an intra-Shi'ite conflict. Like Saudi Arabia, Israel would do well to work at - very secretly - pursuing closer ties with Iraq to quash an Iranian presence there.

Israel should, however, stop endorsing terror organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda as a better alternative to Iran. Such Israeli policy is most unwise and has alienated parts of the civilized world from them.

How Australia should have handled Iraq and Afghanistan

The following is a post about the course the Australian government should have held in their role in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003.

The dilemma faced by then Australian Prime Minister John Howard was how to stick by the United States through thick and thin, to be a most treasured ally. Unfortunately, engaging in the Iraq War was not an intelligent way to do that.

The Iraq War was a complete disaster. Any gains made in the Afghan War were quickly undone by a war that failed so spectacularly a new terror organization has since emerged, and one more brutal than Al-Qaeda. ISIS was forged in the furnace of the Iraq War.

Australian commitment to Iraq greatly undermined Australia's standing internationally, as it did to Britain and the US. Another approach could have been taken other than destabilizing Iraq.

Instead of committing troops to the Iraq War, Australia should have committed thousands of extra troops to Afghanistan, to free up US military to go into Iraq.

By shouldering more burden in Afghanistan, Australia would have been able maintain its international reputation while also not leaving the US entirely isolated. Afghanistan was a cause worth fighting for - Iraq was not. However, if the US wanted to send more troops to Iraq, Australia could have supported the US by sending more Australian troops to Afghanistan, to ease the US burden as they fought in Iraq.

Such policy is worth considering for the Australian Government, next time a partner makes a foolish decision like President George Bush did in Iraq. Such a decision would show independence, integrity and solidarity, while not engaging in blunders as erroneous as the one Prime Minister John Howard led Australia into.